Rajneesh Kumar Sharda

This motion for partial summary judgment concerned the interpretation of an Assignment Agreement for a residential property.

The core dispute was whether the defendants, as assignees, were required to repay the plaintiff, as assignor, the initial deposit of $174,685.29 that the plaintiff had paid to the builder.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, including reading the agreement as a whole and considering the objective intention of the parties.

It found a mathematical error in the payment schedule of the Assignment Agreement and concluded that the objective intention was for the defendants to repay the deposit as part of the total purchase price.

Partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the deposit amount, with a reference directed to determine any additional general damages.

The National Bank of Canada sought summary judgment against personal guarantors, Rajendra Pahuja and Shanta Pahuja, for a defaulted loan to Centrestone Granite and Marble Inc. The Bank also claimed fraudulent misrepresentation against Mr. Pahuja for non-disclosure of a prior guarantee.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging duress and non est factum regarding Ms. Pahuja's guarantee, and improvident actions by the court-appointed receiver.

The court granted summary judgment to the Bank, finding Mr. Pahuja liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and upholding Ms. Pahuja's guarantee, dismissing the defendants' claims of duress and non est factum.

The counterclaim regarding the receiver's actions was dismissed as res judicata.

The appellant, a subtenant operating an unlicensed cannabis store, appealed the dismissal of his claim regarding improper sublease termination and denial of relief from forfeiture.

The head landlord had issued a notice of breach and later repossessed the premises after a police raid, relying on the original notice.

The application judge found that the landlord had not waived the breach because they were misled by the subtenant regarding a valid licensing exemption.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, affirming that a waiver requires full knowledge of rights, which was absent due to the misleading information.

The Court also upheld the denial of relief from forfeiture, considering the seriousness of the breach and the subtenant's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Davies J. dated May 13, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicant, Courtney Campbell, sought relief from forfeiture and re-entry into commercial premises after the landlord, 1493951 Ontario Inc., changed the locks following a police raid on Campbell's unlicensed cannabis store.

The court found Campbell had a valid sub-lease and standing to seek relief.

However, it determined Campbell breached the lease by operating an illegal cannabis business without proper licenses or exemptions.

The landlord was entitled to rely on a prior notice of breach from August 2019, as Campbell had misled them into believing the breach was cured.

The court dismissed Campbell's application for relief from forfeiture, finding the breach serious and the forfeiture lawful, and that it would not be inequitable or unjust to deny relief.

A case management teleconference was held to set the timetable and procedure for the moving party's motion for leave to appeal.

The court directed that the motion be heard in writing by a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court and established deadlines for serving materials and uploading them to an electronic drop box.

The applicant, Courtney Campbell, sought an interim order for relief from forfeiture and re-entry into his cannabis retail store after the landlord changed the locks.

The court applied the three-part test for interim injunctive relief from RJR MacDonald.

While acknowledging serious issues to be tried regarding the sub-lease and forfeiture, the court found that the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favored granting the interim order.

This was primarily because the applicant's business was operating without the required provincial and federal licenses for cannabis sales, rendering any lost profits from such an operation not the type of harm the court should consider.

Furthermore, allowing the unlicensed business to reopen posed a risk of charges to the landlord.

The interim relief was dismissed.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's order finding that a settlement had been reached between the parties based on the appellants' letter of acceptance dated June 15, 2017.

The motion judge rejected the appellants' argument that the respondent's subsequent letter of June 19, 2017 constituted a repudiation of the acceptance, finding that the June 19 letter erroneously referred to a different offer from May 2017 rather than the November 2016 offer that had been accepted.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the costs award of $14,428.14.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's findings or discretionary decision regarding costs and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

DEI Films Ltd. sued Rakesh Tiwari and 3885275 Canada Inc. for defamation.

The defendants successfully brought anti-SLAPP motions, dismissing DEI Films' action.

This decision addresses the defendants' requests for full indemnity costs.

The court granted full indemnity costs to both defendants against DEI Films Ltd., finding no merit in DEI Films' arguments for reduced or no costs.

The court declined to hold non-parties Brij Mohan Trikah and Sital Panesar jointly and severally liable for costs, as the defamation claim was primarily by the corporate entity and had little to do with their personal reputations.

DEI Films Ltd. sued Rakesh Tiwari and 3885275 Canada Inc. for defamation, claiming $1.5 million, arising from a radio broadcast discussing a proposed boycott of a concert.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s.137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the defendants' motions, finding that the broadcast related to a matter of public interest.

DEI Films failed to demonstrate that its action had substantial merit, that the defendants had no valid defense (such as no defamatory statement, justification, or fair comment), or that the harm suffered was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant sued the respondents for $500,000 for stolen consigned jewelry.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued that an e-mail from the respondent constituted an acknowledgment of liability under s. 13(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that promissory estoppel prevented reliance on the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the e-mail did not clearly and unequivocally acknowledge the debt, and there was no promise to forgo the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court costs order of $7,500, arguing it exceeded the 15% limit prescribed by section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The total claims against the remaining respondents at trial were $20,319.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge erred by exceeding the statutory limit without making a finding of unreasonable behaviour to trigger the exception.

The costs award was amended to $3,000.

The court declined to interfere with the trial judge's discretion regarding previous costs orders.

The appellants appealed a family law order regarding access and other issues, arguing the trial judge erred by proceeding in the absence of the appellant's mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had sufficient notice to secure the mother's attendance and failed to request an adjournment.

The court declined to retry the issue of access, finding no error in the trial judge's disposition.

The applicant sought to proceed to arbitration on claims for rehabilitation, housekeeping, and supplementary medical benefits.

The insurer argued these claims were statute-barred because a separate application for arbitration was not filed within the two-year limitation period following the refusal of benefits.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had complied with the spirit of the legislation, as the issues were mediated shortly after the application was filed and the insurer had clear notice of the claims.

The arbitrator ordered that all issues, including income replacement benefits, be heard together at the main arbitration hearing.