Frank Addario

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault bodily harm.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence regarding the officer's actions and the complainant's resistance, erroneous application of case law on police use of force, and misapplication of the R. v. W.D. test.

The court reviewed the trial judge's findings, particularly in light of CCTV footage, and found no material misapprehension of evidence or errors in legal application.

The trial judge's verdict was deemed reasonable, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a violent altercation at a house party.

The appellant, then 19 years old, stabbed and killed a partygoer during a confrontation.

The appeal raised three main issues: (1) whether the appellant's police statement was voluntary despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and police suggestions regarding credibility at trial; (2) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of others under section 34 of the Criminal Code; and (3) whether the trial judge's instructions on self-defence were unbalanced and failed to present evidence supporting the appellant's version of events.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a child.

The Crown's case involved online conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer posing as a mother of two daughters.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make an explicit or implicit finding that the appellant had agreed to commit the offence, which was an essential element of the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for luring, sexual exploitation, and making, possessing and accessing child pornography involving two complainants, as well as his 20-month custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the application judge erred in dismissing the appellant's Charter s. 11(b) application regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay of approximately 43 months from charge to trial exceeded both the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months and the Morin guideline of 14-18 months.

The court identified errors in the application judge's analysis, including: (1) incorrectly characterizing the adjournment of the exit judicial pre-trial as a discrete exceptional event; (2) inflating the neutral intake period for Crown disclosure to five months when only 2.5 months was appropriate; (3) treating institutional delay as neutral rather than attributable to the Crown; and (4) failing to consider inferred prejudice from the length of delay.

The court concluded that transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the delay, and the proceedings were stayed.

The respondent in a judicial review application moved to strike an affidavit delivered by the applicants.

The underlying application sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding sexual assault and harassment.

The applicants sought to introduce the affidavit of a forensic psychiatrist to argue the tribunal improperly relied on treating doctors' evidence to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to strike, holding that the proposed evidence was irrelevant to the legal issue of oath helping and did not meet the narrow test for admitting fresh evidence on judicial review.

A police officer convicted by jury of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to eight months in prison sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed release, arguing the grounds of appeal lacked merit and that public confidence in the administration of justice required incarceration pending appeal.

The motion judge granted bail, finding the grounds of appeal relating to sufficiency of focus on the dangerous driving and guidance on marked departure were not frivolous and warranted close examination.

The judge held that public interest was best served by allowing the applicant to challenge the conviction before serving the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault arising from a collision during a recreational hockey game.

The Court of Appeal allowed his initial appeal and ordered a new trial due to impermissible speculative reasoning by the trial judge.

On retrial, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable delay.

The trial judge dismissed the stay application and convicted the appellant again.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the delay in the retrial was unreasonable and breached the appellant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court held that the clock for calculating delay should have started from the date the Court of Appeal ordered the new trial, not from when the summons was issued.

The court also found that the Crown failed to prioritize the retrial and breached its duty to expedite proceedings by insisting on consecutive trial dates when earlier non-consecutive dates were available.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) upholding a Hearing Officer's penalty requiring her to resign or face termination.

The applicant had pleaded guilty to discreditable conduct and deceit for submitting 15 fraudulent massage therapy benefits claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the OCPC reasonably applied the standard of review, properly deferred to the Hearing Officer's weighing of the Krug factors and usefulness test, and reasonably concluded that the penalty of dismissal was within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the defence brought a pre-trial application to remove Crown counsel, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, suppression of evidence, and collusion with police.

The Crown brought an application under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules to summarily dismiss the defence's application.

The court found that the defence's allegations were based entirely on suspicion, conjecture, and speculation, lacking any evidentiary foundation.

Applying the principles from R. v. Cody, the court concluded there was no reasonable prospect the defence application could succeed and summarily dismissed it without an evidentiary hearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for dangerous driving that was upheld on summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that neither proposed ground of appeal met the merits threshold.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's rejection of expert evidence regarding reaction time, which the trial judge was entitled to reject and which was irrelevant to the facts as found.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, which also failed the merits test.

The court noted that dangerous driving law is well-settled and each case turns on its own facts.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his sexual assault conviction, alleging two legal errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment: an improper leap from disbelief to fabrication regarding his dash camera practice, and impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court found no error in the first ground, affirming that rejecting an explanation as unbelievable is distinct from finding fabrication.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in engaging in propensity reasoning by mischaracterizing the "brazen act defence" as an assertion about the appellant's disposition for risky behavior.

Despite this error, the court concluded it did not significantly impact the overall credibility findings, which were amply supported by other evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

Two co-accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought an order permitting their joint representation by a single counsel, Ms. von Achten, following a prior order removing her as counsel for one accused due to conflict.

The court considered the accused's right to counsel of choice, the potential for tactical disadvantages, and the public interest.

Despite acknowledging potential future conflicts and the risk of proceeding unrepresented, the accused, having received independent legal advice, were adamant about their choice.

The court granted the application, emphasizing the accused's constitutional right to choose counsel, provided they confirm their understanding of the risks on the record.

The applicant, charged with attempting to communicate safeguarded information and preparatory acts under the Security of Information Act, brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of s. 22(1)(c) of the Act.

He argued that the provision violates s. 7 of the Charter by being unconstitutionally overbroad unless interpreted to require an objectively reasonable possibility of committing the underlying offence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the provision does not cast an unconstitutionally wide net, as the Attorney General's consent is required for prosecution and the de minimis threshold would insulate an accused from guilt based on mere criminal ideation.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police discovered drugs and cash following an anonymous call reporting a break-in at his residence.

The appellant sought to exclude the evidence, alleging that police had staged the break-in and made the anonymous call in breach of his Charter rights.

The pre-trial judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant had not met the burden of proving the illegality of the warrantless entry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in finding he lacked authority to permit the defence to record testimony with a high-quality microphone for voice identification analysis; and (2) the trial judge erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant rather than the Crown to justify the warrantless entry.

The Crown brought an application to remove Susan von Achten as solicitor of record for Mladen (Michael) Ivezic, who is jointly charged with first-degree murder alongside Demitry Papasotiriou-Lanteigne.

Ms. von Achten had previously provided legal assistance to Mr. Papasotiriou-Lanteigne in a civil claim related to the matrimonial home and a police complaint, while also acting for Mr. Ivezic in the murder prosecution.

The court found a realistic prospect of conflict of interest due to the dual representation and the inevitable overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings.

Despite waivers from both accused, the court determined that Ms. von Achten could not satisfy the difficult burden of rebutting the presumption of confidential information being imparted.

The court emphasized that the potential for conflict, including the possibility of cross-examining a former client, undermined public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application to remove counsel was granted.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity and participation in the activities of a terrorist group, and acquitted of possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life in association with a terrorist group.

He was sentenced to a global sentence of 12 years imprisonment (5 years for conspiracy, 7 years consecutive for participation in terrorist group activities).

The Crown appealed seeking a 20-year sentence and delayed parole eligibility.

The appellant cross-appealed seeking a 5-8 year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the gravity of the offences, application of sentencing principles including parity and totality, treatment of mitigating factors including rehabilitation and remorse, and determination of parole eligibility.