Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and firearms offences arising from a shooting during a fictitious drug transaction.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the Crown's key witness, rejecting the victim's testimony, making findings about the shotgun without expert evidence, and that he was deprived of a remedy for late disclosure Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary inferences, or handling of the Charter remedies.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated by an unlawful arrest and an illegal strip search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant based on a confidential tip and observed behavior consistent with a drug transaction.

The Court also found that while the rearrangement of the appellant's clothing constituted a strip search, it was conducted reasonably and was necessary for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with an offensive weapon, arguing that the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no indication that the trial judge applied different standards in assessing the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment for the sexual assault of his estranged spouse and use of an imitation firearm.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by treating premeditation as an aggravating factor, by granting insufficient enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and by imposing an overly long probationary period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreed statement of facts supported the finding of premeditation, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and the enhanced credit and probation orders were reasonable exercises of discretion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, voyeurism, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding animus, failing to explicitly find the complainant was fearful, and convicting on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of animus, clear evidence of fear upon the discovery of a hidden camera, and overwhelming circumstantial evidence that left no reasonable doubt of guilt.

The appellant was convicted of child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption of belief in age and the appellant's failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the interlocutor's age.

On appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Morrison, which struck down the presumption of belief in age as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reliance on the unconstitutional presumption and the failure to take reasonable steps to establish the essential element of belief was a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and conditional stays were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated sexual assault arising from sexual intercourse with multiple complainants without disclosure of HIV-positive status.

He argued, through reopening and fresh evidence, that condom use alone should negate the realistic possibility of HIV transmission notwithstanding the absence of a low viral load.

The Court of Appeal held that the proposed evidence was not sufficiently cogent under the fresh evidence framework because it attacked the legal foundations of the governing Supreme Court authority rather than demonstrating a material change in the factual underpinnings relevant to condom effectiveness.

Applying stare decisis and the governing fraud-and-consent analysis in HIV non-disclosure cases, the court declined to alter the existing rule requiring both condom use and a low viral load to negate a realistic possibility of transmission.

The fresh evidence application and the appeal were dismissed, subject to a minor amendment to one count on consent.

The appellant was convicted of accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography after police obtained his subscriber information via a production order and subsequently searched his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the production order was invalidly issued based on a standard of 'reasonable suspicion' rather than 'reasonable grounds to believe'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the production order and subsequent search warrant violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant appealed from a decision denying certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on firearms charges.

The charges related to a handgun with a defective firing pin.

A firearms expert testified that a replacement pin could be sourced and installed relatively easily, though it was temporarily out of stock.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the reviewing judge's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to infer the handgun could be adapted for use as a firearm within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed her sentence, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the harsh conditions she endured during presentence custody.

As a transgender inmate identifying as female, she was subjected to 22-hour lockdowns, segregation, and a lack of rehabilitative programs, leading to severe mental distress and two suicide attempts.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting it should have been before the sentencing judge and demonstrated intense human suffering.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in force.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was awarded $500 in Charter damages, the parties made written submissions on costs for the proceeding below.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing his action was public interest litigation.

The court rejected this argument, finding the action did not meet the criteria in Carter.

However, the court found that applying the strict costs consequences of Rule 49.10(2) would result in the successful appellant paying costs to the respondent, which would be a harsh result for enforcing constitutional rights.

The court departed from the rule in the interests of justice and awarded the appellant $25,000 in costs.

The plaintiff killed his son while experiencing a psychotic episode allegedly caused by the antidepressant Paxil, manufactured by the defendant.

He was found not criminally responsible and was under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board until receiving an absolute discharge in December 2009.

He commenced an action against the defendant in October 2011.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff lacked the psychological capacity to sue until his absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge materially misapprehended the evidence.

Exercising its fact-finding powers, the Court concluded the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of capacity under s. 7(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, as he had demonstrated the ability to instruct counsel, manage affairs, and understand the litigation process well before his discharge.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts each of sexual assault and sexual interference against the daughters of his former girlfriend, alleging numerous errors in the trial judge’s credibility assessments.

He argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny between the complainants’ testimony and his own, misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on demeanour, and failed to properly consider delayed disclosure and alleged motives to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s credibility findings were well supported by the evidentiary record and entitled to significant deference.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence, no improper reliance on demeanour, and no reversible error in the treatment of delayed disclosure or similar fact evidence.

The verdicts were not unreasonable and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a child under 16, as well as a six‑year custodial sentence.

The complainant disclosed years later that the appellant, a trusted family friend living with her father, sexually abused her repeatedly when she was eight to nine years old.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly assessed credibility or should have rejected all of the complainant’s testimony after declining to find proof of one alleged act of intercourse.

The court confirmed that a trier of fact may accept parts of a witness’s testimony while rejecting others and found the trial judge’s credibility analysis thorough and well supported.

The sentence was upheld as consistent with the serious harm caused by sexual abuse of a child, though the mandatory victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available, arguing that the search of his rooming house and electronic devices violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrant was not overbroad, was executed reasonably, and explicitly authorized the search of the seized electronic devices.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and sexual assault of his then-wife, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's motive to fabricate, the meaning of a WhatsApp message, and prior disclosure to her family.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, concluding the trial judge's findings were supported by the record.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but the victim surcharge was set aside on consent.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered a large grow operation on his leased farmland.

The police had unintentionally trespassed on the leased land while investigating, which the trial judge found breached s. 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by not considering the impact of the subsequent searches of the outbuildings and residence.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded the evidence found in the residence due to the high expectation of privacy, but admitted the evidence from the fields and outbuildings.

As the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity under s. 276 and in admitting the deceased complainant's preliminary inquiry testimony under s. 715.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's rulings, noting the s. 276 application was based on an improper foundation of questions asked in violation of the section at the preliminary inquiry.

The court also upheld the admission of the preliminary inquiry testimony and the trial judge's credibility assessments, dismissing the appeal.

The Crown appealed acquittals for making and distributing child pornography and child luring arising from sexualized text messages sent by an adult to a 14‑year‑old boy about the boy's friend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed legal errors in interpreting ss. 163.1 and 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

Private electronic communications can constitute “written material” capable of meeting the statutory definition of child pornography, and the analysis must focus objectively on the content of the communications rather than the accused's claimed joking motive.

The trial judge also erred by importing a requirement that luring be for a sexual purpose and by failing to consider the facilitation element of s. 172.1.

Because the legal errors affected the acquittals, the court set them aside and ordered a new trial on all counts.

The appellant, R.L.S., appealed a 9-month sentence for counseling and touching a child for a sexual purpose, seeking a reduced sentence to avoid deportation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence proportionate given the high moral culpability, breach of trust, and victim's young age, affirming that immigration consequences do not justify an artificial sentence.

The appeal against the sentence was dismissed.

However, the court varied the prohibition order to more narrowly define prohibited conduct, removing the broad "public park" restriction and refining internet/communication conditions.