Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, Brian Lariviere, appealed a 12-month imprisonment sentence for aggravated assault, use of an imitation firearm, breach of recognizance, and fentanyl possession, after receiving credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The appeal sought a reduction in sentence due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and that general pandemic conditions, without unique personal vulnerability, did not justify a sentence reduction.

The appellant, G.J.S., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault involving his step-daughter.

The trial judge had found the appellant guilty of these charges but not guilty of sexual exploitation, distinguishing between earlier and later alleged incidents.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's use of the complainant's prior consistent statements and a threatening incident involving her biological father.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly used this evidence to enhance the complainant's general trustworthiness and reliability, rather than solely to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

This improper use was deemed determinative of guilt for the earlier allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on both counts.

The English-speaking appellants, having obtained orders under s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code for trials before English-speaking judges and juries, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) on the ground of insufficient English language proficiency.

The trial judges dismissed these applications, concluding that a s. 530 order alone did not automatically entitle an accused to such a challenge without an "air of reality" or "realistic potential" for language competency issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judges' decisions, finding that the s. 530 orders were not necessary in these cases as the trials were already in English, and the purpose of s. 530 is to assist official language minorities, not to enforce minimum fair trial conditions for majority language speakers.

The court affirmed that a threshold showing of realistic potential is required for challenges for cause under s. 638(1)(f), similar to s. 638(1)(b), and that existing jury selection processes (Juries Act qualifications, pre-vetting) adequately address language competency.

The appeals were dismissed, and convictions affirmed.

The appellant, Thanh Tung Phan, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged error in the disposition of a Garofoli application concerning the judicial authorization for surveillance and tracking, and an error in admitting evidence of a history of violence between rival gangs (Chin Pac and Asian Assassinz) to establish motive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Garofoli ruling, concluding that the authorizing justice had reasonable and probable grounds even after excising inaccurate information from the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also found no error in admitting the gang evidence, determining its probative value for narrative, animus, and motive outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially given the trial judge's careful instructions and the manner of admission.

The appellant, Jennifer Renaud, appealed a custodial sentence of ten months for multiple criminal offences, including unauthorized possession of a weapon, theft of a motor vehicle, and personation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence to be too harsh because it exceeded the Crown's requested range without explanation, there was an underestimation of pre-sentence custody credit, and the sentencing judge failed to mention the appellant's guilty plea as a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence for personation was varied to be concurrent, resulting in time served.

The appellants, lawyers and the Attorney General of Canada, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of their motion to dismiss an action brought by an Indian Residential School survivor.

The appellants argued the survivor's action was barred by a release and cause of action bar contained in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) approval order.

The survivor's action alleged psychological harm due to the initial dismissal of his Independent Assessment Process (IAP) claim, stemming from Canada's alleged failure to disclose relevant documents and the lawyers' negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the release did not encompass claims arising from Canada's failure to fulfill its obligations under the IRSSA, nor did it bar the survivor's claim against his former lawyers.

The appellant challenged the Toronto Police Services' (TPS) authority to impose bag searches as a condition of entry into Allan Gardens during the 2010 G20 summit, alleging tortious conduct and Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found that the TPS lacked legal authority, as agents of the City under the Trespass to Property Act, to create such a condition.

The court held that the police conduct infringed the appellant's freedom of expression (s. 2(b)), right against arbitrary detention (s. 9), and right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) under the Charter.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was awarded modest Charter damages.

The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its second finding (unsubstantiated) regarding a police misconduct complaint by the Stanleys and ordered a third investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing of the OIPRD's second decision, but on the ground that the OIPRD was functus officio and lacked statutory or common law authority to reconsider its initial substantiated finding.

The Court set aside the Divisional Court's order for a third investigation, restoring the OIPRD's original decision to refer the matter for a disciplinary hearing, while noting that the OIPRD could now apply its newly amended rules for reconsideration.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The appellant (defendants) had won their appeal, leading to the dismissal of the respondent's (plaintiff's) action.

The parties could not agree on the costs of the Superior Court motion, cross-motion, and other action costs.

The appellant sought over $108,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The respondent argued that the appellant should be disentitled to costs incurred after the close of pleadings due to a multi-year delay in bringing a summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal found no special circumstances to disentitle the appellant to costs, noting that both parties contributed to the delay.

However, the court found the total amount claimed by the appellant to be excessive given the straightforward nature of the case and the amounts in issue.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant an all-inclusive sum of $75,000 for costs of the action, including the motion and cross-motion.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault of his daughter, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning his sex offender treatment.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual error regarding the date of the appellant's treatment was material, impacting the assessment of his propensity to re-offend and the weight given to similar fact evidence.

This misapprehension played an essential part in the reasoning leading to the conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

A dissenting judge argued the error was not material to the overall reasoning.

Joseph Haddad appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his detention at a forensic mental health centre subject to conditions, specifically challenging a condition prohibiting him from attending within 250 metres of his mother's home.

Haddad was found not criminally responsible for an index offence involving discharging a shotgun.

The Board's decision to impose the condition was based on concerns for public safety, psychological harm to neighbours, and the appellant's transition to community living.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the Board's reasonable decision, noting that the condition served to address victim safety and was not a significant restraint on the appellant's liberty, especially as his physician did not recommend visits to the family home.

The applicant, Clara Eva Boros, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender her to Romania for extradition.

The Minister's decision regarding the significant delay in the extradition process, spanning over 18 years, was found to be unreasonable due to a lack of transparent investigation into when Romanian authorities became aware of the applicant's presence in Canada and an insufficient explanation for the delay on the Canadian side.

The Court of Appeal allowed the application, remitting the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration with specific directions for further inquiry and explanation regarding the delays.

The appellant, J.C.J., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and incest, and his five-year sentence for incest (concurrent three years for sexual assault).

The conviction appeal was based on ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding a failed s. 11(b) application and inadequate preparation for testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice.

The sentence appeal argued errors in applying s. 155(2) as a guide, failing to properly weigh mitigating factors, considering defence conduct as aggravating, and imposing an s. 161 order for an over-18 complainant.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, except for setting aside the s. 161 order, which the Crown conceded was inapplicable.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal in the all-inclusive sum of $10,000.

The appellant was also entitled to costs of the motion and cross-motion in the Superior Court, and prima facie entitled to costs of the action below, given the dismissal of the respondent's action.

The court set a schedule for the parties to submit written costs submissions if they could not agree on the quantum of the remaining costs.

Ara Koundakjian appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, having sought a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued the Board misstated the governing legal test by using "appropriate" instead of "necessary and appropriate" and failed to meaningfully consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board understood the correct standard despite the shorthand, and that its determination of continued detention was reasonable and entitled to deference given the appellant's history of mental illness, substance abuse (cocaine), lack of insight, frequent breaches of disposition conditions, and the significant risk of serious harm to the public.

This appeal concerned two class actions (Brazeau and Reddock) brought by federal inmates challenging the legality of administrative segregation practices.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the motion judge's finding of liability against Canada for breaches of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, concluding that the prolonged administrative segregation practices constituted cruel and unusual punishment and lacked independent review.

The court found that Canada's failure to alter its policies despite long-standing criticism met the "clear disregard for Charter rights" threshold for awarding damages.

However, the court set aside the motion judge's order in Brazeau to use aggregate damages for structural changes to penal institutions, deeming it an unjustifiable assumption of judicial control and a misinterpretation of the Class Proceedings Act.

The court also overturned the finding of systemic negligence in Reddock, concluding that Charter damages were the more appropriate remedy.

The appeals were allowed in part, with the Brazeau damages remitted for re-determination and the Reddock negligence finding reversed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the grounds that his re-election of trial mode was invalid due to non-compliance with s. 561(7) of the Criminal Code and that the trial judge erred in concluding he was functus officio.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge was not functus officio but agreed with the trial judge's alternative finding that the appellant, through counsel, had validly waived his right to have the re-election words read to him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.P., appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a threat, unlawful confinement, choking, and sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically arguing that the judge failed to address a material conflict regarding noise from the alleged assaults and the lack of significant facial bruising.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The court noted that the noise issue was only one factor in the credibility analysis and that the complainant's bruising was corroborated by a witness, supporting the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident in a high school classroom.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility, resolving inconsistencies, and addressing potential collusion and animus.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, noting that discrepancies in witness accounts were natural given their different vantage points and that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's age and the passage of time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.J., appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used transcripts of the complainant's police statement and preliminary inquiry evidence for credibility assessments.

The transcripts were provided to the trial judge solely to assist in recalling portions put to the complainant during viva voce evidence.

However, the trial judge considered the entirety of the transcripts, including passages not introduced in evidence, to find the complainant's "three interrogations" internally consistent, thereby preferring her evidence and rejecting the accused's.

The Court of Appeal found this improper use rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.