Frank Addario

The person sought in extradition proceedings applied for disclosure of the United States indictment at the committal stage.

The Attorney General argued that disclosure was premature because extradition judges determine committal based solely on the record of the case and the indictment would be disclosed later at the surrender stage.

The court held that while jurisprudence does not require disclosure of the indictment at the committal phase, it does not prohibit it.

Because the indictment was necessary for the person sought to understand the full jeopardy faced in the requesting state and to make informed decisions about consenting to committal, surrender, or waiving extradition under the Extradition Act, withholding it would undermine those statutory rights and violate principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Attorney General was ordered to disclose the indictment with the condition that it not be used to challenge committal.

The appellant appealed two first degree murder convictions arising from a motel room shooting, arguing that the principal eyewitness identification evidence should have been excluded, that defence expert evidence on identification frailties should have been admitted, and that the jury charge on identification was inadequate.

The court held that the eyewitness evidence was fully testable through the adversarial process and did not create the kind of prejudice that would justify exclusion.

The court declined to revisit existing authority limiting general expert evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification and upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the proposed opinion evidence was unnecessary.

Reading the charge as a whole, the court found the jury was adequately cautioned about the dangers of identification evidence, including the limits of witness confidence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a real estate agent and his co-accused, were convicted of conspiracy to produce marijuana and related offences.

During the trial, the trial judge interrupted the Crown's cross-examination of the real estate agent to ask if he knew what perjury was and suggested his counsel advise him on its consequences.

The appellants appealed, arguing this intervention created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's comments indicated he had prejudged the accused's credibility before hearing all evidence, fatally compromising the fairness of the trial for both accused.

The appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

In a criminal appeal concerning workplace computer privacy, the Court held that an employee may retain a reasonable, though diminished, expectation of privacy in personal information stored on an employer-issued laptop where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected.

The police breached section 8 by conducting warrantless searches of computer data received from a school board, because the employer's authority to search for workplace purposes did not transfer to police for criminal investigation.

The majority concluded exclusion under section 24(2) was not warranted after balancing police conduct, privacy impact, and trial truth-seeking interests.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial order remained in place.

A dissent would have excluded the evidence due to serious disregard of warrant requirements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a minor.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of the assaults, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test, ignored evidence about his apparel, and misapprehended video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and application of the W.(D.) test were sufficient and supported by the evidence.

The accused, a former elementary school teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a student during the 1994-95 school year when the complainant was 13-14 years old.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in inappropriate sexual contact including kissing, hand-holding, and masturbation over several months.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming his conduct was limited to appropriate academic support and encouragement.

The trial judge found significant reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding recovered memories obtained through therapy and the provenance of an Italian pendant allegedly given as a gift.

Although the judge found the complainant's testimony generally credible and preferred it over the accused's evidence, the judge concluded that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to these reliability concerns and reasonable doubt arising from the accused's testimony.

The accused, a grade 8 teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference alleged to have occurred in the mid‑1990s against a student.

The complainant described repeated sexualized conduct including kissing and masturbation during tutoring sessions and other interactions, while the accused denied any sexual contact.

The court accepted that certain inappropriate conduct occurred, including hand‑holding and expressions of affection, but identified reliability concerns in the complainant’s evidence, including inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the role of therapy‑recovered memories.

Applying the criminal standard of proof and the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court concluded the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society's Appeal Panel upholding the revocation of his license to practice law following criminal convictions for sexual exploitation of two minors.

The appellant argued the penalty was too harsh given his prior good character and cooperation, and that the panels erred in assessing remorse and character evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the panels' decisions reasonable and that revocation was an appropriate penalty for sexual misconduct involving a breach of trust with young persons.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that an untested informant tip and a brief, neutral observation of a meeting in a vehicle did not provide reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest, subsequent searches of the respondent, his vehicle, and his residence, as well as a breach of the right to counsel, were unconstitutional.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences relating to the attempted exportation of restricted pressure transducers to Iran, including violations of the United Nations Act, Customs Act, and Criminal Code.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's interpretation of the technical specifications for the restricted goods and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the specifications and reasonably concluded the appellant knowingly attempted to supply the goods to a person in Iran.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the sentence on the UN offence because the trial judge erred in treating an unproven link to Iran's nuclear enrichment program as an aggravating factor.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was charged with possession of child pornography after a school computer technician found explicit images of a student on his work laptop.

The principal seized the laptop and copied the images, and the school board later copied temporary Internet files before handing everything to the police, who searched the laptop without a warrant.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal files on the work computer, though modified by the technician's right to maintain the network.

While the school officials did not breach the Charter, the warrantless police search of the laptop and temporary Internet files violated section 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the laptop and temporary Internet files under section 24(2), but admitted the disc containing the images of the student.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat against an intoxicated person in custody.

At trial, the parties agreed that a crucial portion of an audio surveillance recording was inaudible, and the appellant testified to what he had said.

During deliberations, the trial judge re-listened to the recording, concluded the appellant had said something materially different, and used this finding to reject his credibility and convict him without reopening the trial.

The Court of Appeal held that this denied the appellant the opportunity to make full answer and defence, constituting a denial of natural justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, awaiting a retrial for first-degree murder, had his bail revoked after failing to report to police on Christmas Eve.

He applied for a review of the revocation order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the applicant had been acquitted of the failure to comply charge because he simply forgot to report.

Finding the failure was not deliberate, the Court set aside the revocation order and reinstated the applicant's bail on the original conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of cannabis resin, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him following a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant after he received the package and left the residence shortly after with a bag capable of carrying it.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of no Charter breaches under sections 8 and 9.

However, the court quashed the appellant's summary conviction for simple possession of marijuana on consent, as it should not have been tried together with exclusively indictable offences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and uttering threats.

Years later, he appealed his convictions, seeking to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence to establish he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR-MD) at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the fourth criterion of the Palmer test.

The court concluded that the appellant's own writings demonstrated he knew his conduct was morally and legally wrong, meaning the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appellant, an Aboriginal woman with a tragic history of abuse and mental health issues, abducted a newborn infant from a hospital after her own child was stillborn.

She pled guilty and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by using a prior seven-year sentence as a baseline and failing to properly apply the principle of restraint and the Gladue framework for Aboriginal offenders.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two and a half years' imprisonment.

The applicant, a manager of a hazardous waste facility, sought judicial review of a justice of the peace's order compelling him to submit to an interview and produce documents under s. 163.1(2) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the statutory provision authorizes investigators to use devices and techniques but does not explicitly confer the power to compel third parties to answer questions or produce documents.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault after the trial judge found he was in a state of non-mental disorder automatism (sexsomnia) at the time of the offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the condition should have been classified as a mental disorder leading to a not criminally responsible (NCR) verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for disease of the mind by failing to properly consider the risk of recurrence and the internal causes of the condition.

Concluding it lacked jurisdiction to substitute an NCR verdict on an appeal from an acquittal, the Court ordered a new trial limited to determining whether the automatism should result in an acquittal or an NCR verdict.

The respondent entrusted $5,000 to a courier who attempted to take $50,000 out of Canada without reporting it, leading to the seizure of the funds.

The respondent applied for a declaration that his interest in the funds was not affected by the seizure under s. 33 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding the respondent exercised all reasonable care.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent failed to make necessary inquiries about legal restrictions or steps taken by the courier to comply, and thus did not exercise all reasonable care.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting a deceased witness's utterance, giving an inadequate instruction on post-offence conduct, and providing unbalanced written materials to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in setting the parole ineligibility period.