Lois B. Roberts

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15.8 months on the ground that the trial judge exceeded the Crown's position of 13 to 14 months without providing notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2.8-month increase was not significant enough to require notice as a matter of fairness.

Furthermore, the sentence was fit given the appellant's multiple convictions for impaired driving, breaches of court orders, and history of domestic violence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

He alleged that his counsel failed to properly cross-examine the complainant on inconsistencies, failed to comply with the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and improperly asserted alternative defences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's performance was reasonable, the trial judge was aware of the evidentiary frailties, and there was no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a global sentence of 15 months (less one month pre-trial custody) for three serious offences, including uttering threats against his stepdaughter and former wife, and breaching a no-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge appropriately emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the appellant's violent history, which included sexual exploitation and obstructing justice.

The court held that the sentencing judge implicitly considered the guilty plea as a mitigating factor and that the sentence did not violate the totality principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent investment dealer terminated the contracts of four sales agents when it closed its Thunder Bay office.

The respondent sued for repayment of transition loans that became due upon termination.

The appellants defended the action, claiming misrepresentation by omission regarding the office closure and equitable set-off.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against two of the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in fact and law, and that a fair and just determination required a trial of all claims and counterclaims together to avoid inconsistent verdicts.

The appellant was convicted of two offences under the Customs Act and received a conditional discharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the sentence, finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the mens rea requirement.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal judge misapprehended the trial judge's comments, which were directed at whether the conduct was planned and deliberate for sentencing purposes, not mens rea.

The trial judge's sentence was restored, and a request for a Kienapple stay was declined.

The appellant construction company sued the respondent city for alleged breaches of the Occupational Health and Safety Act after discovering asbestos at a work site.

The motions judge granted summary judgment to the city, finding the appellant failed to prove it suffered actual damages and refusing to grant declaratory relief for hypothetical future claims by employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding that the appellant's claims for administrative and legal costs lacked evidentiary support, and agreeing that declaratory relief was inappropriate where the dispute had yet to arise and could affect third-party rights.

The appellant, who had been continually detained under certificates of involuntary admission since 2005, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his civil committal.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal as moot based on a recent Court of Appeal decision regarding the constitutionality of the Mental Health Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in finding the matter moot, as there were live factual and legal issues regarding the appellant's specific detention.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for an expedited rehearing.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a home invasion where the victim was beaten and shot.

At trial, a key Crown witness refused to testify, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence, as the appellant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the admission did not render the trial unfair.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning adequate and the verdict reasonable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 13-year term was fit for an aggravated manslaughter involving a preplanned home invasion.

The receiver of the appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of an accounts receivable insurance policy with the respondent insurer.

The motion judge found that buyers' claims for set-off against amounts owing to the appellant constituted a 'dispute' under clause 7 of the policy, which deferred the insurer's liability to pay claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the clause and confirming that a dispute is not restricted to claims arising out of the unpaid shipment of goods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The trial judge had dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim but indicated that if the claim had been allowed, damages would have been assessed at $25,000.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction because the trial judge indicated the award would have been not more than $50,000.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of Blair J.A., which denied his request for the province to pay for appeal transcripts and refused a stay of child support pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the single judge's analysis or conclusions and dismissed the motion.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 4 years and 3 months for armed robbery, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's determination that a 5-year global sentence was appropriate given the significant planning and aggravating factors.

However, the Court found errors in the calculation of pre-disposition custody credit, specifically regarding a 3-week period prior to release and a 13-month period spent in custody on unrelated charges that were ultimately stayed.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced by 7 months to 3 years and 8 months.

The appellant was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon against his aunt and daughter, and sentenced to nine months' incarceration.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias by relying on cultural stereotypes, misapprehended evidence, and erred in relying on his daughter's KGB statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary findings.

While the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the Court upheld the nine-month sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from a traffic stop, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility during a blended voir dire and trial.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony, citing his presence during the officers' testimony as an opportunity to fabricate his story, and relying on his counsel's perceived reactions to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a legal error, holding that the appellant was entitled to have his credibility assessed without paying an evidentiary price for exercising his right to be present at trial.

The Court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis was tainted by this flawed credibility assessment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief and his 17-month sentence for mischief and sexual exploitation.

The mischief occurred when the appellant pulled the parking brake of a moving vehicle driven by his stepdaughter, who had refused to let him out.

The appellant argued the driver was unlawfully confining him, meaning she was not in lawful use of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown negated unlawful confinement as it requires a significant period of time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the cumulative sentence reflected no error in principle given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the sexual exploitation complainant.

The appellants, an author and her company, appealed a decision granting the respondent television production company a declaration that an option agreement for the television rights to her books remained in effect.

The respondent had mistakenly paid a lower extension fee under the wrong contractual clause.

The application judge interpreted the contract to allow for cumulative extensions and granted the respondent relief from forfeiture for the mistaken payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge's reasons were adequate, his interpretation of the contract was correct, and he made no error in exercising his equitable discretion to grant relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Crown and members of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on several grounds, including judicial immunity, improper notice, non-compliance with the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, and improper collateral attack, characterizing the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's damages assessment of $270,735 for the tort of conversion of large metal die blocks.

The appellant argued damages should be based on scrap metal value rather than replacement cost, challenged the finding that it purchased 90% of the missing blocks, and disputed a $7,500 award for the respondent's lost time and productivity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the die blocks were useable and properly valued at replacement cost, the factual findings were supported by evidence, and the employee costs were directly connected to investigating the conversion.

Metrolinx purchased a railway corridor from CN and requested that Enbridge relocate six gas pipelines crossing under the railway.

A dispute arose over who should bear the relocation costs.

The application judge found that under the historical agreements, Enbridge was responsible for the costs, and that CN had assigned these rights to Metrolinx.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Enbridge's appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in interpreting the complex commercial agreements.

The appellant appealed an order appointing the Law Society of Upper Canada as trustee of the professional legal practice materials of a deceased lawyer.

The appellant argued for a neutral third party to handle the materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appointment authorized under the Law Society Act and concluding the Law Society is the appropriate neutral party to manage and dispose of the client files and computers.