Court of Appeal for Ontario
Roberts, Miller and Trotter JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Shadrack Amankwa
Appellant
Shadrack Amankwa, acting in person
David Parry, appearing as duty counsel
Benita Wassenaar, for the respondent
Heard: August 11, 2020 with the appellant appearing by teleconference and duty counsel and the respondent appearing by videoconference
On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Cynthia Johnston of the Ontario Court of Justice on April 12, 2019.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant was convicted of the offences of break and enter and commit theft, and robbery with an offensive weapon. He pled guilty to the break and enter charge but disputed the robbery charge.
2Following the end of their relationship, the appellant carried out a home invasion robbery at his former girlfriend’s residence. Accompanied by another man, the appellant admitted that he kicked in the door of her condominium. He confronted the complainant with what appeared to her to be a firearm while she was in bed with her one-year-old son. He pushed the complainant against her bedroom wall and demanded money, which she gave to him. The appellant and his accomplice also took the complainant’s computer and television that she has never recovered.
3The appellant was sentenced on the convictions to four years’ imprisonment less 308 days’ credit for pre-sentence custody. He is now out of custody and has abandoned his sentence appeal.
4The appellant appeals only his robbery conviction. With the able assistance of duty counsel, the appellant’s main submission is that the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence of the appellant and the complainant.
5We do not accept this submission.
6It is well established that the standard for the ground of uneven scrutiny is high and the trial judge’s findings on credibility are owed deference. As this court, per Laskin J.A., explained in R. v. Aird, 2013 ONCA 447, at para. 39:
The "different standards of scrutiny" argument is a difficult argument to succeed on in an appellate court. It is difficult for two related reasons: credibility findings are the province of the trial judge and attract a very high degree of deference on appeal; and appellate courts invariably view this argument with skepticism, seeing it as a veiled invitation to reassess the trial judge's credibility determinations. Thus, as Doherty J.A. said in R. v. J.H. (2005), 2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 59: "[t]o succeed in this kind of argument, the appellant must point to something in the reasons of the trial judge or perhaps elsewhere in the record that make it clear that the trial judge had applied different standards in assessing the evidence of the appellant and the complainant."
7There is no indication that the trial judge applied different standards in assessing the evidence of the appellant and the complainant in this case. We see no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s findings that were reasonable and grounded in the evidence that was open to her to accept.
8The trial judge was alive to the frailties in the complainant’s evidence, including the fact that she failed to immediately tell the police of her relationship with the appellant and attempted to downplay that relationship at trial. As she was entitled to do, the trial judge accepted the complainant’s explanation of her failure to be entirely candid about her relationship with the appellant because she was embarrassed by it. She concluded that the complainant was otherwise credible and reliable with respect to the details of the home invasion robbery.
9As she was also at liberty to do, the trial judge did not accept the appellant’s evidence where it conflicted with the complainant’s version of events. Her rejection of the appellant’s evidence did not result from trial judge’s uneven scrutiny but from the clear problems with the appellant’s credibility that the trial judge detailed in her reasons. The most striking example, as the trial judge noted, was the appellant’s denial of being angry notwithstanding that he admitted violently kicking in the complainant’s door.
10The appellant, himself, questioned the reasonableness of the trial judge’s findings that he threatened the complainant with an offensive weapon and put his hands on her neck. These findings were reasonable and supported by the complainant’s evidence that the trial judge was entitled to accept. There is no basis to intervene.
11In conclusion, we see no error in the trial judge’s analysis or conclusions, which were reasonable and open to her to make on the record before her. After carefully considering the whole of the evidence, she determined that the Crown had met its high onus of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had committed the robbery offence as charged. Essentially, the appellant is asking this court to retry the case. That is not the function of an appellate court.
12Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
“L.B. Roberts J.A.”
“B.W. Miller J.A.”
“Gary Trotter J.A.”