Lois B. Roberts

The appellant sued the Government of Nunavut in Ontario for wrongful dismissal.

The motion judge found no real and substantial connection to Ontario and that Nunavut was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the appellant argued Ontario was a 'forum of necessity' because returning to Nunavut would trigger severe mental illness symptoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the appellant's mental health challenges did not rise to the exceptional level required for the forum of necessity doctrine, noting that accommodations could be sought in a Nunavut court.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its defamation action following a Rule 21 motion.

The motion judge had held that the appellant's notices did not comply with s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act because they failed to sufficiently specify the matters complained of.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the notices clearly specified the statements and inferences from the internet broadcast and newspaper article, and were sufficiently specific to allow the respondents to know the essence of the complaint and decide how to respond.

The respondent contractor entered into a construction contract with the appellant to build management offices.

The contractor advanced a claim for extras due to delays.

The application judge ordered the Project Engineer to consider a portion of the claim ($1,437,976), finding the contractor provided sufficient notice under the contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge committed an extricable error of law by interpreting the contractual provision in isolation.

Read as a whole, the contract required detailed information to support a claim for extras, which the contractor failed to provide.

The application was dismissed and the claim for extra payment was declared barred.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in accepting the testimony of the complainant and her brother due to inconsistencies and memory loss, and in admitting the complainant's video statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the children's credibility or the admission of the video statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The moving party sought to review and set aside an order refusing to extend the time to have a single judge's decision reviewed by a panel of the Court of Appeal.

The underlying dispute involved the termination of the moving party's membership and occupancy rights in a housing co-operative due to unpaid housing charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with previous judges that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

He was found asleep in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle stopped in a driving lane.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding no realistic risk of danger, but the summary conviction appeal judge entered convictions.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by assuming an inoperable vehicle could not create a realistic risk of danger, entitling the appeal judge to intervene.

The appellant moved to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his motion to extend the time for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed his motion to vary an order denying an adjournment of his motion to extend time for filing a Small Claims Court appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the single judge's reasons, noting the appellant failed to appeal in a timely manner, provided no explanation for the delay, and raised no point of law or public importance.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant commenced an action in 2001 against the municipality.

After years of inactivity and failure to set the action down for trial, the motion judge dismissed the action for delay in 2015.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and failed to accommodate him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was indeed inordinate and inexcusable, raising a presumption of prejudice that the appellant failed to rebut.

The court noted that while self-represented litigants face challenges, they must still familiarize themselves with relevant procedures.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing their failure to file defending material was their lawyer's fault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the appellants' failure to comply with numerous court orders was due to their own intransigence.

The court agreed with the motion judge that this was one of the rare cases where striking a statement of defence was appropriate.

The appellant meat processing company sued the respondent energy retailer for rescission of a fixed price electrical contract and damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the respondent had fully explained the contract terms, including the risk that the appellant would pay more if electricity prices dropped, and that the respondent had not misled the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants' personal injury action was dismissed for delay by the registrar due to their counsel's inadvertent failure to request a status hearing.

The motion judge refused to set aside the dismissal order, finding that the respondents were significantly prejudiced by the delay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in her assessment of prejudice, as the prejudice arose from the insolvency of co-defendants and the respondents' own failure to preserve evidence, rather than the appellants' delay.

The appeal was allowed and the action reinstated.

The appellant appealed her convictions for two counts of fraud over $5,000 and her concurrent six-year sentences.

The fraud involved real estate transactions and promissory notes orchestrated by the appellant and her husband.

The trial judge found the appellant was an active participant in the scheme, occupying management positions and aiding her husband.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and supported by evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the large-scale fraud had devastating consequences on multiple victims, requiring emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for cocaine trafficking, arguing that the motion judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that various production orders, warrants, and wiretap authorizations were invalid.

They also argued that the search of a Blackberry was unreasonable and that intercepted communications were protected by spousal communication privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the validity of the warrants and authorizations under the Garofoli standard, and concluding that spousal communication privilege does not extend to common-law spouses.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim, the Court of Appeal determined the issue of costs.

The parties agreed the successful party on appeal should receive $5,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant $5,000 for the appeal, but upheld the motion judge's $15,000 costs award in favour of the respondent.

The amounts were set off, resulting in a net payment of $10,000 from the appellant to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a judgment prohibiting them from depositing additional fill on their property and requiring them to remove deposited fill to comply with an approved drainage and grading drawing.

They argued procedural unfairness, limitation periods, and an exemption under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness or limitation period violation, and agreeing with the application judge that the appellants' operations did not resemble a normal farming operation.

The court also dismissed the appellants' application to file fresh evidence and awarded costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed their sentences for drug trafficking to avoid deportation resulting from the retrospective application of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal on Crown consent, reducing his sentence to six months less a day as it remained fit.

The Court dismissed the second appellant's appeal, finding that the requested reduction would render his sentence unfit given his criminal record and the aggravating factors, and would circumvent parliamentary intent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order enforcing an indemnity agreement for $1,170,312.47.

She argued her signature was forged and relied on the defence of non est factum, while also claiming the motion judge should have drawn an adverse inference from a witness's refusal to answer questions during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of forgery or misrepresentation, and concluding the appellant was careless in signing documents without reading them.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to set aside a municipal investigator's report.

The investigator had concluded that the respondent municipality properly held in camera meetings under the Municipal Act exception for advice subject to solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that under sections 223.16 and 239.2(9) of the Municipal Act, an investigator's report can only be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The court also rejected arguments that the investigator exceeded her jurisdiction or that the municipality failed to prove it properly appointed the investigator.

The moving party brought motions to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that denied his request to expand the appeal records and hear two appeals together, and ordered him to perfect both appeals within 45 days.

The moving party sought an adjournment of his review motions to obtain further evidence, which the court denied because the review must be based on the material before the single judge.

The court upheld the single judge's decision regarding the records and hearing the appeals together.

However, the court clarified the timeline for perfecting the cross-appeal in the family law matter, allowing the moving party 45 days after the appellant perfects her appeal.

The motion was otherwise dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent lawyer.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after a sniffer-dog alerted on her at an international airport and a subsequent search revealed four kilograms of cocaine in her luggage.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that the dog sniff and a subsequent strip search violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge made evidentiary and jury charge errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a dog sniff during a routine border crossing does not violate section 8 of the Charter, the appellant was not detained at the time of the alert, and the sentence imposed was fit.