Frank Addario

This decision concerns the costs of a successful motion brought by the plaintiffs.

The court reviewed the parties' submissions, considering factors such as the nature and complexity of the motion, the amount claimed in the action, the defendant's conduct (including fulfilling undertakings and making concessions), and the proportionality of the requested costs.

While finding the plaintiffs wholly successful, the court determined that the quantum of costs requested was disproportionately large and applied a discount to the partial indemnity costs.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent, Jake Grant, on an assault charge.

The trial judge had stayed proceedings due to alleged abuse of process, citing the complainant's monetary motivation, police misconduct in not referring the investigation out, and Crown's disclosure issues (not disclosing *R. v. Tout* and not calling the complainant).

The appellate court found that the trial judge made reversible errors in law and fact, particularly in misapprehending the evidence (especially surveillance videos), misapplying the *Babos* test for abuse of process, and incorrectly stating the Crown's duty to call witnesses or the accused's right to confront an accuser.

The appellate court found the police investigation was comprehensive and the disclosure process was adequately managed through pre-trial conferences.

The court concluded that the case was not one of the "rarest of cases" warranting a stay and that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the charges did not go to trial, given the egregious conduct depicted in the surveillance videos.

The appeal was allowed, the stay quashed, and the matter remitted for trial before a different judge.

This appeal concerned the admissibility of evidence seized during a warrantless police entry following an anonymous tip.

The appellant, charged with drug offences, alleged that police staged the break-in and that a specific detective was the anonymous caller, violating his s. 8 Charter rights.

Following a successful first appeal that clarified the Crown's persuasive burden to disprove state actor involvement in a warrantless search, a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the second trial judge's decision to admit the evidence, arguing the judge again misapplied the burden of proof and relied on irrelevant considerations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had fulfilled its onus by providing additional evidence (cell phone records, whereabouts, voice samples) and that the trial judge's credibility findings, including accepting the officer's denials, were reasonable and open to her.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard appeals from convictions and sentences related to a series of tractor-trailer thefts and robberies.

Appellants challenged the validity of cell tower production orders, the admission of evidence obtained from Charter-breaching production orders under s. 24(2), and the use of similar act evidence.

One appellant also challenged possession convictions.

The Court dismissed all conviction appeals, finding the initial production orders valid, the s. 24(2) analysis sound (due to reduced privacy expectation in public location data), and the similar act evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, finding the trial judge erred by analogizing the robberies to home invasions, which led to unduly high base sentences.

The Court reduced the total sentences for the three appealing accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms and narcotics offences, arguing that police surveillance violated his s. 8 Charter rights, the initial search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations, and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, or that the police conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police surveillance from a distance on neighbouring property did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

While acknowledging minor s. 8 breaches related to delayed reporting and a defective warrant, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found no abuse of process, noting the police trespass was not serious and based on erroneous legal advice.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences following a search of his apartment.

The trial proceeded as a Charter application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Three primary issues were raised: (1) whether the search warrant was validly issued based on confidential informant information; (2) whether covert pre-warrant entries into the apartment building constituted unlawful trespasses and section 8 violations; and (3) whether the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel were violated when police failed to facilitate access to counsel following arrest.

The court found that while the warrant was validly issued and the pre-warrant entries constituted only minor section 8 breaches, the failure to facilitate access to counsel was a serious and gross violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed on March 21, 2012.

The appellant, who suffered from brain damage from meningitis, borderline personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and dysthymia, was self-represented during a complex dangerous offender hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that the proceeding was procedurally unfair due to multiple cumulative deficiencies: the failure to inquire whether the appellant wished to retain counsel despite facing severe jeopardy; the failure to conduct a fitness inquiry despite clear indicia that the appellant may not have been mentally present; the failure of amicus curiae to adequately protect the appellant's interests, including by conceding admissibility of psychiatric records and ultimately advocating in favour of the dangerous offender finding; and the failure to explore meaningful alternatives such as video linking to keep the appellant informed when she was absent from court.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

The appellants were convicted of terrorism-related offences including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in terrorist activity.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the jury selection procedure used at trial.

The trial judge erroneously held that he lacked common law discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while using rotating triers to determine challenges for cause, and instead ordered the use of static triers with all jurors excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers with unsworn jurors excluded, resulting in an improperly constituted jury.

The curative proviso could not be applied to remedy this fundamental procedural error.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault bodily harm.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence regarding the officer's actions and the complainant's resistance, erroneous application of case law on police use of force, and misapplication of the R. v. W.D. test.

The court reviewed the trial judge's findings, particularly in light of CCTV footage, and found no material misapprehension of evidence or errors in legal application.

The trial judge's verdict was deemed reasonable, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a violent altercation at a house party.

The appellant, then 19 years old, stabbed and killed a partygoer during a confrontation.

The appeal raised three main issues: (1) whether the appellant's police statement was voluntary despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and police suggestions regarding credibility at trial; (2) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of others under section 34 of the Criminal Code; and (3) whether the trial judge's instructions on self-defence were unbalanced and failed to present evidence supporting the appellant's version of events.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a child.

The Crown's case involved online conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer posing as a mother of two daughters.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make an explicit or implicit finding that the appellant had agreed to commit the offence, which was an essential element of the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for luring, sexual exploitation, and making, possessing and accessing child pornography involving two complainants, as well as his 20-month custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the application judge erred in dismissing the appellant's Charter s. 11(b) application regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay of approximately 43 months from charge to trial exceeded both the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months and the Morin guideline of 14-18 months.

The court identified errors in the application judge's analysis, including: (1) incorrectly characterizing the adjournment of the exit judicial pre-trial as a discrete exceptional event; (2) inflating the neutral intake period for Crown disclosure to five months when only 2.5 months was appropriate; (3) treating institutional delay as neutral rather than attributable to the Crown; and (4) failing to consider inferred prejudice from the length of delay.

The court concluded that transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the delay, and the proceedings were stayed.

A police officer convicted by jury of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to eight months in prison sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed release, arguing the grounds of appeal lacked merit and that public confidence in the administration of justice required incarceration pending appeal.

The motion judge granted bail, finding the grounds of appeal relating to sufficiency of focus on the dangerous driving and guidance on marked departure were not frivolous and warranted close examination.

The judge held that public interest was best served by allowing the applicant to challenge the conviction before serving the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault arising from a collision during a recreational hockey game.

The Court of Appeal allowed his initial appeal and ordered a new trial due to impermissible speculative reasoning by the trial judge.

On retrial, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable delay.

The trial judge dismissed the stay application and convicted the appellant again.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the delay in the retrial was unreasonable and breached the appellant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court held that the clock for calculating delay should have started from the date the Court of Appeal ordered the new trial, not from when the summons was issued.

The court also found that the Crown failed to prioritize the retrial and breached its duty to expedite proceedings by insisting on consecutive trial dates when earlier non-consecutive dates were available.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for dangerous driving that was upheld on summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that neither proposed ground of appeal met the merits threshold.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's rejection of expert evidence regarding reaction time, which the trial judge was entitled to reject and which was irrelevant to the facts as found.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, which also failed the merits test.

The court noted that dangerous driving law is well-settled and each case turns on its own facts.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his sexual assault conviction, alleging two legal errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment: an improper leap from disbelief to fabrication regarding his dash camera practice, and impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court found no error in the first ground, affirming that rejecting an explanation as unbelievable is distinct from finding fabrication.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in engaging in propensity reasoning by mischaracterizing the "brazen act defence" as an assertion about the appellant's disposition for risky behavior.

Despite this error, the court concluded it did not significantly impact the overall credibility findings, which were amply supported by other evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.