Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, Hussein Kelkas, appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual assault involving two complainants.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The trial judge found the complainants credible and the appellant's evidence incredible.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence, impermissible judicial notice, improper bolstering of credibility, and a finding of fact without evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or credibility, and no impermissible use of judicial notice.

The appellants appealed the orders of a motion judge who granted a declaration that previous court orders survived the appellants' bankruptcy.

The motion judge provided no reasons for her decision or for the costs order.

Both parties asked the Court of Appeal to set aside the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the failure to provide reasons incapable of meaningful appellate review constituted an error in law, and ordered a new hearing before a different judge.

The appellant abandoned its appeal, and the respondent sought substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant challenged the court's jurisdiction to award costs for an abandoned appeal and proposed a lower partial indemnity amount.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Rule 61.14 did not displace this discretion.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, finding substantial indemnity was not justified.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after a joint trial.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's misapprehension of video surveillance evidence, which was believed to be uninterrupted but contained significant gaps.

The Court of Appeal found this misapprehension material and central to the trial judge's reasoning for conviction, thus warranting setting aside the convictions.

However, the Court declined to enter an acquittal, determining that the verdict was not unreasonable given other circumstantial evidence, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from two separate incidents.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of unsavoury witnesses under Vetrovec principles and the use of "prefer" language in evaluating witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied Vetrovec by seeking corroboration and that the use of "prefer" was a linguistic slip, not a misapprehension of the burden of proof, given the overall context of the reasons and the trial judge's self-direction on the standard of proof.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 6-year sentence for aggravated assault, which included credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions of confinement.

The conviction stemmed from a violent knife attack on his former partner's husband.

The sentencing judge emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, noting the victim's severe injuries, the appellant's use of two knives, his related criminal record, and the attack occurring partly in front of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of the appellant's limited insight into the gravity of the offence, which restricted the weight given to his rehabilitative potential.

The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge made errors of law in evaluating evidence, specifically regarding witness testimony, a formal admission about a substance trail, and speculation about blood evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's analysis and reiterating that appellate review on a Crown appeal is limited to questions of law, not the reasonableness of an acquittal or reweighing of evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge's finding that the complainant's passivity was due to fear and not consent was upheld, with the Court of Appeal affirming that silence or passivity does not constitute communicated consent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, citing the appellant's history of sexual assaults and the intractability of his behavioural challenges, supported by expert psychiatric evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Roger Guppy, brought an appeal from convictions.

Despite being offered assistance by duty counsel, the appellant declined and remained silent when asked for submissions.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to the appellant's continued silence and failure to make submissions.

This appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to the appellant's failure to appear for the hearing, despite being notified multiple times.

The court was also informed that the appellant had previously failed to attend his criminal trial, which led to the underlying application for habeas corpus, and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

The appellants (Beach parties) appealed summary judgments granted in favour of the respondents (Magenta parties) in three mortgage enforcement actions, and the motion judge's refusal to stay enforcement of those judgments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to grant summary judgment or to decline a stay.

The court clarified and applied a restated multi-factorial approach for stays under Rule 20.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the merits of the counterclaim, the relationship between claims, the defendant's litigation conduct, and the balance of prejudice.

This appeal arose from the seizure of heavy construction equipment without notice following a default on a promissory note and an unassumed lease.

The trial judge had dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, concluding that no notice was required under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the common law duty to provide reasonable notice before seizing secured assets (the Lister v. Dunlop principle) was not displaced by the PPSA.

Furthermore, the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) explicitly required 15 days' notice, and the doctrine of merger did not apply to this personal property transaction.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in holding Mr. Priest personally liable for the unassumed excavator lease, as he was not a party to that specific agreement.

The cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's re-calculation of damages in the main action was dismissed, as no error in principle was identified.

The case was remitted to the Superior Court for an assessment of damages on the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons to its earlier judgment in Nemchin v. Green, 2021 ONCA 238, which had allowed the appellant's appeal regarding the "top-up" of long-term disability benefits assigned to the respondent's insurer, Aviva.

This addendum addresses the treatment of potential tax refunds from Sun Life's remittances and the allocation of expenses related to pursuing such refunds.

The court clarified that while Aviva is not compelled to seek tax refunds or cease tax deductions, if Aviva chooses not to pursue a tax refund, it must reimburse the appellant's reasonable expenses for bringing such an application, as Aviva would ultimately receive the benefit of any tax refunds.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a stay of convictions for trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing police entrapment in "dial-a-dope" operations.

The appeal centered on the application of the Supreme Court's R. v. Ahmad framework for entrapment, specifically regarding the "reasonable suspicion" test.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge applied an incorrect analytical approach by relying on "bona fide investigation" as a standalone justification, her ultimate conclusion of no entrapment was correct.

The Court determined that reasonable suspicion was formed during the initial and subsequent communications with the appellant before the opportunity to commit the crime was presented.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility by finding a lack of motive to fabricate, which was not supported by evidence and improperly bolstered the complainant's testimony.

The court also addressed the standard for production of Children's Aid Society records, noting a lower privacy interest than counselling records.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered due to the credibility assessment error.

The appellants failed to comply with a court order requiring them to post security for costs of the trial and appeal by a specified deadline.

Despite their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and attempts to obtain a stay of the order, the security was not posted.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted the respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with the security for costs order.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a detention order and denied an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued the Board erred in failing to grant an absolute discharge, giving weight to previous appellate findings, and considering the vigour of counsel's submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety was reasonable, based on expert evidence of likely relapse and criminal conduct without supervision.

Michael Theriault appealed his conviction for common assault and his nine-month sentence, stemming from an altercation where he, an off-duty police officer, and his brother assaulted Dafonte Miller, a young Black man, after catching him stealing from their truck.

The trial judge had acquitted the brothers of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice but convicted Michael of common assault for striking Miller with a pipe when Miller was retreating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Theriault's appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence.

The Crown's cross-appeal against the acquittals was also dismissed without addressing its merits, as the Crown had indicated they would not pursue a new trial if Michael Theriault's common assault conviction was upheld.

The appellant, convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's application of wilful blindness to both the nature and origin of the controlled substance.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 15-year global sentence, finding the comparison of fentanyl to heroin for sentencing purposes to be apt, and emphasizing the principles of denunciation and general deterrence given the drug's extreme danger and quantity.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant, Grant Litt, appealed his conviction for breaking and entering, touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose, and attempting to choke a person to commit sexual assault, stemming from a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of evidence, particularly expert evidence on a boot print, and the dismissal of a Charter application to exclude evidence.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence: a revised expert opinion on the boot print, downgrading its association with the appellant's boot.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the cogency and due diligence criteria, as the trial judge had heavily relied on the original expert opinion and failed to sufficiently scrutinize other circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.