Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, a subtenant operating an unlicensed cannabis store, appealed the dismissal of his claim regarding improper sublease termination and denial of relief from forfeiture.

The head landlord had issued a notice of breach and later repossessed the premises after a police raid, relying on the original notice.

The application judge found that the landlord had not waived the breach because they were misled by the subtenant regarding a valid licensing exemption.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, affirming that a waiver requires full knowledge of rights, which was absent due to the misleading information.

The Court also upheld the denial of relief from forfeiture, considering the seriousness of the breach and the subtenant's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the responding parties' application for disclosure under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The responding parties sought disclosure of alleged out-of-court communications between the trial judge and an FBI handler, which were referenced in a book published by an undercover agent, to support a reasonable apprehension of bias claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding it premature to conclude the bias claim could not succeed, and ordered the Crown to make further inquiries regarding the alleged communications.

The appellant, Adu-Bekoe, appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time due to post-verdict sentencing delay.

The trial judge had dismissed his application for a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding a net delay of just under eight months, which was presumptively unreasonable under the five-month ceiling established in R. v. Charley.

However, the court determined that the Crown's dangerous offender application, which was not frivolous, constituted an exceptional circumstance.

After attributing three months to this application (two for preparation and one for the decision), the remaining post-verdict sentencing delay was just under five months, falling within the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the court found no Charter breach and dismissed the appeal.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder, sought review of a single judge's decision denying bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a Court of Appeal detention order.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the application, holding that s. 679(1)(c) of the Criminal Code does not apply to bail pending leave to appeal from a bail decision under s. 680, but rather to appeals from conviction/sentence.

While the Court could exercise its power under s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act to stay the detention order, the original release plan, which relied on specific sureties, could no longer be met, and substituting new sureties would constitute a significant refashioning of the original order, which was characterized as a "close call."

The appellant challenged his convictions for two counts of second-degree murder, arson, and interfering with human remains, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

Specifically, the appellant contended the judge failed to give a W.(D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements, a corrective instruction on purported after-the-fact conduct, and improperly instructed the jury on the defence's failure to call evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's charge, concluding that the jury was adequately instructed on reasonable doubt, the assessment of the accused's out-of-court statements, and the irrelevance of the accused's silence at trial.

The appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi, appealed his convictions for gun-related and criminal organization offences, and his 12-year sentence, stemming from a police investigation ("Project Traveller").

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of Somali-language translator's opinion evidence or in the jury charge regarding the criminal organization definition and flight as after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from 12 years to 10 years.

This reduction was due to the trial judge's error in considering the appellant's racial minority status as an aggravating factor, which the Court of Appeal deemed an improper basis for sentencing.

Justice Paciocco dissented in part on the conviction appeal, arguing that the jury charge on the definition of a criminal organization was inadequate for failing to properly instruct on the elements of structure and continuity.

The appellant appealed his five-year global sentence for drug and firearm offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred by exceeding the Crown's four-year proposal without notice or reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that a sentencing judge must notify counsel and provide clear reasons when intending to impose a sentence higher than the Crown's proposal, even in the absence of a joint submission.

Finding an error in principle that impacted the sentence, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted a four-year sentence.

The accused was convicted of drug trafficking and possession.

He appealed, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling from *R. v. Jordan*, dismissing the stay application.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the 30-month ceiling instead of the 18-month ceiling, as the accused was tried in the Ontario Court of Justice without a preliminary inquiry.

The Court determined that the Crown failed to justify the excessive delay, as the case was not complex enough and the Crown's reliance on the prior *Morin* framework was unreasonable given its dilatory conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision concerning the division of net family property and claims for spousal and child support following a five-year marriage.

The appeal raised issues regarding the beneficial ownership of properties, the application of resulting trust principles, the deductibility of alleged loans from family members, and the dismissal of support claims.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of legal principles, noting that the trial judge's conclusions were well-grounded in the evidence and clearly explained.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jeremey Ceasor, appealed a sentencing judge's decision regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

After pleading guilty to weapons offences, he was released on bail.

He was later charged with breaching his release order and pleaded guilty, with parties proposing time served (33 days).

However, his guilty plea to the breach charge was subsequently struck.

The defence sought to apply the 33 days of pre-sentence custody to the earlier weapons charges, but the sentencing judge denied this.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 719(3) of the Criminal Code does not permit "banking" custodial time for unrelated offences, and credit must relate to the specific offence under consideration.

The appellant was convicted of procuring and advertising sexual services.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in applying the actus reus for procuring by failing to consider the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, as required by the interpretation of "control, direction or influence" under s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

Additionally, the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant for advertising on a theory of party liability that the Crown had disavowed, without providing the defence notice and an opportunity to respond.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights during the execution of a search warrant at his home.

The police used a forced entry without knocking, handcuffed the appellant, and delayed his access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no breaches of s. 8 (search and seizure) or s. 9 (arbitrary detention), as the forced entry and handcuffing were justified for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.

However, the Court found two breaches of s. 10(b) (right to counsel) due to the police questioning the appellant before he could consult a lawyer and failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the Court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breaches were not causally connected to the discovery of the drugs and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned an actionable encroachment on an easement.

The appellants built a swimming pool and amenities over a ten-foot strip of land subject to an easement held by the respondents, which prohibited the erection of any building or structure.

The application judge found an actionable encroachment and ordered removal.

The appellants appealed, arguing the easement was not intended to prohibit such structures, that the 'substantial interference' test was misapplied, and that the easement was abandoned or proprietary estoppel applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the express prohibition in the easement constituted an actionable encroachment, and rejected arguments of abandonment or proprietary estoppel.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly analyze circumstantial evidence and contradictions in the victim's testimony, and erred in principle during sentencing by confusing the roles of the assailants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 6.5-year sentence was fit given the appellant's prior record and the aggravating nature of home invasions, though the assault conviction was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant was convicted of multiple weapons offences based entirely on circumstantial evidence after a police officer witnessed a single gunshot and briefly chased the fleeing suspect.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant's DNA found on the recovered handgun, a fleeting description by the officer, and grainy surveillance videos showing the appellant in the vicinity over an hour prior.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's verdict unreasonable, concluding that the totality of the evidence was too generic to establish the appellant's identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen property, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

He argued that the trial judge erred in relying on flawed eyewitness identification evidence and in finding that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly cautioned herself on the frailties of eyewitness identification and reasonably relied on overwhelming confirmatory evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the dangerous driving and the stolen licence plate.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following his guilty pleas to several offences, including driving while disqualified.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum available under the Criminal Code at the time was five years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lifetime prohibition, and substituted a five-year driving prohibition, noting the appellant's criminal record and the nature of the offences.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing her appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to raise a question of law alone as required by section 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, with the consent of the Crown, the court vacated the $300 victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 6-year sentence for internet luring, sexual interference, and sexual assault of a developmentally delayed child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which relied on corroborating electronic messages showing grooming behaviour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the exploitation of a highly vulnerable child.

However, the court stayed the sexual assault charge to avoid double jeopardy.

The appellant pled guilty to robbery and using an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles, failed to consider rehabilitation, and that the sentence should be reconsidered due to the Sharma decision and COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge appropriately applied Gladue principles, considered rehabilitation, and already accounted for COVID-19 hardships.

A conditional sentence was unavailable as the sentence was not less than two years.