Gary T. Trotter

The plaintiff, Ms. Clarke, sought long-term disability benefits from Sun Life.

Sun Life initially approved 'own occupation' benefits but closed the file in February 2014, stating medical information did not support 'any occupation' benefits.

After a three-year delay, Ms. Clarke provided further medical information in March 2017, leading to another rejection in June 2017.

Ms. Clarke then filed a statement of claim in August 2018.

Sun Life moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred, which was denied by the motion judge.

Sun Life appealed.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in determining the limitation period's commencement and in failing to conduct a proper discoverability analysis under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the motion judge's order and directing the matter to proceed to trial to determine the limitation period issues.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their property claim, spousal support action, and claim for return of a bracelet, with their primary concern being the costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the statement of claim, finding it an inappropriate method for the claims.

However, the court viewed the appellant's actions as a product of confusion by a self-represented litigant rather than abuse of process.

Consequently, the court reduced the costs award from $7,500 to $2,500 but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation, which escalated into an arrest for marijuana possession.

Police committed multiple serious Charter breaches, including an unlawful public strip search, a 20-minute delay in providing the right to counsel, and a warrantless cellphone search.

The trial judge admitted the seized firearm and drugs, but the Crown conceded on appeal that the s. 24(2) analysis was flawed.

The Court of Appeal found the breaches to be egregious and highly impactful on the appellant's protected interests, outweighing the public interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded, the appeal allowed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant applied for relief to enforce a promissory note assigned to him by a corporation.

The application judge dismissed the application on a without-prejudice basis, finding the appellant had not proven the validity of the assignment, but stated she would remain seized if further proceedings were brought.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the application judge erred in principle by putting the parties to the expense of a new proceeding.

To avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, the judge should have directed the trial of an issue under Rule 38.10(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claim for indemnification against the respondent condominium corporation and refusing to vacate a lien.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the indemnification claim was barred by res judicata as a collateral attack on a prior decision finding the appellant acted in bad faith as a director, and that the lien was validly registered.

The court affirmed that the lien could be revised in accordance with the motion judge's order without affecting its underlying validity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their wrongful dismissal action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants were dismissed for cause in November 2009 and commenced their action in July 2015, approximately six years later.

The appellants argued that they did not know whether a civil proceeding was an appropriate means to seek remedy until related criminal proceedings were resolved.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that "appropriate" under section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act means legally appropriate, not whether the proceeding will succeed.

The court distinguished Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board) on the basis that the civil and criminal matters were not mirror images of each other in this case.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting payment of invoices for demolition and clean-up work performed on their fire-damaged property.

The motion judge found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the amount owing.

The respondent had provided comprehensive documentation including receipts, supplier invoices, worker timesheets, and the final amount had been audited by a company appointed by the appellants' insurer.

The appellants did not cross-examine and failed to raise sufficient doubt about the amount.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of a prohibited firearm, careless use of a firearm, and possession of marijuana following a self-inflicted gunshot wound at an industrial unit.

The appellant challenged the lawfulness of two searches: a warrantless entry and a subsequent search conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The trial judge found the warrantless search justified by exigent circumstances and the warrant valid despite exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of either search.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five charges arising from a home invasion, including an imitation firearm charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence.

He appealed to strike his guilty pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the plea to the imitation firearm charge was uninformed because trial counsel failed to advise him of it.

Furthermore, the court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on the remaining charges by failing to assess the strength of the Crown's case, review disclosure, or consider potential Charter claims before advising the appellant to plead guilty.

The guilty pleas were struck and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of use of an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, two counts of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of threatening to cause death, arising from violent robberies of two victims behind the Yorkdale Subway Station in Toronto.

The appellant received a global sentence of four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of an expert forensic report authenticating Voxer App voicemail messages that would establish his absence from the scene of the robberies.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence and conceded that the convictions amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of child luring contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and communicating with a person believed to be under 18 for sexual services contrary to s. 212(4).

He was one of 104 people caught in a police sting operation on Backpage.com.

The appellant claimed he believed he was engaged in role-play with an adult, not a 16-year-old.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and found the appellant actually believed the person was 16.

The appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 12 months' imprisonment under s. 172.1(2)(a) and 6 months under s. 212(4), to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the mandatory minimum under s. 172.1(2)(a) was declared unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable circumstances, though the 12-month sentence imposed was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of a will provision granting an employee an option to purchase the testator's auto supply company.

The application judge determined the purchase price to be $529,611 (calculated using the formula in the will with adjustments for salary normalization and deductions for improperly made support payments), and dispensed with the requirement for a collateral mortgage against the employee's residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in treating the employee as a potential purchaser rather than a beneficiary, in dispensing with the collateral mortgage requirement, in accepting the employee's expert valuation for salary purposes, and in deducting the support payments from the purchase price.

The appellant appealed a default judgment obtained by the respondents in a real estate dispute.

The respondents, as purchasers, alleged that the appellant, as vendor, made negligent misrepresentations regarding property taxes in MLS listings for two properties.

The motion judge declined to set aside the default judgment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judgment was irregularly obtained.

The Court of Appeal upheld the default judgment, finding that the statement of claim provided a sufficient basis for the judgment as it included allegations of negligent misrepresentation and a plea that the respondents would not have entered into the transactions but for the misrepresentations.

The respondent commenced an action against the appellants arising from mortgage investments.

After the appellants were noted in default and failed to appear on a motion for judgment, default judgment was granted in excess of $800,000.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion to set aside the default judgment.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the motion judge's analysis on all grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants failed to establish an arguable defence on the merits and that there was no evidence of prejudice beyond the axiomatic prejudice of having a judgment entered against them.

The court also noted that the appellants' allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias was recklessly made without evidentiary support.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the condominium corporation an order to enter and inspect a unit following a complaint about noise emanating from the staircase.

The appellants denied entry and issued a trespass notice.

The appellants raised seven grounds of appeal in their factum but narrowed their argument at hearing to a single contention that there was no evidentiary basis for the condominium board to carry out an inspection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the condominium corporation had a right and duty under the Condominium Act to ensure compliance with legislation and to inspect the unit to gather information about the nature and extent of the suspected problem.

An appeal concerning the appointment of guardians for a 90-year-old mother's property and personal care.

David and Edward Carey, who were originally applicants, withdrew their support for the applicants' position and sought to be appointed as appellants.

The motion judge had previously removed them as applicants without making them respondents.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to appoint guardians in the best interests of the mother.

The court ordered David and Edward Carey to pay costs of $5,000 to the respondents.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a fraudulent scheme involving the sale of used vehicles.

The trial judge found the appellant garage liable for conversion of five missing vehicles and awarded damages of $40,792.

The trial judge dismissed conversion claims regarding consigned vehicles, finding the parties acquired them in good faith without notice of defects in title.

The appellants challenged the findings regarding stolen vehicles, mitigation of damages, quantum of damages, and the failure to adjudicate certain counterclaims.

The respondents cross-appealed the mercantile agent finding and the costs award.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, with limited relief granted for a contribution and indemnity claim against one defendant.

The appellant, a heavy electricity user, challenged the constitutionality of the Global Adjustment component of Ontario's electricity pricing formula, which funds the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) program.

The appellant argued that the FIT program component was a colourable attempt to disguise a tax as a regulatory charge, designed to provide economic stimulus and subsidies to preferred communities (aboriginal peoples, co-operatives, and municipalities) rather than to regulate electricity generation.

The motion judge struck the applications, finding the Global Adjustment was a valid regulatory charge within a closed system.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the appellant's colourability challenge was sufficiently plausible that the applications should not have been dismissed on a pleadings motion and should proceed to a full hearing on the merits.

The appellant was convicted after a 70-day trial of two counts of fraud over $5000, two counts of fraud under $5000, one count of attempting to obstruct justice, one count of forgery, and one count of causing someone to use a forged document.

She was sentenced to 14 months in jail.

The appellant appealed her convictions on multiple grounds, including claims that the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment, that certain counts were void for vagueness, that the convictions were unreasonable, and that the burden of proof was reversed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

On June 21, 2019, Parliament enacted Bill C-75, which substantially limited the availability of preliminary inquiries in Canada.

Prior to the amendments, any accused who elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice could request and obtain a preliminary inquiry.

After September 19, 2019, preliminary inquiries became available only for indictable offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The central issue on appeal was whether these amendments applied retrospectively to charges that were before the Ontario Court of Justice when the amendments came into force, specifically to accused who had elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice and requested preliminary inquiries before September 19, 2019.

The appellants were charged with sexual assault, which is not punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The Superior Court of Justice had prohibited the Ontario Court of Justice from holding preliminary inquiries in their cases.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the amendments do not apply to accused who had elected and requested preliminary inquiries before the amendments came into force.