Richard Nathanson

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision staying sexual assault and forcible confinement charges for breach of the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred in assessing delay, including mischaracterizing the neutral intake period, incorrectly attributing institutional delay, and placing disproportionate weight on a disclosure issue that caused only a brief delay.

The court concluded the overall delay of approximately 15¾ months was reasonable when accounting for inherent case requirements and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The stay was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on circumstantial evidence to support police identification, and effectively reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reasons adequately explained the rejection of defence evidence and that no material evidence was misapprehended.

The court further found the identification evidence was properly assessed in light of corroborating circumstantial evidence, including ownership of the vehicle and its return to the appellant’s residence shortly after the incident.

The judge also concluded that the burden of proof remained properly on the Crown throughout the trial.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence imposed following convictions for mischief and two counts of breach of probation arising from conduct at a medical clinic.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission of time served and instead imposed an additional custodial sentence resulting in an effective six‑month term of imprisonment.

The appellate court held that joint submissions on sentence are entitled to significant deference and should only be rejected where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by rejecting the joint submission without adequate justification and by imposing a sentence that was demonstrably unfit and disproportionate to the gravity of the offences.

The appeal was allowed and the custodial sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in force.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal challenged the characterization of several periods of delay, including the interval between arrest and first appearance, the period from set date to trial, and the delay between trial dates when the trial did not conclude in one day.

The court held that the six‑week intake period between arrest and first appearance was reasonable and neutral.

Although the trial judge erred in attributing the entire period from set date to trial as institutional delay, the appellate court re‑assessed the delay and found that much of it reflected inherent case requirements.

The remaining delay did not reach a constitutionally unacceptable level, and the trial judge’s brief misstatement of the legal test did not undermine the correctness of the decision.