Robert J. Maki

The defendant moved for summary judgment to discharge a construction lien and certificate of action registered by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff failed to file responding materials and requested an adjournment, which was denied.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to perfect the lien within the 45-day statutory period under the Construction Lien Act.

As the lien had expired, the court granted the motion and ordered the lien discharged, awarding costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff, a shareholder of a corporation that previously lost a mortgage enforcement action, brought a new action against the mortgagee and the mortgagee's lawyers alleging fraud, negligence, and breach of contract.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motions, finding that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the plaintiff had no privity of contract, the lawyers owed no duty of care to a litigation adversary, and the claims were barred by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process and frivolous and vexatious, as it attempted to re-litigate issues already decided in the prior mortgage action.

Following a prior endorsement, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The plaintiff submitted a Costs Outline, which the defendant/plaintiffs by counterclaim did not dispute.

The court ordered the defendant/plaintiffs by counterclaim to pay the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $4,778.03, to be paid within 30 days.

The plaintiff, London Eco-Roof Manufacturing Inc., brought a motion to strike the statement of defence and dismiss the counterclaim of South River Developments Ltd. and Les Holdway due to their repeated failure to comply with court orders, specifically an order to deliver an affidavit of documents.

The court considered the balance between resolving disputes on their merits and ensuring timely and efficient administration of justice.

While acknowledging the defendants' non-compliance, the court found it was not contumelious and that the affidavit of documents had been sworn, albeit late, due to counsel's error.

The motion to strike was dismissed, but the defendants were granted a "last chance order" with new peremptory deadlines for discovery, undertakings, and a pre-trial, and were ordered to pay costs.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the Applicant's request for leave to commence an action against the Respondents.

The court assessed the costs payable by the Applicant to the successful Respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the reasonableness of two separate sets of costs, duplication of legal work by multiple lawyers of similar call years, and the hourly rates and disbursements claimed.

The court reduced the costs sought by Centennial College and the individual Respondents due to concerns about duplication and excessive disbursements, while approving the costs sought by the Toronto Police Services Board.

The Applicant, a vexatious litigant, was ordered to pay costs, and his approval of the costs order's form and content was waived.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to commence an action against a college, its employees, the police, and the Attorney General.

The proposed action related to his expulsion from a paralegal program and subsequent arrest for uttering threats.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed pleading was defective, lacked an evidentiary basis, and constituted an abuse of process as an attempt to re-litigate a final college decision.

The court noted the applicant's history of bringing meritless proceedings and his failure to pay over $73,000 in outstanding costs orders.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant.

He argued he was denied the right to be heard when the application judge denied him standing and ejected him from the courtroom, and that the judge failed to accommodate his medical illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge was entitled to refuse standing due to the appellant's failure to comply with a prior peremptory order.

The Court also held that the appellant's disruptive behaviour justified his ejection and further demonstrated his vexatious manner of conducting proceedings.