Gary T. Trotter

The appellants appealed the motion judge's order striking their statement of claim and amended statement of claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants alleged that the Law Society's practice of requiring lawyers facing negligence claims to provide client files to the professional indemnity insurer violated confidentiality, privacy, and solicitor-client privilege.

The motion judge struck the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that section 9 of the Law Society Act provides statutory immunity for actions taken in good faith in the performance of statutory duties.

The appellants did not plead bad faith, which is necessary to overcome the statutory immunity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The father appealed from the dismissal of his appeal from four family law orders relating to custody and access of three children.

The lower court orders had modified the father's access from unsupervised to supervised, citing concerns about the father's conduct in disparaging the mother to the children and the sporadic nature of his visits.

The father failed to obtain required transcripts for the appeal hearing and insisted on proceeding without them.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as having no merit.

The father appealed, arguing denial of procedural fairness and inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and confirming that the appeal had no merit based on the materials before the lower court judge.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a Settlement Agreement requiring payment of USD $200,000 upon satisfaction of a condition regarding the withdrawal of criminal charges in Panama.

The motion judge interpreted the condition as satisfied when the prosecutor provided written confirmation that charges were discontinued, despite an outstanding detention order/arrest warrant.

The appellant argued the motion judge misapprehended evidence and that the condition required both dismissal of charges and withdrawal of the detention order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding no error in the textual analysis of the Settlement Agreement and rejecting the appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside a settlement regarding property in Highland Falls, New York and finding respondents in contempt.

The motion judge had granted the respondents' cross-motion for relief permitting implementation of the settlement terms.

The appellant raised four main grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge erred in requiring leave to bring the motion; (2) the motion judge erred in rejecting her argument that the Final Order should be set aside due to environmental dumping issues; (3) the motion judge erred in approving a Deed Transfer that created an easement not contemplated by the Final Order; and (4) the motion judge erred in approving a Conservation Easement that was substantially more restrictive than agreed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the motion judge's decision.

The father appealed a trial judge's order granting the maternal uncle monthly weekend access to the children following the mother's death.

The trial judge had awarded sole custody to the father but ordered that the uncle have access one weekend per month, including overnight visits.

The father argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not occur without a court order, that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for disbelieving his evidence that he would voluntarily provide access, and that the trial judge failed to consider potential psychological harm to the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was properly driven by the children's best interests and entitled to deference.

Following the breakdown of a 15-year cohabitation and 14-year marriage, the parties settled parenting issues but disputed financial matters.

After a nine-day trial, the trial judge made orders regarding equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, and spousal and child support, but declined to order disposition of a cottage property on First Nation land.

The father appealed nearly all orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the father's lack of candor and dishonesty were entitled to deference, and that her decisions on equalization, support, and section 7 expenses were properly reasoned and supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing two related proceedings and striking out his statement of defence in a third proceeding arising from an aborted real estate transaction in 2004.

The appellant had accumulated multiple costs orders and failed to meet a 60-day deadline to pay outstanding costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the condition that the appellant pay all outstanding costs within 30 days, finding that dismissal without notice to the appellant regarding one of the actions was improper and that a trial on the merits was preferable.

This is a supplementary decision to the Court of Appeal's judgment allowing the appeal in part.

Following the release of the main decision, the respondent requested that funds paid into court by the appellants as security for costs be paid out to the respondent.

The appellants did not oppose this request.

The court ordered that the funds held by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice be paid out to the respondent.

The appellant agreed to sell her home at 45 Moore Avenue, Toronto to the respondents.

Between execution of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and closing, neighbouring property owners asserted ownership of a two-foot-wide strip of the driveway.

The respondents refused to close, claiming the appellant could not convey clear title to the entire driveway.

The appellant sued for damages; the respondents counterclaimed for return of their deposit.

The motion judge found in favour of the respondents, determining that the APS represented the appellant owned all of what visually appeared to be the functioning private driveway, and that the title defect was significant enough to justify refusing to close.

The appellant appealed, arguing the APS only required sale of a seven-foot-wide driveway (per the 1987 survey) and that any defect was not significant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and two counts of driving while impaired causing bodily harm, following a head-on collision that resulted in one death and injuries to two passengers.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: alleged violation of s. 8 Charter rights regarding blood sample seizure; alleged violation of s. 10(b) Charter rights regarding access to counsel; alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding a third vehicle; and alleged error in rejecting evidence of bolus drinking prior to the collision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellants purchased two parcels of land in an unorganized township in the District of Parry Sound and sought a declaration that Trussler Road, which crossed respondents' private property, was a public highway.

The appellants claimed the road qualified as a public highway under section 261 of the Municipal Act based on colonization road status, statute labour, or dedication and acceptance.

The motion judge dismissed the claims on all grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to establish dedication and acceptance on the evidence.

The court found the use of the road was consistent with neighbourly tolerance rather than public dedication.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his action under Rule 21(a) on the basis that the contractual provision at issue—a covenant to insure—could be determined as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeal found that Rule 21(a) was improperly applied because the covenant could not be interpreted in isolation from the contract as a whole or in a factual vacuum.

The motion judge did not have the contract itself before him, making it impossible to determine the objective intentions of the parties according to principles of contract interpretation.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

Appeal from a motion judge's order varying child and spousal support orders from a 1999 judgment.

The respondent sought to vary support based on changed circumstances, including health issues and reduced income.

The motion judge terminated spousal support as of December 31, 2002, based on the appellant's material change in circumstances (employment and remarriage), and reduced child support from 2004 onwards due to the respondent's declining income.

The appellant appealed the variation of support orders and the dismissal of a fraudulent conveyance application.

The respondent cross-appealed the refusal to award costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part regarding child support, dismissed the appeals regarding spousal support and fraudulent conveyances, and dismissed the cross-appeal on costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision of the Superior Court of Justice in favor of the respondent bank.

The respondent bank sought recovery of a debt from the appellant and a corporation.

The motion judge found that there was no genuine dispute that the appellant and the corporation were liable for the debt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding it was an appropriate case for summary judgment and that the motion judge's findings were supported by the record.

The appellant was convicted of break and enter of a dwelling house and other offences based primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove discovered at the crime scene.

The Crown admitted in an agreed statement of fact that the appellant's DNA was found in the glove but called no expert evidence regarding DNA transfer characteristics or whether the appellant's DNA was the sole profile on the glove.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts unreasonable, holding that the DNA evidence alone was incapable of bearing the burden of proving the appellant left the glove at the scene.

The convictions were set aside and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of importing almost two kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to six years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody on a 1.5:1 basis plus an additional 90-day credit for harsh conditions in remand custody.

The appellant appealed, arguing that sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code violated her Charter rights under sections 7 and 12 by effectively requiring her to spend significantly longer in custody before becoming eligible for parole than an offender who had received bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that parole eligibility questions are not a component of the determination of a fit sentence, and that neither section 719(1) nor 719(3.1) delays parole eligibility or requires offenders denied bail to serve longer sentences than those granted bail.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 40-month sentence.

He was self-represented at trial and argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, rendering the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence overwhelming and that the trial judge provided extensive assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 40-month sentence fell within the appropriate range for aggravated assault given the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the appellant, who was self-represented, was deprived of a fair hearing because the trial judge failed to provide appropriate assistance to her as a self-represented party.

The appellate court found it was not in a position to make the necessary factual findings to conduct the appeal and therefore allowed the appeal, remitting the matter back to the Ontario Court of Justice for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the trial judge on January 10, 2018.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of a key Crown witness.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the Crown and defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had effectively complied with the spirit of Vetrovec by carefully examining the evidence and considering both confirmatory aspects and frailties.

The court noted that a Vetrovec warning is discretionary and that counsel had agreed at trial that no such warning was necessary.

The court also rejected the argument regarding uneven scrutiny, noting that the appellant was essentially requesting that the court re-weigh evidence, which is the function of the trial judge.

A senior vice president with 37 years of service was terminated without cause following a minor dispute over promotional sporting event tickets.

The motion judge awarded 30 months' notice and full bonus entitlements during the notice period.

On appeal, the employer challenged both the notice period and the bonus entitlement.

The Court of Appeal reduced the notice period to 24 months, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting a longer period.

However, the court upheld the bonus entitlement, finding that while the termination provision in the bonus plans was unambiguous and would have limited the employee's entitlement, the provision was unenforceable because it was not properly communicated to the employee by the employer.