Frank Addario

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and uttering threats.

Years later, he appealed his convictions, seeking to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence to establish he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR-MD) at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the fourth criterion of the Palmer test.

The court concluded that the appellant's own writings demonstrated he knew his conduct was morally and legally wrong, meaning the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appellant, an Aboriginal woman with a tragic history of abuse and mental health issues, abducted a newborn infant from a hospital after her own child was stillborn.

She pled guilty and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by using a prior seven-year sentence as a baseline and failing to properly apply the principle of restraint and the Gladue framework for Aboriginal offenders.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two and a half years' imprisonment.

The applicant, a manager of a hazardous waste facility, sought judicial review of a justice of the peace's order compelling him to submit to an interview and produce documents under s. 163.1(2) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the statutory provision authorizes investigators to use devices and techniques but does not explicitly confer the power to compel third parties to answer questions or produce documents.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault after the trial judge found he was in a state of non-mental disorder automatism (sexsomnia) at the time of the offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the condition should have been classified as a mental disorder leading to a not criminally responsible (NCR) verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for disease of the mind by failing to properly consider the risk of recurrence and the internal causes of the condition.

Concluding it lacked jurisdiction to substitute an NCR verdict on an appeal from an acquittal, the Court ordered a new trial limited to determining whether the automatism should result in an acquittal or an NCR verdict.

The respondent entrusted $5,000 to a courier who attempted to take $50,000 out of Canada without reporting it, leading to the seizure of the funds.

The respondent applied for a declaration that his interest in the funds was not affected by the seizure under s. 33 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding the respondent exercised all reasonable care.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent failed to make necessary inquiries about legal restrictions or steps taken by the courier to comply, and thus did not exercise all reasonable care.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting a deceased witness's utterance, giving an inadequate instruction on post-offence conduct, and providing unbalanced written materials to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant telecommunications company sought an exemption from two production orders requiring it to produce call data records for criminal investigations, arguing that compliance without compensation was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal Code production order scheme does not permit a judge to order compensation for compliance.

A judge can only consider the financial aspect of compliance when deciding whether to grant an exemption on the basis that the financial burden is unreasonable.

The Court found that the appellant had not established that the cost of compliance was unreasonable in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to carrying a weapon, unlawful confinement, and assault against his former girlfriend.

He was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have been permitted to serve it in the community.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in assigning sole responsibility for delay to the appellant and in treating his initial minimization of the offence as an aggravating factor, the refusal of a conditional sentence was ultimately correct given the planned nature of the offence, the use of a weapon, and the significant psychological harm to the victim.

The appeal was dismissed.

Several police officers sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Police Services Board granting the Chief of Police an extension of time to serve notices of disciplinary hearings under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The officers argued that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide full disclosure of the investigative brief, denying an oral hearing, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Board's procedure met the minimal requirements of fairness for an administrative, pre-charge decision and that the Board's decision to allow the delay was reasonable given the unprecedented complexity of the underlying criminal investigation.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of two orders by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of total dollar figures for legal services rendered to other ministries.

The Ministry argued the information was protected by solicitor-client privilege under s. 19 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the IPC correctly applied the rebuttable presumption of privilege test from Maranda v. Richer and reasonably concluded the presumption was rebutted because disclosing the aggregate amounts would not reveal privileged communications.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a telephone conversation with a police officer.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the misapprehension but found it was not essential to the trial judge's conclusion that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, police officers facing criminal charges, brought a motion for a publication ban and a sealing order regarding a confidential report by the Chief of Police.

The report was filed in support of an application for leave to serve notices of hearing under the Police Services Act.

The applicants argued that media access to the report would prejudice their right to a fair trial and risk witness tainting.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious risk to the administration of justice, as the report was general in nature and alternative measures like challenges for cause were available.

The moving party, the Chief of Police, brought a motion to have two applications for judicial review heard at the same time pursuant to Rule 6.01(1).

Both applications arose from a decision of the Toronto Police Services Board regarding the delay in serving notices of hearing under the Police Services Act.

The court found that the applications arose out of the same transaction or occurrence and shared common questions of law and fact.

To avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent results, the court granted the motion and ordered the applications to be heard together.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting deaths of his parents.

At trial, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's exclusive insider opportunity and physical evidence, to prove he committed the murders and fabricated a story about an intruder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the defence theory, motive, post-offence conduct, and the burden of proof.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court held that the fresh evidence did not meet the due diligence criterion and would not have affected the verdict.

Furthermore, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The Crown appealed a decision staying criminal charges against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The respondent faced multiple charges including domestic assault and firearms offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in calculating and allocating the periods of delay, particularly by failing to attribute delay to the respondent after he declined an early trial date.

The Court concluded that the total delay was not unreasonable and that the respondent's prejudice was largely negated by his lack of interest in an early trial.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for rape and indecent assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a letter authored by the complainant which she denied writing at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence, finding that trial counsel exercised due diligence and the interests of justice compelled its admission.

The court held the evidence could have affected the verdict on all counts by impacting the complainant's credibility.

The court also noted the trial judge failed to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding moral prejudice reasoning between the counts.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to advert to the possibility of collusion or tainting between the two complainants after ruling to that effect on a similar fact evidence voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge subjected the evidence of both complainants to careful scrutiny and did not accept much of the evidence of one complainant.

The Court also rejected arguments that the trial judge assumed the assault took place, relied on an improbable account, or made improper use of demeanour evidence.

Following a successful Crown appeal against directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder, the Court of Appeal considered whether to set aside the respondents' convictions for forcible confinement.

Although the respondents had not cross-appealed, the Court invoked s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code to set aside the forcible confinement convictions.

The Court reasoned that the forcible confinement charge was inextricably bound to the first-degree murder charge under s. 231(5)(e), and allowing the convictions to stand would impair the respondents' fair trial rights at the new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the objective component of the reasonable and probable grounds standard for arrest was satisfied.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which included dated information from police and the appellant's presence in a hotel room where drugs were likely being used or sold, as well as his assistance in placing drugs into his car.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

She was arrested after customs officers in St. Lucia observed her checking a suitcase that was later found to contain 14 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge erred by admitting intelligence hearsay, admitting the baggage tag for the truth of its contents, failing to adequately warn the jury about photo lineup identification, and admitting evidence of her demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some evidence was inadmissible, it caused no prejudice, and the other evidentiary rulings and jury instructions did not constitute reversible error.