Frank Addario

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving over eighty, dangerous driving, and impaired driving.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by placing Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on vials of his blood, which had been drawn for medical purposes, prior to obtaining a search warrant.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the brief sealing of the vials did not interfere with the appellant's spatial, physical, or informational privacy interests and thus did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The court also found the jury charge on the burden of proof regarding bolus drinking was sufficient.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge failed to resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and misused prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence, resolved inconsistencies using a common sense approach, and correctly used the prior consistent statements to explain delayed disclosure and rebut a motive to fabricate.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery following a jury trial and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment with an order for increased parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on prior discreditable conduct and by failing to leave the defence of theft with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as part of the narrative and there was no air of reality to the theft defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lengthy criminal record and poor prospects for rehabilitation justified the increased parole ineligibility period.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault against a classmate.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the burden of proof regarding credibility, improperly handled inconsistencies in the testimonies of the child witnesses, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the criminal burden of proof when assessing credibility and reasonably addressed the minor inconsistencies in the children's testimonies.

The court emphasized that children may not recall precise details, but this does not mean they misconceived the core events.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation.

The Crown conceded the sexual exploitation conviction was unreasonable as the victim was not a 'young person' under the Criminal Code.

For the child pornography charges, which involved written materials, the trial judge had convicted the appellant before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Sharpe.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the defence of artistic merit and by applying an overly broad definition of child pornography.

The appeal was allowed, an acquittal was entered for the sexual exploitation charge, and a new trial was ordered for the child pornography charges.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound after shooting the complainant in the neck.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on his post-offence conduct and failed to properly instruct the jury on the defence of accident.

He also appealed his 8-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the post-offence conduct was relevant to intent and the jury instructions were adequate given the lack of evidence supporting an accident.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the acceptable range.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his false statements to police, bad character evidence, and a hearsay statement, as well as in admitting evidence from a warrantless search of his truck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to use the false statements as evidence of fabrication, improperly admitted highly prejudicial bad character evidence without a limiting instruction, and erred in admitting the hearsay statement.

Although the warrantless search violated section 8 of the Charter, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2).

However, the cumulative effect of the other errors required a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a 16-year-old girl with a sawed-off shotgun during a home invasion robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding planning and deliberation, forcible confinement, re-examination of a Crown witness, and the limited use of a defence witness's preliminary inquiry testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on the preliminary inquiry testimony, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his parole ineligibility period.

At trial, the appellant raised defences of provocation and lack of intent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly removing from the jury's consideration acts by the deceased that could amount to wrongful acts for the provocation defence, specifically brandishing a knife and engaging in a physical struggle.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to direct the jury to evidence supporting the appellant's lack of intent, including expert testimony regarding his mental state.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing following a street-level drug transaction and chase.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the jury charge was deficient on circumstantial evidence, cross-racial identification, and the included offence of manslaughter.

The court held that, although an explicit cross-racial identification instruction would have been appropriate, the identification charge as a whole was sufficient, the circumstantial evidence instruction did not misstate the burden of proof when read in context, and there was no air of reality to manslaughter given the depth and nature of the stab wound.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant operated an escort agency, arranging dates between male clients and female escorts, and keeping one-third of the fee.

She was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution, attempting to procure, and breach of probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for living on the avails, finding her business relationship with the escorts was parasitic.

The court upheld one procuring conviction but set aside another, and quashed the breach of probation conviction.

The sentence was varied from ten months' imprisonment to a $10,000 fine.

Supplementary reasons adjusting the specific counts of the indictment on which the appellant was convicted, in order to reduce the totality of the sentences to five years imprisonment.

The court varied the sentences to two years concurrent on most counts, with three one-year consecutive sentences for use of a firearm, as agreed upon by counsel.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences arising from three home invasion robberies.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice, supported by circumstantial and frail identification evidence.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence, instructing the jury on confirmatory evidence, and defining reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the ten-year sentence was reduced to five years, considering the appellant's youth, rehabilitation efforts, and the appropriate sentencing range for first offenders.

The accused was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport after being threatened by a man in Belgrade who said he would harm her mother if she did not comply.

She raised the common law defence of duress, successfully arguing that the strict immediacy and presence requirements of section 17 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct should attract criminal liability.

The Court found that section 17's requirements were too restrictive, infringed section 7, and could not be justified under section 1.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter and the sentences imposed for manslaughter and possession of a restricted weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on common intention under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, noting the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the common intention to rob did not terminate before the appellant and his confederate left the scene.

The appeals against conviction and sentences were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for importing heroin and argued that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence seized from a hotel room following a warrantless arrest that violated ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed no error of law in applying the s. 24(2) analysis and was entitled to conclude that, although the breaches were serious, their seriousness was somewhat blunted by the officer’s honest belief and the surrounding circumstances.

The court rejected arguments concerning search incident to arrest, the effect of discoverability, and the alleged failure to consider a pattern of Charter breaches.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching involving a 12-year-old complainant arising from a single alleged incident.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge made several errors in evaluating credibility in a case turning centrally on whether the allegation was true or fabricated to explain romantic and sexual fantasy writings discovered by the complainant’s mother.

The court found error in the unsupported inference concerning the appellant’s alleged sterility, concern over the treatment of the medical evidence and defence theory, failure to address a significant prior inconsistent statement, and a misapprehension of comparative evidence about the events when the mother returned home.

The cumulative effect of those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and required a new trial.

The appellants, Suzack and Pennett, were convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Constable Joe MacDonald during a routine traffic stop.

Both appellants advanced cut-throat defences at trial, each blaming the other for firing the fatal shots.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge erred in refusing a change of venue, refusing to sever their trials, and misdirecting the jury on propensity evidence and after-the-fact conduct.

Suzack also challenged the constitutionality of s. 635(2) of the Criminal Code regarding the order of peremptory challenges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or jury instructions, and upholding the constitutionality of the jury selection provisions.

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent, a Canadian citizen, on charges of attempting to launder money and conspiracy to launder money following a failed FBI sting operation.

The respondent argued his conduct would not constitute an offence in Canada because the money was not actually the proceeds of crime, making the offence impossible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent's conduct would amount to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy under Canadian law, as factual impossibility is not a defence to these inchoate offences.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding disclosure, finding that the limited disclosure provided was adequate for an extradition hearing.