Frank Addario

The appellants, Vito Buffone and Jeffrey Kompon, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and several substantive offences following a 50-day jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds: the admissibility and scope of analyst's certificate evidence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the trial judge's instructions on conspiracy (specifically the three-step Carter analysis), the instructions regarding inferences to be drawn from a third party's actions concerning an encrypted cellphone, and the instructions on the substantive counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions.

The applicant, charged under the Security of Information Act, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from an undercover operation pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that the evidence was derived from a CSIS wiretap warrant that violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of candour by the affiant.

The court assumed a s. 8 breach had occurred but applied the Grant factors and concluded that the breach was not at the most serious end of the scale, the impact on the applicant's rights was diminished by several factors, and society's interest in adjudicating the serious national security charges on their merits was exceptionally high.

The motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

In an enforcement proceeding, the respondent Serrano brought a motion seeking disclosure of a Confidential Order and related reasons that redacted portions of a co-respondent's compelled interview transcripts.

Staff argued they were legally prohibited from identifying information relating to the Confidential Order and proposed an ex parte, in camera hearing to make submissions.

The Commission held that it had the inherent authority to control its own procedure and ordered a confidential phase of the hearing.

To address the inherent fairness concerns of excluding the respondents, the Commission appointed an amicus curiae to represent the interests of justice during the confidential phase.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by using inflammatory language in a supplementary ruling on a recusal motion, after defence counsel observed the judge with a draft judgment during submissions.

The appellant also alleged errors in the trial judge's Charter analysis under ss. 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) regarding the roadside screening device and the right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's comments about counsel were problematic, they did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the trial judge's Charter findings, concluding there was no misapprehension of evidence and the police waited a reasonable time for counsel of choice.

The applicant, charged under the Security of Information Act, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act.

He argued that his right to a fair trial was compromised because relevant information in a CSIS wiretap affidavit was withheld from him due to an Attorney General's certificate, preventing him from making full answer and defence on a s. 24(2) Charter application.

The court found that while the judicial editing process was fair, the Attorney General's unreviewable redactions of relevant information adversely affected trial fairness by precluding a subfacial challenge to the warrant.

Instead of a stay, the court fashioned a lesser remedy, declaring a s. 8 Charter breach and directing that the reviewing judge assume the affidavit contained false or misleading information.

The appellant, Thirumal Kanthasamy, sought leave to appeal his sentence for tractor trailer thefts and robberies, after his co-accused had their sentences reduced.

He argued for a reduction based on the principle of parity and changes in his personal circumstances, including new health issues (coronary artery disease, COVID-19 susceptibility) and increased family responsibilities due to his daughter's cerebral palsy and common-law partner's medical disability.

The Crown consented to a reduction from 8.5 years to 6.5 years based on parity but opposed further reduction based on the fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal accepted the fresh evidence but found that a sentence below 6.5 years would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offences, which involved the use of firearms.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six and one-half years.

The Crown brought an application for a sealing order and to hold part of the proceedings in camera regarding charges under the Security of Information Act.

The charges stemmed from intercepted telephone calls to a foreign embassy.

The Crown sought to prevent public disclosure of a redacted CSIS affidavit and warrant, arguing it would injure Canada's international relations.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that the orders were necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice and that the salutary effects outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle.

The application was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury for aggravated assault arising from a group altercation.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable due to flaws in the eyewitness identification evidence and alternatively sought a new trial on the basis that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was ample circumstantial and descriptive evidence to support the conviction, including bloodstain evidence matching the victim on the appellant's shirt.

The Court also held that the trial judge's charge clearly distinguished between descriptive evidence and in-court identification, and would not have misled the jury.

Staff and the respondents agreed to adjourn the start of a complex insider trading merits hearing to allow Staff to present investigator evidence by affidavit, reducing the number of hearing days required.

The Commission held that while a formal motion for an adjournment was not required in these circumstances, the parties still had to establish 'exceptional circumstances' under Rule 29(1) despite their agreement.

The Commission found that the pandemic and the efficient use of affidavit evidence to eliminate eight days of live testimony constituted exceptional circumstances.

The adjournment was granted.

This decision concerns the costs of a successful motion brought by the plaintiffs.

The court reviewed the parties' submissions, considering factors such as the nature and complexity of the motion, the amount claimed in the action, the defendant's conduct (including fulfilling undertakings and making concessions), and the proportionality of the requested costs.

While finding the plaintiffs wholly successful, the court determined that the quantum of costs requested was disproportionately large and applied a discount to the partial indemnity costs.

The moving parties, respondents in an insider trading and tipping enforcement proceeding, brought a motion seeking further documentary disclosure from Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission.

They requested all relevant, non-privileged investigator notes, internal communications, and a log of privileged documents.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding that the requested documents, including investigator notes and internal emails, constituted internal analysis, commentary, or opinion, which have no probative value and are therefore irrelevant.

The Commission also declined to order Staff to conduct a document-by-document relevance review or provide a privilege log, as no documents were withheld on the basis of privilege.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent, Jake Grant, on an assault charge.

The trial judge had stayed proceedings due to alleged abuse of process, citing the complainant's monetary motivation, police misconduct in not referring the investigation out, and Crown's disclosure issues (not disclosing *R. v. Tout* and not calling the complainant).

The appellate court found that the trial judge made reversible errors in law and fact, particularly in misapprehending the evidence (especially surveillance videos), misapplying the *Babos* test for abuse of process, and incorrectly stating the Crown's duty to call witnesses or the accused's right to confront an accuser.

The appellate court found the police investigation was comprehensive and the disclosure process was adequately managed through pre-trial conferences.

The court concluded that the case was not one of the "rarest of cases" warranting a stay and that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the charges did not go to trial, given the egregious conduct depicted in the surveillance videos.

The appeal was allowed, the stay quashed, and the matter remitted for trial before a different judge.

This appeal concerned the admissibility of evidence seized during a warrantless police entry following an anonymous tip.

The appellant, charged with drug offences, alleged that police staged the break-in and that a specific detective was the anonymous caller, violating his s. 8 Charter rights.

Following a successful first appeal that clarified the Crown's persuasive burden to disprove state actor involvement in a warrantless search, a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the second trial judge's decision to admit the evidence, arguing the judge again misapplied the burden of proof and relied on irrelevant considerations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had fulfilled its onus by providing additional evidence (cell phone records, whereabouts, voice samples) and that the trial judge's credibility findings, including accepting the officer's denials, were reasonable and open to her.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard appeals from convictions and sentences related to a series of tractor-trailer thefts and robberies.

Appellants challenged the validity of cell tower production orders, the admission of evidence obtained from Charter-breaching production orders under s. 24(2), and the use of similar act evidence.

One appellant also challenged possession convictions.

The Court dismissed all conviction appeals, finding the initial production orders valid, the s. 24(2) analysis sound (due to reduced privacy expectation in public location data), and the similar act evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, finding the trial judge erred by analogizing the robberies to home invasions, which led to unduly high base sentences.

The Court reduced the total sentences for the three appealing accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms and narcotics offences, arguing that police surveillance violated his s. 8 Charter rights, the initial search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations, and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, or that the police conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police surveillance from a distance on neighbouring property did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

While acknowledging minor s. 8 breaches related to delayed reporting and a defective warrant, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found no abuse of process, noting the police trespass was not serious and based on erroneous legal advice.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences following a search of his apartment.

The trial proceeded as a Charter application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Three primary issues were raised: (1) whether the search warrant was validly issued based on confidential informant information; (2) whether covert pre-warrant entries into the apartment building constituted unlawful trespasses and section 8 violations; and (3) whether the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel were violated when police failed to facilitate access to counsel following arrest.

The court found that while the warrant was validly issued and the pre-warrant entries constituted only minor section 8 breaches, the failure to facilitate access to counsel was a serious and gross violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding them liable for sexual harassment and creating a poisoned work environment, and ordering them to pay $200,000 to the respondent.

The applicants argued the Vice-Chair's approach to credibility was unreasonable and procedurally unfair, particularly regarding the respondent's memory issues and the use of expert evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Vice-Chair's credibility assessments were reasonable, did not improperly rely on oath-helping, and did not subject the applicant's evidence to unequal scrutiny.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed on March 21, 2012.

The appellant, who suffered from brain damage from meningitis, borderline personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and dysthymia, was self-represented during a complex dangerous offender hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that the proceeding was procedurally unfair due to multiple cumulative deficiencies: the failure to inquire whether the appellant wished to retain counsel despite facing severe jeopardy; the failure to conduct a fitness inquiry despite clear indicia that the appellant may not have been mentally present; the failure of amicus curiae to adequately protect the appellant's interests, including by conceding admissibility of psychiatric records and ultimately advocating in favour of the dangerous offender finding; and the failure to explore meaningful alternatives such as video linking to keep the appellant informed when she was absent from court.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

The appellants were convicted of terrorism-related offences including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in terrorist activity.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the jury selection procedure used at trial.

The trial judge erroneously held that he lacked common law discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while using rotating triers to determine challenges for cause, and instead ordered the use of static triers with all jurors excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers with unsworn jurors excluded, resulting in an improperly constituted jury.

The curative proviso could not be applied to remedy this fundamental procedural error.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.