Bradley W. Miller

The appellant, A.N., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appeal focused on whether a 60-day period of delay, attributed by the trial judge to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance, was properly deducted from the total delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s reliance on local knowledge and internal court statistics to find the delay was justified, and dismissed the appeal.

This appeal concerns a commercial dispute between The North West Company LP (NWC) and Classic Furs Company Ltd. (CF) over the supply of coyote furs for use in Canada Goose parkas.

The trial judge found a contract existed and that NWC breached it in several respects, but also found in NWC’s favour on unpaid invoices.

Both parties appealed aspects of the damages assessment and liability findings.

The Court of Appeal allowed CF’s appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding that certain furs were delivered, and recalculated damages accordingly, including an award of punitive damages against NWC.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Pierre Dartiguenave from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Crown requested dismissal on the basis that Mr. Dartiguenave was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Board, and the appellant could not be located.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed J.S.'s conviction and sentence appeals for child luring and sexual interference.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the complainant’s evidence or in the allocation of the burden of proof regarding the possibility of a third-party hacker.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge failed to consider the appellant’s personal circumstances or recent appellate guidance on family considerations in sentencing.

The sentence, including the lack of Downes credit for bail conditions, was upheld.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Conal Quinn’s appeal from his conviction for sexual assault.

The court found no reversible error in the trial judge’s exclusion of evidence under section 276 of the Criminal Code, nor in the exclusion of expert evidence regarding methamphetamine use and sexual impulsivity.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons and the finding that any consent would have been vitiated by abuse of authority.

The decision affirms the trial judge’s careful application of the law regarding sexual history evidence and the proper approach to expert testimony in the context of sexual assault prosecutions.

The appellant, C.O., appealed convictions for two counts of sexual interference involving his then partner’s 14-year-old daughter.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge erred in her application of the principles from R. v. J.J.R.D. and whether she drew speculative inferences or misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or application of the law, including her treatment of peripheral evidence and credibility findings.

The appellant’s application to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed as not meeting the legal threshold.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention order at a psychiatric facility.

The appellant argued that the Board's decision to deny him a conditional discharge was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the Board's decision was well-supported by evidence of the appellant's decompensation, untreated mental illness, and history of absconding from his treatment team.

Accordingly, the Court found no error in the Board's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Z.V., appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant’s evidence regarding consent to oral sex, and (2) that the trial judge erred by using a finding of fabrication in the appellant’s evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt without independent evidence of fabrication.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of the complainant’s evidence and held that the trial judge’s use of the fabrication finding was limited to credibility assessment and did not constitute an error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, incest, and sexual interference involving his biological daughter.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the frequency of the abuse and failed to consider the implausibility of the allegations given the presence of a home surveillance camera.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario rejected these arguments, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or her treatment of the evidence.

The court also clarified the proper limits of admitting out-of-court statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed D.C.'s appeal from convictions for sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial and in assessing the evidence.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s approach, including his assessment of the complainant’s credibility and the pattern of verdicts.

The court also rejected arguments regarding consent and the sufficiency of the evidence, upholding the convictions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order, arguing the judge misapprehended evidence regarding the interpretation of a quitclaim deed and its tax consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interpretation of the deed was a matter of law and intention, not evidence, and that the motion judge correctly considered the tax consequences without misapprehending the evidence.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondents.

The moving party sought a panel review of a decision dismissing her motion for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her appeal of five Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that despite meeting the first four factors for an extension of time, the justice of the case weighed against granting leave because the proposed appeal lacked merit and general public importance.

The appellant appealed her convictions for drug trafficking and her 4-year custodial sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter by mischaracterizing periods of delay, including those related to COVID-19 and a missing Information.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the trial judge's attribution of delay to the defence and exceptional circumstances.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4-year sentence was below the established range for mid-level cocaine trafficking and the trial judge made no error in principle in rejecting a conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately quantify the mitigating effect of harsh pretrial conditions (Duncan credit) and sought a further reduction based on the sentence's impact on his family.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that under R. v. Marshall, harsh pretrial conditions are a mitigating factor to be weighed holistically, not a mathematical deduction.

The court also rejected the family impact argument due to insufficient evidence and the appellant's history.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell land to the respondent for $4.1 million.

The appellant argued the oral agreement was unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, contending the detrimental reliance aspect of the doctrine of part performance was not met because the respondent's only obligation was to pay the purchase price, which was tendered but refused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding the respondent irremediably carried out its obligations to its detriment by taking all necessary steps to close the transaction while the appellant stood by.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages related to a failed real estate transaction involving a Hindu Temple.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims of fraud and unjust enrichment, partly because the appellant's corporations were not named as parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the fraud claims but found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the unjust enrichment claim and in limiting the piercing of the corporate veil to cases of fraud.

The Court allowed the appeal, awarded the appellant $7,500 for mortgage payments made on behalf of the respondents, and ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claim regarding the remaining advances.

The husband appealed a family law judgment made following an uncontested trial in which he did not participate due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and pleadings.

The wife brought a motion to quash the appeal based on the husband's ongoing non-compliance with support and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding it more appropriate to hear the appeal on the merits.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with an uncontested trial given the husband's repeated breaches of court orders and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The appellant reinsurer appealed a trial judgment ordering it to indemnify the respondent retrocedant for its share of a $140 million settlement reached by the lead insurer regarding a business interruption claim.

The appellant argued it was not bound by the 'follow settlements' clause in the retrocession agreement because it had not agreed to the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant was bound by the single proviso follow settlements clause, that the settlement arguably fell within coverage as a matter of law, and that the lead insurer took proper and businesslike steps in reaching the settlement.