Lois B. Roberts

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He had forced his way into the complainant's apartment, confined her, and eventually ordered her to watch him masturbate.

The appellant argued that because he did not touch the complainant or verbally threaten her, his actions did not amount to a threat of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in the context of the violent and sexualized atmosphere created by the appellant, his actions constituted a threat to apply force of a sexual nature.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment against him.

The underlying action related to funds advanced by the respondent to the appellant and her daughter to purchase a home, which the appellant claimed were a gift rather than a loan.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the defence, given the appellant's own written communications admitting to the indebtedness and corroborating evidence from a mortgage broker.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference involving a child complainant.

At trial, the complainant's prior consistent statements were introduced to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination on inconsistencies.

The trial judge did not give a limiting instruction warning the jury not to use the prior consistent statements for their truth.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, as there was a real risk the jury would use the statements for an impermissible purpose to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent possessory title over a portion of his beachfront property by way of adverse possession or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the finding of adverse possession because the respondent had not effectively excluded the appellant from the property.

The Court also varied the easement finding, limiting it to non-vehicular traffic on a specific path, as there was no continuous 20-year period of vehicular use.

The trial judge's costs orders, including an order against the appellant's counsel personally, were set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the agent of his paralegal entered a guilty plea against his instructions.

The Crown conceded that the plea was invalid.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision that found the respondents successfully exercised a Put-Right option in an asset purchase agreement.

The option allowed the respondents to compel the appellants to purchase their shares for $3.00 a share.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the option was part of a bilateral contract, that the respondents substantially complied with notice provisions, and that the failure to provide section 116 Income Tax Act certificates was not a precondition to exercising the option.

The remedy of $600,000 and specific performance was upheld.

The offender was convicted of tax evasion and failing to remit GST after earning approximately $3,000,000 over four years without filing tax returns.

He was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $687,000 with ten years to pay.

The offender appealed his convictions, arguing the jury charge failed to distinguish between tax evasion and tax avoidance.

The Crown appealed the sentence, seeking a penitentiary term and a shorter time to pay the fines.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge accurate.

The Court upheld the custodial sentence but allowed the Crown's appeal regarding the fines, reducing the time to pay from ten years to two years.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with pre-sentence custody credited on a 1:1 basis.

The sentencing judge denied enhanced credit on the mistaken belief that the appellant's bail had been revoked.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this was a material factual misunderstanding.

Applying the principles from Summers, the Court held the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit of 1.5:1, as there was no evidence to rebut the inference that he had lost eligibility for early release.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced accordingly.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and breach of probation, and sentenced to 18 months and 12 months consecutive, plus three years' probation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the identification evidence was weak, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of the identification evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant had a lengthy history of similar offences on public transit, justifying the sentence and the probation condition prohibiting his use of public transit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences arising from a high-speed car chase where a police officer was struck and seriously injured.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The trial judge admitted an unsworn videotaped statement from a passenger identifying the appellant as the driver, as the passenger claimed no memory at trial due to heroin use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statement, finding it met the threshold requirements of necessity and reliability.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the deliberate attack on a vulnerable police officer.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for arson, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

She argued the Board erred in finding she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence indicating a high risk of decompensation and violent behaviour if the appellant discontinued her medication.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding his conviction.

The conviction related to a car driven to the border that was found to be subject to duties under section 159 of the Customs Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's decision and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant.

He argued he was denied the right to be heard when the application judge denied him standing and ejected him from the courtroom, and that the judge failed to accommodate his medical illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge was entitled to refuse standing due to the appellant's failure to comply with a prior peremptory order.

The Court also held that the appellant's disruptive behaviour justified his ejection and further demonstrated his vexatious manner of conducting proceedings.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they were in default of a vendor take back promissory note, which triggered an acceleration clause.

The application judge found that the appellants failed to make full quarterly payments and that proper written notice of default was provided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's interpretation of the promissory note and conclusion that notice was properly given were reasonable.

The appellant appealed the probation conditions imposed following a conviction for breach of probation, arguing that the requirements to remain in Ontario and report weekly were improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly exercised their discretion.

The conditions were necessary to monitor the appellant, particularly because the underlying breach occurred while he was outside the province, and did not unduly restrict his mobility rights since he could seek permission to travel or vary the reporting frequency.

The appellant father appealed from the dismissal of his Superior Court of Justice appeal from a Crown wardship order without access made in the Ontario Court of Justice in respect of his son.

The child had been in care since he was four months old.

The appellant argued that the trial judge should have weighed the evidence differently and should have given him sole custody.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of law by either the trial judge or the appeal judge.

The appellant had not proposed a plan of care for sole custody at trial, and the trial judge did not err in concluding that continuing access would not be beneficial and meaningful for the child.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents based on the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued that a $5,000 cash payment from the respondents extended the limitation period, a claim the respondents denied.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge properly refused an adjournment, he failed to resolve the material contradictions in the evidence regarding the alleged payment.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of stolen property.

The trial judge entered the stay on his own initiative when the trial Crown was 22 minutes late due to a conflicting sentencing matter in Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge was right to be displeased, a stay of proceedings was not warranted as there was no prejudice to the respondent's right to a fair trial and the integrity of the justice system was not diminished.