Frank Addario

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after stabbing a neighbour during a physical altercation on her driveway.

The fight was instigated by the neighbours over noise from a leaf blower.

The appellant claimed she acted in self-defence to protect her husband, who was involved in the melee.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the victim was not applying force or engaged with the husband at the moment of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the law of self-defence and did not impermissibly weigh the appellant's response to a nicety.

The appellants, a father, mother, and son, were convicted of four counts of first-degree murder after four family members were found drowned in a submerged vehicle.

On appeal, the son sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming he was a young person at the time of the offences, thereby challenging the adult court's jurisdiction.

The appellants also appealed on grounds relating to the admission of expert evidence on honour killings, instructions on post-offence conduct, the admission of ante-mortem hearsay statements, and the Crown's theory of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed documents lacked threshold reliability.

The Court also dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The applicant was charged with two drunk driving offences on May 18, 2015, with trial scheduled for October 24-26, 2016, resulting in a total delay of 17 months and 8 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets an 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice matters.

The court found that while the delay fell below the ceiling, the applicant failed to meet the onus of establishing that the case took markedly longer than reasonable.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, particularly by failing to pursue Crown pre-trials or judicial pre-trials, and that both parties had limited availability for trial dates.

The applicant sought to quash a direct indictment for first-degree murder, alleging actual or apprehended bias by the Deputy Attorney General who preferred the indictment, lack of opportunity to be heard, and insufficient consideration of facts.

The court dismissed the application, finding no actual or reasonable apprehension of bias, no legal requirement for pre-indictment submissions (especially given flight risk concerns), and that the Deputy Attorney General was entitled to review material as deemed necessary.

The Crown brought a motion to remove two lawyers and their firm from the record due to a conflict of interest.

The lawyers, partners in the same firm, were representing two co-accused charged with sexual assault.

The respondents opposed the motion, asserting solicitor-client privilege over their defence positions and formally waiving any conflict.

The court addressed threshold procedural issues regarding the review of sealed affidavit evidence and the concept of waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that a judge's review of privileged information for adjudication purposes does not destroy or waive the privilege.

However, considering the differing DNA evidence for the co-accused, the court concluded there was a substantial and realistic risk that their defence positions would diverge, creating conflicting duties of loyalty for their counsel.

Despite the clients' waivers, the interests of justice, including the integrity of the trial process, predominated.

The motion to disqualify and remove counsel was granted.

The appellant, Andrew Wilby, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The conviction arose from an incident where he drove his police cruiser onto a sidewalk, colliding with a fleeing suspect, Cammalleri, during an apprehension attempt.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by using speculation, applying a harsher standard of scrutiny to defence evidence, and rendering an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found that the trial judge was entitled to reject certain defence evidence and draw inferences that logically flowed from the accepted facts, including that the appellant deliberately drove onto the sidewalk to obstruct the suspect's path.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or the application of the dangerous driving test.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a criminal bribery prosecution, the appellant international financial organization challenged a third party production order and subpoenas issued in support of a Garofoli wiretap challenge.

The Court held that archival and personnel immunities under the Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act applied to records and investigators of the organization’s integrity unit, and no waiver was established.

The Court further held that, in the Garofoli context, third party production requires a reasonable likelihood of probative value to the affiant-knowledge issues, not broad relevance to trial truth.

Because that threshold was not met, the production order was set aside.

Three Toronto police officers charged with sexual assault sought a publication ban on investigative materials filed by the Crown in a related application to remove counsel.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, finding a real and substantial risk to trial fairness due to potential juror stigmatization and witness tainting, especially given the salacious nature of the allegations against police officers.

While acknowledging the public interest in scrutiny, the court determined that allowing media access to the information (without publication) and expert commentary provided a sufficient substitute for full public disclosure.

The publication ban was granted, prohibiting publication until the jury retires or the charge is withdrawn/dismissed.

The appellant police officer appealed his conviction for Discreditable Conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal from the police service.

The officer had previously pleaded guilty to the disciplinary charge, which was based on a criminal conviction that was later overturned on appeal.

The Commission held that the subsequent overturning of the criminal conviction did not render the original, informed guilty plea a nullity.

The Commission further found that the penalty of dismissal was reasonable given the officer's disciplinary history and the serious nature of the misconduct, which involved violence and threats against members of the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his conviction for the sexual exploitation of a student.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to his testimony, and erred in admitting similar act and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were fair, the admission of similar act evidence from another student was reasonable, and the post-offence conduct evidence was properly used to assess credibility and the trajectory of the relationship.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following the stabbing death of his girlfriend.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on an eyewitness who was highly intoxicated at the time of the offence.

The appellant was also found in a near-comatose state of alcohol intoxication at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the eyewitness's reliability and the appellant's extreme intoxication related to reasonable doubt and the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an on-ice collision during a recreational no-contact hockey game.

The trial judge rejected the defence's evidence that the collision was accidental, finding instead that it was a deliberate blindside hit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge engaged in impermissible speculative reasoning by relying on her own personal knowledge of hockey strategy and on-ice injuries to reject the defence witnesses' testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought to quash convictions for sexual interference arising from allegations that he repeatedly touched a child complainant under her clothing during family tickling incidents at a cottage.

The appeal argued that the trial reasons were insufficiently responsive to the defence theory of mistake, that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, and that demeanour evidence was given undue weight.

Applying the functional sufficiency-of-reasons approach and reviewing the credibility analysis, the court held that the trial judge adequately addressed the live issues, made no material misapprehension, and did not over-rely on demeanour.

The appeal was dismissed and the surrender order was confirmed.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The 18-year-old appellant, a first-time offender, was convicted of multiple offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault following a violent home invasion.

The trial judge sentenced him to a total of nine years' imprisonment, holding that general deterrence and denunciation were the paramount sentencing considerations.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while general deterrence and denunciation are weighed heavily for serious violent crimes, individual deterrence and rehabilitation remain the primary objectives for a youthful first offender.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the total sentence to seven years by making the two-year sentence for unauthorized possession of a firearm concurrent rather than consecutive.

On a summary conviction appeal from convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a nightclub altercation, the appellant challenged both the adequacy of the trial reasons and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court held that the trial judge failed to explain how exculpatory eyewitness evidence was treated, failed to explain how equivocal recognition evidence from grainy surveillance video established identity, and referred to legal doctrines that had no clear application to the evidentiary record.

After independently reviewing the surveillance footage and the totality of the evidence, the court concluded that no properly instructed trier could reasonably find identity proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

Accused charged with bribery of foreign public officials sought production of investigative records from the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency in support of a Garofoli challenge to wiretap authorizations.

The World Bank asserted immunity as an international organization and refused to produce additional materials.

The court held that by initiating and actively assisting the Canadian criminal investigation, the organization had impliedly waived immunity and must accept the procedural burdens of a criminal prosecution.

The applicants established likely relevance under the first stage of the O’Connor framework.

Production was ordered for certain investigative materials for judicial review.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his foster child.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including reversing the burden of proof, misapprehending evidence, improperly using out-of-court statements as corroboration, and failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) principles, correctly admitted prior consistent statements as narrative, and made credibility findings that were fully supported by the record.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.

The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.