Frank Addario

The accused was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport after being threatened by a man in Belgrade who said he would harm her mother if she did not comply.

She raised the common law defence of duress, successfully arguing that the strict immediacy and presence requirements of section 17 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct should attract criminal liability.

The Court found that section 17's requirements were too restrictive, infringed section 7, and could not be justified under section 1.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter and the sentences imposed for manslaughter and possession of a restricted weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on common intention under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, noting the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the common intention to rob did not terminate before the appellant and his confederate left the scene.

The appeals against conviction and sentences were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for importing heroin and argued that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence seized from a hotel room following a warrantless arrest that violated ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed no error of law in applying the s. 24(2) analysis and was entitled to conclude that, although the breaches were serious, their seriousness was somewhat blunted by the officer’s honest belief and the surrounding circumstances.

The court rejected arguments concerning search incident to arrest, the effect of discoverability, and the alleged failure to consider a pattern of Charter breaches.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching involving a 12-year-old complainant arising from a single alleged incident.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge made several errors in evaluating credibility in a case turning centrally on whether the allegation was true or fabricated to explain romantic and sexual fantasy writings discovered by the complainant’s mother.

The court found error in the unsupported inference concerning the appellant’s alleged sterility, concern over the treatment of the medical evidence and defence theory, failure to address a significant prior inconsistent statement, and a misapprehension of comparative evidence about the events when the mother returned home.

The cumulative effect of those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and required a new trial.

The appellants, Suzack and Pennett, were convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Constable Joe MacDonald during a routine traffic stop.

Both appellants advanced cut-throat defences at trial, each blaming the other for firing the fatal shots.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge erred in refusing a change of venue, refusing to sever their trials, and misdirecting the jury on propensity evidence and after-the-fact conduct.

Suzack also challenged the constitutionality of s. 635(2) of the Criminal Code regarding the order of peremptory challenges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or jury instructions, and upholding the constitutionality of the jury selection provisions.

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent, a Canadian citizen, on charges of attempting to launder money and conspiracy to launder money following a failed FBI sting operation.

The respondent argued his conduct would not constitute an offence in Canada because the money was not actually the proceeds of crime, making the offence impossible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent's conduct would amount to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy under Canadian law, as factual impossibility is not a defence to these inchoate offences.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding disclosure, finding that the limited disclosure provided was adequate for an extradition hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions on numerous weapons charges, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the conduct of a search was not unreasonable under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in sentencing on the most aggravating factual basis when the jury's verdict was supportable on any one of three factual bases and was not particularized.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to depart from the established law regarding sentencing.

Criminal appeals arising from convictions for conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances where a substantial part of the Crown's case rested on intercepted private communications.

The central issue was whether the trial judge over-edited affidavits supporting wiretap authorizations, thereby preventing an effective Wilson review and depriving the appellants of their Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The majority held that full disclosure is the governing premise, subject only to narrow public-interest exceptions, and that the deletions improperly withheld material that could have been used to challenge the validity of the authorizations.

The Court allowed the appeals, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully exposing goods on a municipal road allowance without lawful authority after selling T-shirts on a street corner.

The municipality had delegated licensing authority to the city, which only permitted owners or occupiers of abutting property to apply for a licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the by-law was ultra vires the municipality because it was not specifically authorized by the provincial enabling legislation.

The Court found that the by-law's broad prohibition on exposing articles on sidewalks was not authorized by provisions relating to retail sales, public nuisances, or highway obstructions.

The appellant was involved in a fight where a bystander was injured by a glass fragment from a bottle allegedly thrown by the appellant.

The appellant was charged with unlawfully causing bodily harm under s. 269 of the Criminal Code.

Prior to trial, the trial judge quashed the indictment, finding that s. 269 violated s. 7 of the Charter because it could include absolute liability offences.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 269 requires an underlying offence with a constitutionally sufficient mental element and objective foresight of bodily harm, thereby satisfying the requirements of fundamental justice.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings ordered by the trial judge due to delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the framework from R. v. Morin and considered the societal interest in proceeding expeditiously with charges under the Young Offenders Act.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that there was no unreasonable delay in this case and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault based in part on wiretap evidence.

The trial judge admitted the evidence without opening the sealed packet.

The Court of Appeal opened and edited the packet but denied the appellant the right to cross-examine the affiant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the appellant had established a basis to cross-examine the affiant because the affidavit was misleading regarding the use of a police informant, which bore directly on whether other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures program, arguing its admission criteria violated sections 15(1) and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as moot, relying on a concurrent judgment which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such programs.

The appellant conceded that if the programs are a matter of provincial option, no remedy is available.