Frank Addario

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder.

The respondents had been convicted of manslaughter and forcible confinement after participating in the beating and confinement of the victim, who was left bound in a remote cabin and subsequently died.

The trial judge ruled there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge impermissibly weighed the evidence and usurped the jury's function.

The Court held there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent, planning, and deliberation to leave the murder charges to the jury, and ordered a new trial on first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a concurrent rather than a consecutive sentence for a second set of offences committed two months after the first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell, which establishes that a sentencing judge has considerable discretion in determining whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive, and that appellate courts will generally defer to that discretion.

The appellant appealed their Dangerous Offender designations and indeterminate sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the designations and indeterminate sentences, and ordered a new hearing.

Additionally, because several convictions had been previously set aside by the court, the fixed sentence of twelve years and two months was quashed and a new hearing was ordered under section 686(8) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a lengthy trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of three unsavoury witnesses, including a jailhouse informant.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial recantations by two of these witnesses and argued that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to give an adequate Vetrovec warning and improperly admitting highly prejudicial evidence of a prior manslaughter conviction.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of one witness's recantation and found that the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning and evidentiary rulings.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and recklessness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to apply an objective standard nor did they place the onus of proof on the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the victim was found killed in his garage.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification of a man driving the victim's car, and expert evidence matching the appellant's barefoot impressions to blood-spattered boots found at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on eyewitness identification and in admitting the barefoot impression evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the eyewitness instructions were proper but found the trial judge erred in admitting the novel expert evidence regarding barefoot impressions, as its slight probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving over eighty, dangerous driving, and impaired driving.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by placing Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on vials of his blood, which had been drawn for medical purposes, prior to obtaining a search warrant.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the brief sealing of the vials did not interfere with the appellant's spatial, physical, or informational privacy interests and thus did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The court also found the jury charge on the burden of proof regarding bolus drinking was sufficient.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge failed to resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and misused prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence, resolved inconsistencies using a common sense approach, and correctly used the prior consistent statements to explain delayed disclosure and rebut a motive to fabricate.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery following a jury trial and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with an order for increased parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on prior discreditable conduct and by failing to leave the defence of theft with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as part of the narrative and there was no air of reality to the theft defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lengthy criminal record and poor prospects for rehabilitation justified the increased parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation.

The Crown conceded the sexual exploitation conviction was unreasonable as the victim was not a 'young person' under the Criminal Code.

For the child pornography charges, which involved written materials, the trial judge had convicted the appellant before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Sharpe.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the defence of artistic merit and by applying an overly broad definition of child pornography.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered for the sexual exploitation charge, and a new trial was ordered for the child pornography charges.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault against a classmate.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the burden of proof regarding credibility, improperly handled inconsistencies in the testimonies of the child witnesses, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the criminal burden of proof when assessing credibility and reasonably addressed the minor inconsistencies in the children's testimonies.

The court emphasized that children may not recall precise details, but this does not mean they misconceived the core events.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound after shooting the complainant in the neck.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on his post-offence conduct and failed to properly instruct the jury on the defence of accident.

He also appealed his 8-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the post-offence conduct was relevant to intent and the jury instructions were adequate given the lack of evidence supporting an accident.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the acceptable range.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his false statements to police, bad character evidence, and a hearsay statement, as well as in admitting evidence from a warrantless search of his truck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to use the false statements as evidence of fabrication, improperly admitted highly prejudicial bad character evidence without a limiting instruction, and erred in admitting the hearsay statement.

Although the warrantless search violated section 8 of the Charter, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2).

However, the cumulative effect of the other errors required a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a 16-year-old girl with a sawed-off shotgun during a home invasion robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding planning and deliberation, forcible confinement, re-examination of a Crown witness, and the limited use of a defence witness's preliminary inquiry testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on the preliminary inquiry testimony, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his parole ineligibility period.

At trial, the appellant raised defences of provocation and lack of intent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly removing from the jury's consideration acts by the deceased that could amount to wrongful acts for the provocation defence, specifically brandishing a knife and engaging in a physical struggle.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to direct the jury to evidence supporting the appellant's lack of intent, including expert testimony regarding his mental state.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing following a street-level drug transaction and chase.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the jury charge was deficient on circumstantial evidence, cross-racial identification, and the included offence of manslaughter.

The court held that, although an explicit cross-racial identification instruction would have been appropriate, the identification charge as a whole was sufficient, the circumstantial evidence instruction did not misstate the burden of proof when read in context, and there was no air of reality to manslaughter given the depth and nature of the stab wound.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant operated an escort agency, arranging dates between male clients and female escorts, and keeping one-third of the fee.

She was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution, attempting to procure, and breach of probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for living on the avails, finding her business relationship with the escorts was parasitic.

The court upheld one procuring conviction but set aside another, and quashed the breach of probation conviction.

The sentence was varied from ten months' imprisonment to a $10,000 fine.

Supplementary reasons adjusting the specific counts of the indictment on which the appellant was convicted, in order to reduce the totality of the sentences to five years imprisonment.

The court varied the sentences to two years concurrent on most counts, with three one-year consecutive sentences for use of a firearm, as agreed upon by counsel.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences arising from three home invasion robberies.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice, supported by circumstantial and frail identification evidence.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence, instructing the jury on confirmatory evidence, and defining reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the ten-year sentence was reduced to five years, considering the appellant's youth, rehabilitation efforts, and the appropriate sentencing range for first offenders.