Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the timeline of events and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the timeline discrepancy went only to the reliability of time estimates rather than core credibility, and that the trial judge had ample corroborating evidence to support his findings.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that overturned the accused's convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration.

The appeal judge had found that the Crown failed to prove a breath demand was made, which precluded reliance on the evidentiary shortcuts in former ss. 258(1)(c) and (g) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that while the lawfulness of a demand need not be proven to use the shortcuts, the fact that a demand was made is a condition precedent.

The Court also agreed that the defence's failure to object to the certificate's admissibility when tendered did not prevent them from arguing in closing that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing an error in the calculation of his pre-trial custody credit.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that the parties made a mathematical error at trial.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, allowed the appeal, and reduced the appellant's sentence by 257 days.

Following the disposition of the appeal, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement.

The successful respondents were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant was ordered to pay $6,375.58 to the respondent university and $6,000 to the respondent professional corporation and individual.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for multiple offences against an intimate partner, including sexual assault with a weapon and forcible confinement.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding his likelihood of recidivism and failed to properly assess the intractability of his conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the expert evidence on age-related decline in violent behaviour.

The Court held that the sentencing judge's findings on intractability at the sentencing stage could be applied to the designation stage, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's poor treatment prospects and high risk of violent reoffending.

The moving parties sought a stay of two orders of the Court of Appeal pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved the respondent's termination of 36 standard-form Feed-in Tariff Contracts for solar power facilities.

Applying the three-part test for a stay, the motion judge found that the proposed appeal raised serious questions of law regarding contractual interpretation, that the moving parties would suffer irreparable harm if the contracts were terminated and their loans called, and that the balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The moving party, having been successful, was awarded costs fixed at $5,000 all inclusive, payable within 30 days.

The appellants were convicted of drug trafficking offences following the execution of search warrants at two condominiums and a vehicle.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing that the searches violated their s. 8 Charter rights and that a delay in facilitating access to counsel violated s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal found that the searches were lawful, with the warrantless entry justified by exigent circumstances.

Although the court found a s. 10(b) breach due to a four-hour delay in providing access to counsel, it declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), noting the breach was an isolated incident rather than systemic.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed acquittals and sentence arising from offences involving the sale of sexual services by underage females.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by defining 'procures' and 'harbours' too narrowly when directing the jury and granting a directed verdict, which materially affected several acquittals.

New trials were ordered on multiple counts.

The court also found significant errors in principle in sentencing, including minimizing the inherent exploitation of the offences, overemphasizing bail conditions, and improperly relying on media publicity to satisfy deterrence.

While upholding declarations that certain mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court substituted a global sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of steroids and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence suggesting the appellant was associated with the Hells Angels and was a target of a large-scale organized crime investigation.

The Crown also introduced intercepted communications portraying the appellant as knowledgeable about the criminal justice system, and anecdotal opinion evidence from a police officer regarding steroid stockpiling.

The Court of Appeal held that the gang affiliation and intercept evidence constituted highly prejudicial bad character evidence that was irrelevant to the material issues.

Furthermore, the police officer's anecdotal testimony exceeded the proper bounds of opinion evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the cumulative errors rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial decision upholding the validity of a marriage contract that waived property and spousal support rights, and awarding a $40,000 lump sum for spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the marriage contract was valid, noting the appellant chose not to obtain independent legal advice despite being warned by a paralegal.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in calculating the quantum of spousal support by failing to consider imputing income to the respondent from his $5 million real estate holdings.

The appeal was allowed in part and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for a focused hearing on imputing income.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography and his 15-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in her Garofoli ruling regarding the search warrant and in declining to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite finding three s. 8 breaches.

He also argued the sentence was harsh given his medical condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of the law on amplification or the Grant analysis.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court deferring to the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's medical condition.

The appellant mother appealed a finding of contempt and the subsequent penalty imposed for her failure to comply with a final order regarding the respondent father's access to their children.

The motion judge found multiple, wilful breaches of the order, relying heavily on text messages where the appellant explicitly denied the court's authority over her parenting decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the contempt finding or the penalty, which included fines for failing to attend a cooperative parenting program.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence, noting it either could have been produced earlier or did not displace the motion judge's findings.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring him to pay his former common-law spouse $75,000 for unjust enrichment and $561 in indefinite monthly spousal support.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding unjust enrichment and in awarding indefinite rather than transitional support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the test for unjust enrichment or her assessment of the respondent's contributions to the property.

The court also upheld the indefinite spousal support award as reasonable given the respondent's age, income potential, and the 17-year duration of the relationship.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding him liable for civil conspiracy to cause economic injury and an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The respondent had lost his investment after being misled into transferring funds to a shell company, which were then diverted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal test for conspiracy to injure and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, noting it was justified by the appellant's egregious and fraudulent behaviour in furthering the conspiracy.

The appellant fell off his bicycle and sued the municipality for damages more than four years later.

The municipality successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired.

On appeal, the appellant argued that he did not discover the full extent of his injuries until years later and that he lacked the capacity to commence litigation due to a disability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that knowledge of the material facts, not the extent of damages, triggers the limitation period, and that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of capacity under section 7 of the Limitations Act.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her action against the respondent university under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant sought to relitigate issues regarding her law school transcript that had been previously dismissed in civil and human rights proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the action was an abusive relitigation and barred by cause of action estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal brought by the responding party from a motion judge's dismissal of a request to reconsider a costs order.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order refusing to reconsider the costs disposition was interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of any substantive right.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was quashed with costs awarded to the moving party.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to quash the defendant's appeal from a timetabling endorsement in a mortgage enforcement proceeding.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal had previously ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction because the endorsement was an interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the appeal frivolous and completely devoid of merit, as the endorsement did not determine any substantive rights.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding spousal support, child support, and net family property, the respondent sought costs of $13,585 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant suggested $10,000, citing modest success and unproven economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive, noting the appeal was heard in writing, and ordered the costs enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.