Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, convicted of importing and possessing heroin, appealed her convictions, alleging two errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

First, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly invited propensity reasoning by summarizing the Crown's position that the appellant was a person who would break the law for money, despite an earlier caution against such reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found this instruction related to the appellant's credibility and did not constitute reversible error.

Second, the appellant challenged the trial judge's answer to a jury question clarifying "negligence/recklessness or being wilfully blind." The Court found the judge's definition of wilful blindness accurate and her explanation of negligence and recklessness adequate for the jury to distinguish the concepts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash an appeal judge's order disqualifying his unlicensed agent and refusing an adjournment in a provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appeal judge correctly applied the principles for disqualifying agents, particularly where the agent engaged in misconduct by intentionally concealing their involvement.

The court affirmed its inherent authority to control its processes and ensure the integrity of proceedings.

The adjournment issue was deemed moot as the appellant was permitted to restart his appeal.

The appellant, Michael Trought, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised two grounds: unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) appeal, finding the transitional exceptional circumstance applied and prejudice was not sufficiently established.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance, concluding that trial counsel failed to properly advise the appellant on the concept of constructive possession and agreed to a "blended procedure" (where voir dire evidence applied to the trial proper) without the appellant's informed consent.

This failure undermined the appellant's fundamental right to decide whether to testify and rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a jury's finding of negligence and causation in a birth injury case, arguing the jury misapplied the "but for" test and that the verdict was unreasonable due to lack of evidence on timely delivery.

The appellant also claimed the trial judge improperly questioned witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's application of the "but for" test, finding the verdict reasonable based on expert evidence, and concluding the trial judge's questions were proper clarifications within established judicial protocol.

The appellant, Adrian Daou, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on confessions made by the appellant to police while he was incarcerated and suffering from schizophrenia.

The lead investigator, Det. Monette, testified that he believed the confession was true, providing detailed reasons.

The Court of Appeal found this police opinion evidence inadmissible as it amounted to an opinion on the appellant's guilt and usurped the jury's function.

The trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction and by reiterating the officer's opinion.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that the inadmissible evidence and lack of caution seriously risked dominating the jury's consideration of the confession's veracity and the appellant's guilt, thus resulting in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the Court of Appeal allowed the appellant's appeal, setting aside a trial judge's order requiring the appellant to "top up" assigned benefits due to tax deductions.

The appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

This endorsement specifically addresses the costs of a prior motion before the trial judge (the "top up motion"), for which the trial judge had made no costs order.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant entitled to costs for this motion, ordering the respondent to pay $10,000, reasoning that the unanticipated nature of the trial judge's order and the parties' failure to seek an advance tax ruling contributed to the litigation.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance, trafficking in methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

On conviction, he argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application, claiming police failed to ensure he understood his right to counsel and delayed access to duty counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's finding that the appellant understood his rights and declined to consider the delay argument raised for the first time on appeal.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly considered irrelevant aggravating factors, specifically his "higher involvement" in the drug hierarchy and discussions about fentanyl and firearms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the evidence supported the appellant's higher role and that discussions of other serious criminal activities were relevant aggravating factors, even if the transfers did not materialize due to arrest.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and while leave to appeal sentence was granted and fresh evidence admitted, the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant, Rajin Sunda, abandoned his appeal from conviction but appealed his sentence for drug trafficking and possession.

The parties jointly proposed a resolution for the sentence appeal, suggesting the remaining custodial sentence be stayed and replaced with a one-year probation period.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, agreeing with the joint proposal.

The court emphasized the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress, including addiction treatment and compliance with release conditions, finding that re-incarceration would be detrimental to his rehabilitation and contrary to public interest.

The mother appealed a trial decision in a high-conflict parenting dispute, which had resulted in an order for joint custody with parallel decision-making authority and equal parenting time.

The trial judge had rejected the mother's allegations against the father and the OCL's recommendation for sole custody to the mother.

The mother alleged errors regarding hearsay evidence, consideration of children's wishes, application of the maximum contact principle, the trial judge's jurisdiction to vary prior orders, and the award of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's factual findings, assessment of evidence, or application of legal principles.

The court affirmed that OCL recommendations are not binding, the maximum contact principle does not mandate equal parenting time, and a trial judge has broad jurisdiction to make final parenting orders, not being bound by interlocutory orders.

The costs award against the mother was upheld due to her unreasonable conduct during the litigation.

The appellant, Andrew Clifford Miracle, appealed an order appointing a receiver over his assets, which was granted to the respondent, Glenn Bogue, to satisfy a debt arising from an arbitration award.

The arbitration concerned the joint ownership of a store on Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory.

Andrew alleged the application judge erred by lacking authority for a final receiver order, miscalculating contingency fees, and, crucially, that the order contravened sections 29 and 89 of the Indian Act, which prohibit enforcement by a non-status Indian against assets situated on a reserve.

The Court of Appeal identified the Indian Act issue as a threshold matter, noting it was not fully litigated or determined in the lower court.

Consequently, the court remitted the matter to the application judge for a determination on the effect of the Indian Act, adhering to the principle that new issues are generally not decided on appeal.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant purchased a restaurant from the respondent and subsequently sued for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the restaurant's revenues.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no misrepresentation and stating the appellant should have verified the actual sales receipts provided to her.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by ignoring formal admissions regarding the revenue representations and by improperly relying on the appellant's lack of due diligence as a defence to fraudulent misrepresentation.

This appeal was dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal determined that the proper jurisdiction for an appeal involving a single payment of less than $50,000 is the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a judgment of less than $50,000 to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it was properly brought to the Divisional Court due to the monetary amount.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of a material change in circumstances for a motion to change under the Family Law Rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the issue of material change was properly determined by summary judgment and that the factors (respondent's move, new partner, work schedule change) clearly constituted a material change under the Gordon and Goertz test, relevant to the children's best interests.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to "top up" assigned long-term disability benefits to account for income tax deductions, arguing procedural unfairness and misinterpretation of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal found the "top up" order procedurally unfair as it was not requested by parties and misinterpreted the statutory trust and assignment provisions.

The court held that the assignment applies to net after-tax payments, and the respondent's insurer, as assignee, must bear the burden of addressing tax implications with the insurer and CRA.

The appeal was allowed, and the "top up" order was set aside.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for various offences, appealed a detention order issued by the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to consider his significant progress in hospital, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the hospital's prior non-compliance with a restriction of liberty (ROL) order, and an alleged outdated understanding of the Mental Health Act's committal provisions by the treating psychiatrist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly considered the appellant's progress and the pandemic's effects, appropriately reprimanded the hospital for its past non-compliance, and was entitled to rely on the psychiatrist's evidence given the record.

The court emphasized the Board's paramount consideration of public safety and the need for a complete record on Mental Health Act committal provisions in future disputes.

The appellant, Elahe Vahed, appealed a summary judgment decision that found her in breach of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a condominium unit.

The motion judge had ordered the return of deposits to the buyer (Mohmmad Danesh), damages payable by Vahed, and dismissed Vahed's counterclaims against Danesh, her lawyer (Michael Bury), and the realtor (Remax Crossroads Realty Inc.).

Vahed argued that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the authenticity of a letter extending the closing date and whether her lawyer followed instructions.

She also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed the costs award in favour of Re/Max.

This is a motion to quash an appeal on the basis that the order under appeal was interlocutory, not final, and therefore not properly before the Court of Appeal.

The motion judge had dismissed a motion to strike out claims for declaratory relief, holding that it was not plain and obvious the causes of action had no merit and were properly pleaded.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's order did not finally determine any issues between the parties, leaving them for the trial judge, and was thus interlocutory.

The Court concluded that only the Divisional Court had jurisdiction over such an order and quashed the appeal, awarding substantial indemnity costs to the moving parties.

This appeal concerned the estate of Jeanne Hayward, specifically claims by her former husband, Alexander Hayward, regarding a Chevrolet Malibu (alleged loan vs. gift) and a Montana tractor, and a costs award.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by ruling on the Malibu as a gift without the issue being argued, remitting it for a new trial.

The appeal regarding the tractor loan repayment being time-barred was dismissed as the defence was not raised at trial.

The Court largely upheld the substantial indemnity costs award against Alexander and supporting siblings due to their misconduct, including disputing document authenticity, but reduced the amount Leslie, as estate trustee, could recover from the estate for personal disputes.