Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order, arguing the judge misapprehended evidence regarding the interpretation of a quitclaim deed and its tax consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interpretation of the deed was a matter of law and intention, not evidence, and that the motion judge correctly considered the tax consequences without misapprehending the evidence.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondents.

The moving party sought a panel review of a decision dismissing her motion for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her appeal of five Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that despite meeting the first four factors for an extension of time, the justice of the case weighed against granting leave because the proposed appeal lacked merit and general public importance.

The appellant appealed her convictions for drug trafficking and her 4-year custodial sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter by mischaracterizing periods of delay, including those related to COVID-19 and a missing Information.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the trial judge's attribution of delay to the defence and exceptional circumstances.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4-year sentence was below the established range for mid-level cocaine trafficking and the trial judge made no error in principle in rejecting a conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately quantify the mitigating effect of harsh pretrial conditions (Duncan credit) and sought a further reduction based on the sentence's impact on his family.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that under R. v. Marshall, harsh pretrial conditions are a mitigating factor to be weighed holistically, not a mathematical deduction.

The court also rejected the family impact argument due to insufficient evidence and the appellant's history.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell land to the respondent for $4.1 million.

The appellant argued the oral agreement was unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, contending the detrimental reliance aspect of the doctrine of part performance was not met because the respondent's only obligation was to pay the purchase price, which was tendered but refused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding the respondent irremediably carried out its obligations to its detriment by taking all necessary steps to close the transaction while the appellant stood by.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages related to a failed real estate transaction involving a Hindu Temple.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims of fraud and unjust enrichment, partly because the appellant's corporations were not named as parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the fraud claims but found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the unjust enrichment claim and in limiting the piercing of the corporate veil to cases of fraud.

The Court allowed the appeal, awarded the appellant $7,500 for mortgage payments made on behalf of the respondents, and ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claim regarding the remaining advances.

The husband appealed a family law judgment made following an uncontested trial in which he did not participate due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and pleadings.

The wife brought a motion to quash the appeal based on the husband's ongoing non-compliance with support and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding it more appropriate to hear the appeal on the merits.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with an uncontested trial given the husband's repeated breaches of court orders and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The appellant reinsurer appealed a trial judgment ordering it to indemnify the respondent retrocedant for its share of a $140 million settlement reached by the lead insurer regarding a business interruption claim.

The appellant argued it was not bound by the 'follow settlements' clause in the retrocession agreement because it had not agreed to the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant was bound by the single proviso follow settlements clause, that the settlement arguably fell within coverage as a matter of law, and that the lead insurer took proper and businesslike steps in reaching the settlement.

The appellant, a condominium unit owner, sued the lawyers who represented the condominium corporation in prior litigation, alleging fraud, perjury, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made by solicitors in the course of litigation are protected by absolute privilege, there is no civil cause of action for perjury, and solicitors owe no duty of care to opposing parties.

The appellants contracted with the respondent to repair fire damage to their property.

The project was overseen by a third party who fraudulently requested and retained personal payments from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondent for the outstanding contract amount, concluding the third party lacked actual or ostensible authority to receive personal payments on the respondent's behalf.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the governing principles of ostensible authority.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a mother and her daughter and son-in-law over beneficial ownership interests in two residential properties.

The trial judge found that the mother beneficially owned one property via a resulting trust and held a 35.6% interest in the second property.

The appellants argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding intentions for the first property and that there was an apprehension of bias due to the immediate oral judgment for the second.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on resulting trust and property interests, and found no reasonable apprehension of bias, though it noted the immediate oral decision was not best practice.

The appellant, Seargeant Picard Incorporated (SPI), appealed a "boomerang" summary judgment order that found the respondents' (Saxbergs') action for breach of a construction contract was not statute-barred.

SPI argued the motion judge erred in the discoverability analysis and in granting the boomerang order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the discoverability analysis, particularly regarding the application of the "appropriate means" test under the Limitations Act, 2002, and upheld the boomerang order given the parties' agreement and the thoroughness of the motion judge's review.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The parties settled the issue of costs for the appeal.

The appellant, Anna Barbiero, was ordered to pay the respondent, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, $10,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant, Bishop Girgis, appealed a lower court decision that interpreted and rectified a will to distribute proceeds from a property sale to the estate of the deceased's brother, rather than to the residuary beneficiary (Bishop Girgis).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the rectification on the basis that it gave effect to the testator's plain intention, despite disagreeing with the application judge's specific analytical path.

Costs were awarded against the appellant.

The appellant, Anna Barbiero, sought to overturn the dismissal of a 21-year-old certified class proceeding against Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack for unlawfully injecting Liquid Injectable Silicone.

The motion judge dismissed the action for inordinate and inexcusable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, emphasizing the need for a "culture shift" in civil justice to combat delay, finding the Langenecker approach to delay out of step with the Supreme Court of Canada's Hryniak decision.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, and the appellant failed to demonstrate error in the prejudice analysis or the exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order declaring a basement unit part of the premises leased by the respondent.

The original lease defined the premises as "the whole" and while an amended lease changed the rent calculation method, the definition of the premises did not change.

The appellant argued the new rent calculation implied the basement was excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation that the rent calculation merely changed the method for the entire building, especially given the original landlord's knowledge of basement subletting and the illogical outcome of decreased space with increased rent.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order dismissing the appellant's action as an abuse of process, specifically for contravening s. 2(1) of the Solicitors Act by bringing an action within one month of delivering a bill without leave.

The appellant argued errors regarding the nature of retainer, procedural unfairness in dismissing an amendment motion, and reversal of burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision, confirming the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the dismissal of the amendment motion due to lack of leave.