Frank Addario

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The 18-year-old appellant, a first-time offender, was convicted of multiple offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault following a violent home invasion.

The trial judge sentenced him to a total of nine years' imprisonment, holding that general deterrence and denunciation were the paramount sentencing considerations.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while general deterrence and denunciation are weighed heavily for serious violent crimes, individual deterrence and rehabilitation remain the primary objectives for a youthful first offender.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the total sentence to seven years by making the two-year sentence for unauthorized possession of a firearm concurrent rather than consecutive.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his foster child.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including reversing the burden of proof, misapprehending evidence, improperly using out-of-court statements as corroboration, and failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) principles, correctly admitted prior consistent statements as narrative, and made credibility findings that were fully supported by the record.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.

The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.

The applicant sought review of a detention order pending an extradition hearing arising from United States drug trafficking allegations involving substantial quantities of cocaine and MDMA.

The court applied the deferential extradition bail review standard, requiring demonstration of an error in principle by the application judge.

It held that the judge was entitled to find a serious primary-ground flight risk in light of the strength of the foreign case, the prospect of a very lengthy sentence, the scale of the alleged trafficking operation, and the limits of the proposed surety and monitoring plan.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings that prevented a fourth trial of the respondent for first degree murder.

The respondent's first trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and his second and third trials ended in hung juries.

At the second and third trials, the judge excluded evidence that a 911 call containing details known only to the killer had been traced to a payphone near the respondent's workplace.

The Court of Appeal held that the 911-trace evidence should have been admitted under the principled approach to hearsay, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

Because the Crown was denied a full opportunity to present its case due to the erroneous exclusion of this highly probative evidence, the Court found that a fourth trial would not constitute an abuse of process.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to five counts involving the sexual exploitation of a minor: invitation to sexual touching, sexual interference, possession of child pornography, making available sexually explicit material to a child, and luring a child.

Over a three-week period, the 30-year-old accused engaged in online contact with a 15-year-old victim, misrepresenting his age, coercing her to create explicit images and videos, and ultimately forcing her to perform oral sex.

A search of his electronic devices revealed 76 images of child pornography and 26 images of child nudity.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years imprisonment with enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, along with DNA, SOIRA, and prohibition orders.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple charges arising from a series of robberies and break and enters, including robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and use of a firearm in the commission of unlawful confinement.

On appeal, he argued that the Kienapple principle precluded multiple convictions for these offences arising from the same incidents.

The Court of Appeal held that while the unlawful confinement convictions could stand, the convictions for using a firearm in the commission of unlawful confinement must be stayed, as they punished the same criminal wrong as the robbery with a firearm convictions.

The court varied the sentences on the armed robbery convictions to maintain the total sentence of seven years and nine months' imprisonment.

The person sought in extradition proceedings applied for disclosure of the United States indictment at the committal stage.

The Attorney General argued that disclosure was premature because extradition judges determine committal based solely on the record of the case and the indictment would be disclosed later at the surrender stage.

The court held that while jurisprudence does not require disclosure of the indictment at the committal phase, it does not prohibit it.

Because the indictment was necessary for the person sought to understand the full jeopardy faced in the requesting state and to make informed decisions about consenting to committal, surrender, or waiving extradition under the Extradition Act, withholding it would undermine those statutory rights and violate principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Attorney General was ordered to disclose the indictment with the condition that it not be used to challenge committal.

The appellant appealed two first degree murder convictions arising from a motel room shooting, arguing that the principal eyewitness identification evidence should have been excluded, that defence expert evidence on identification frailties should have been admitted, and that the jury charge on identification was inadequate.

The court held that the eyewitness evidence was fully testable through the adversarial process and did not create the kind of prejudice that would justify exclusion.

The court declined to revisit existing authority limiting general expert evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification and upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the proposed opinion evidence was unnecessary.

Reading the charge as a whole, the court found the jury was adequately cautioned about the dangers of identification evidence, including the limits of witness confidence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a real estate agent and his co-accused, were convicted of conspiracy to produce marijuana and related offences.

During the trial, the trial judge interrupted the Crown's cross-examination of the real estate agent to ask if he knew what perjury was and suggested his counsel advise him on its consequences.

The appellants appealed, arguing this intervention created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's comments indicated he had prejudged the accused's credibility before hearing all evidence, fatally compromising the fairness of the trial for both accused.

The appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

In a criminal appeal concerning workplace computer privacy, the Court held that an employee may retain a reasonable, though diminished, expectation of privacy in personal information stored on an employer-issued laptop where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected.

The police breached section 8 by conducting warrantless searches of computer data received from a school board, because the employer's authority to search for workplace purposes did not transfer to police for criminal investigation.

The majority concluded exclusion under section 24(2) was not warranted after balancing police conduct, privacy impact, and trial truth-seeking interests.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial order remained in place.

A dissent would have excluded the evidence due to serious disregard of warrant requirements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a minor.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of the assaults, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test, ignored evidence about his apparel, and misapprehended video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and application of the W.(D.) test were sufficient and supported by the evidence.

The accused, a former elementary school teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a student during the 1994-95 school year when the complainant was 13-14 years old.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in inappropriate sexual contact including kissing, hand-holding, and masturbation over several months.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming his conduct was limited to appropriate academic support and encouragement.

The trial judge found significant reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding recovered memories obtained through therapy and the provenance of an Italian pendant allegedly given as a gift.

Although the judge found the complainant's testimony generally credible and preferred it over the accused's evidence, the judge concluded that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to these reliability concerns and reasonable doubt arising from the accused's testimony.