Gary T. Trotter

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing bodily harm, and causing bodily harm while being over 80.

The respondent had collided with an oncoming vehicle on Lakeshore Boulevard in Toronto, causing serious injuries to three occupants.

The Crown's case was hampered by the unavailability of blood alcohol evidence due to continuity concerns and a malfunctioning breathalyzer.

The only evidence of alcohol consumption was the respondent's own statement to paramedics that she had consumed two glasses of wine.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to consider all evidence regarding impairment and whether the driving constituted a marked departure.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated thorough consideration of all evidence and that the Crown had failed to prove a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.

A youthful first offender appealed a sentence of seven and one-half years (reduced from ten years on account of pre-sentence custody) imposed for incest, sexual assault, and making, possessing and distributing child pornography involving his four-year-old daughter.

The appellant sought a reduction to four and one-half years and sought to set aside the victim surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but allowed it in part by setting aside the victim surcharge under R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson causing damage to property and mischief endangering life arising from two incidents involving damage to a vehicle belonging to the mother of his former girlfriend.

The appellant was acquitted of a third mischief charge involving a slashed tire.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's admission and reliance on similar fact evidence and her identification of the appellant from security video footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's identification of the appellant from video evidence or in her conclusion that the two offences were likely committed by the same person based on striking similarities.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence to eliminate the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and life sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The victim was shot three times at close range at a busy Toronto intersection after exiting a TTC bus, resulting in permanent paralysis.

The appellant challenged the conviction on the basis of eyewitness identification concerns, arguing the trial judge failed to exercise appropriate caution regarding the reliability of the victim's identification.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh surveillance video evidence and argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit given his age at the time of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence and that the life sentence was justified given the serious nature of the unprovoked attempted murder committed with a firearm in a public place.

The appellant appealed a sentence of eight years and two months imposed for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine.

The principal ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in selecting the appropriate sentencing range for mid-level trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the case contained numerous aggravating factors including the appellant's calculated return to commercial trafficking within months of release from custody, the nature and variety of highly addictive substances trafficked, and significant community problems with opioid use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to one year imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of production orders and tracking warrants obtained through informations to obtain that relied on information from two confidential informants.

The trial judge applied the Debot factors and found reasonable grounds to support the authorizations.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test and erred in assessing the reliability of the confidential informants' information.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the correct statutory test or her analysis of the Debot factors.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a 21-year-old complainant.

The appellant, aged 53, had invited the complainant to a motel room where he had planned a sexual encounter.

He provided alcohol to the complainant, who became severely intoxicated.

The appellant engaged in sexual contact with the complainant, who testified she was semi-conscious or in and out of consciousness throughout.

The appellant claimed the encounter was consensual and that he honestly believed the complainant was consenting.

The trial judge found the complainant was intoxicated and semi-conscious, to the appellant's knowledge, and therefore could not consent.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance to the self-represented appellant by disallowing cross-examination regarding potential collusion; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding the appellant's honest but mistaken belief in consent; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence resulting in an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering continued detention under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the Board improperly conflated the risk of relapse in mental illness with the risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the evidence supported a finding of significant risk of reoffending based on the appellant's psychosis triggered by substance abuse, his history of violent behaviour, and high actuarial risk scores.

The Board properly rejected a conditional discharge, accepting expert evidence that Mental Health Act provisions would be inadequate to protect the public.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment (less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 3 years) imposed for guilty pleas to possession of a counterfeit mark, operation of a motor vehicle while disqualified, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and failure to stop at the scene of an accident.

The appellant was a serious serial recidivist with 51 prior convictions spanning 20 years, predominantly for driving-related offences.

The incident involved a high-speed chase through city streets at speeds up to 138 km/h, resulting in a collision that caused serious injuries to the other driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and upholding the sentence as appropriate given the appellant's extensive criminal record, poor rehabilitation prospects, and the need for public protection.

The moving party sought either to have the Court of Appeal reconstitute itself as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear his appeal immediately after the appellant's appeal, or to be granted leave to intervene as a party in the appellant's appeal.

Both the moving party and the appellant were injured in motor vehicle accidents and had their statutory accident benefits claims denied.

The moving party argued that both appeals raised the same or similar issues regarding the application of the two-year limitation period for disputing the refusal of statutory accident benefits.

The court dismissed both requests, finding that allowing the moving party to bypass the Divisional Court would be improper absent compelling reasons, and that efficiency alone was insufficient justification for such an extraordinary step.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of fraud, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant claimed his lawyer failed to properly prepare him for trial, made improper admissions, failed to present relevant evidence, and colluded with the Crown.

The Court of Appeal rejected all allegations, finding that defence counsel's performance met the standard of reasonably competent counsel.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his fine and compensation orders based on impecuniosity, but the Court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on multiple offences including theft, threatening, fail to stop, and break and enter.

The sentencing judge accepted the defence range of 18-24 months and imposed a sentence of 21 months after deducting pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge made a mathematical error in calculating the sentence and failed to expressly consider the appellant's Indigenous background.

The court reduced the total sentence to 17 months, including five months credit for pre-sentence custody, by reducing the sentences for theft and threats by four months on each count.

The appellant was convicted of numerous sexual offences against various family members.

On appeal, the appellant challenged convictions relating to two victims, arguing the trial judge failed to address their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground of appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed credibility and reliability considerations in his reasons.

However, the court accepted the Crown's concession that the trial judge erred in considering pre-undertaking conduct when convicting on one count of breaching an undertaking, and set aside that conviction and stayed the charge.

The court also accepted the Crown's concession regarding pre-sentence custody credit, awarding an additional 503 days at a 1.5:1 rate.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from a conviction on four counts of threatening his professor and family members.

The trial judge provided thorough reasons with careful credibility findings.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal and rejected the applicant's motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no proper basis for leave, no legal errors by the lower court, and that the issues did not transcend the facts of the case or raise matters of significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a young woman with an intellectual disability.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the majority held that the trial judge's reasons were deficient in several respects: the trial judge failed to adequately address the complainant's reliability, particularly her heightened suggestibility as established by expert evidence; the trial judge appeared to find the complainant's evidence self-corroborating when it was not; and the trial judge failed to explain why the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The majority concluded these deficiencies, taken together, foreclosed meaningful appellate review and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The dissent argued the trial judge's reasons were adequate and that the trial judge was clearly alive to the reliability issues.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The Superior Court had dismissed his appeal.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge failed to address the appellant's disorientation and possible concussion following an accident as raising a reasonable doubt, and whether an alleged lie by a police officer provided grounds for leave to appeal.

The court found that the trial judge was clearly aware of the disorientation evidence, having acquitted the appellant on the impaired driving charge, and that any alleged police officer lie had no impact on the conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

Leave to appeal was denied.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part to strike the victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed a one-year sentence for civil contempt imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant argued the sentence was excessive, that the judge was inflamed by the appellant's non-compliance with asset freezing and disclosure orders, and that the sentence was purely punitive rather than coercive.

The appellant also contended the sentence was out of line with other civil contempt cases.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence appropriate given the appellant's multiple opportunities to purge contempt, attempts to deceive the court, the brazen and deliberate nature of the contempt, the underlying $7 million civil fraud, and the lack of asset recovery despite the judge's delay in imposing sentence.

A corn grower who neither purchased nor planted genetically modified corn seed brought a proposed class action against the seed manufacturer for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the Competition Act.

The manufacturer had commercialized the seed in North America before obtaining approval in China.

The seed's traits commingled with all North American corn, causing China to ban all North American corn imports, resulting in a market glut and price collapse.

The motion judge struck all claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the negligence claim for premature commercialization while upholding dismissal of the misrepresentation and Competition Act claims.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 46 months imposed for three robberies of vulnerable businesses, arguing the sentence was too harsh and that the sentencing judge had double-counted by treating offence elements as aggravating factors and had given insufficient weight to the guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit, finding that the sentencing judge was correct in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, the use of weapons and threats, and the appellant's criminal history.

The plaintiff, a truck driver operating a tractor-trailer as an independent contractor in Florida, was struck by an underinsured vehicle with only $20,000 in coverage.

He sought underinsured motorist coverage under two insurance policies: his personal automobile policy with AllState and the fleet coverage through ACE INA for the commercial vehicle.

Both policies contained optional Family Protection Coverage endorsements for underinsured vehicle coverage.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that AllState was obliged to provide underinsured coverage while ACE INA was not.

AllState appealed, and the plaintiff cross-appealed the ACE INA decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed AllState's appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal, holding that neither insurer was obliged to provide underinsured coverage for the heavy commercial vehicle operated by the plaintiff.