Bradley W. Miller

The appellant, a condominium unit owner, sued the lawyers who represented the condominium corporation in prior litigation, alleging fraud, perjury, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made by solicitors in the course of litigation are protected by absolute privilege, there is no civil cause of action for perjury, and solicitors owe no duty of care to opposing parties.

The appellants contracted with the respondent to repair fire damage to their property.

The project was overseen by a third party who fraudulently requested and retained personal payments from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondent for the outstanding contract amount, concluding the third party lacked actual or ostensible authority to receive personal payments on the respondent's behalf.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the governing principles of ostensible authority.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

The appellant, Seargeant Picard Incorporated (SPI), appealed a "boomerang" summary judgment order that found the respondents' (Saxbergs') action for breach of a construction contract was not statute-barred.

SPI argued the motion judge erred in the discoverability analysis and in granting the boomerang order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the discoverability analysis, particularly regarding the application of the "appropriate means" test under the Limitations Act, 2002, and upheld the boomerang order given the parties' agreement and the thoroughness of the motion judge's review.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a mother and her daughter and son-in-law over beneficial ownership interests in two residential properties.

The trial judge found that the mother beneficially owned one property via a resulting trust and held a 35.6% interest in the second property.

The appellants argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding intentions for the first property and that there was an apprehension of bias due to the immediate oral judgment for the second.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on resulting trust and property interests, and found no reasonable apprehension of bias, though it noted the immediate oral decision was not best practice.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The parties settled the issue of costs for the appeal.

The appellant, Anna Barbiero, was ordered to pay the respondent, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, $10,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant, Anna Barbiero, sought to overturn the dismissal of a 21-year-old certified class proceeding against Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack for unlawfully injecting Liquid Injectable Silicone.

The motion judge dismissed the action for inordinate and inexcusable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, emphasizing the need for a "culture shift" in civil justice to combat delay, finding the Langenecker approach to delay out of step with the Supreme Court of Canada's Hryniak decision.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, and the appellant failed to demonstrate error in the prejudice analysis or the exercise of discretion.

The appellant, Bishop Girgis, appealed a lower court decision that interpreted and rectified a will to distribute proceeds from a property sale to the estate of the deceased's brother, rather than to the residuary beneficiary (Bishop Girgis).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the rectification on the basis that it gave effect to the testator's plain intention, despite disagreeing with the application judge's specific analytical path.

Costs were awarded against the appellant.

The applicant, West Whitby Landowners Group Inc., sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their judicial review application against the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) and Elexicon Energy Inc. The Divisional Court had found it lacked jurisdiction over the OEB's opinion on cost allocation, deeming it not a statutory power of decision affecting legal rights, and that certiorari was unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, clarifying the test for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The court emphasized that the key consideration for granting leave is the impact the decision will have on the development of Ontario's jurisprudence, particularly in administrative and public law, moving away from a rigid checklist approach.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order dismissing the appellant's action as an abuse of process, specifically for contravening s. 2(1) of the Solicitors Act by bringing an action within one month of delivering a bill without leave.

The appellant argued errors regarding the nature of retainer, procedural unfairness in dismissing an amendment motion, and reversal of burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision, confirming the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the dismissal of the amendment motion due to lack of leave.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order declaring a basement unit part of the premises leased by the respondent.

The original lease defined the premises as "the whole" and while an amended lease changed the rent calculation method, the definition of the premises did not change.

The appellant argued the new rent calculation implied the basement was excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation that the rent calculation merely changed the method for the entire building, especially given the original landlord's knowledge of basement subletting and the illogical outcome of decreased space with increased rent.

The appellants, Enhanced Care Pharmacy and 2819826 Ontario Inc., appealed an order directing them to cease pharmacy operations in a condominium building.

The respondents, World Medpharm Inc., held an exclusive right to operate a pharmacy in the building, granted by an Exclusive Use Agreement and enforced by a Declaration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the appellants were aware of the prohibition, the respondents had standing to enforce the declaration, and there was no basis to exercise discretion to relieve the appellants from compliance.

The court found no error in the application judge's rejection of arguments regarding the impact on the respondents' business or harm to patients.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The central issue was whether the appellant's violent conduct was intractable and untreatable.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by ignoring a gap in his criminal record and by failing to consider his circumstances and the potential for intensive treatment in the federal penitentiary system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered all evidence, including the appellant's history of violence, treatment resistance, and lack of motivation, and reasonably concluded that there was no realistic prospect of controlling his risk to the public through less onerous means.

The appellant, Essex Condominium Corporation No. 125 (ECC 125), appealed a partial summary judgment that dismissed its claim for unpaid common expense fees against the respondents based on a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on the issue of discoverability under the Limitations Act, incorrectly placing the onus on the plaintiff to disprove that its claim was statute-barred.

The Court clarified that the burden remains on the defendant to prove the claim was discoverable.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the summary judgment, and directing the claim for unpaid common expense fees to proceed to trial.

This appeal concerned a dispute over indemnification and escrow provisions in an asset purchase agreement, specifically whether an amendment to a Notice of Application was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision that the amendment was not statute-barred, despite an error in the application of s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, as it did not introduce a new cause of action or remedy.

The court also upheld the interpretation of the Escrow Agreement regarding notice delivery, finding that registered mail was not a valid method of delivery.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed the disposition of $30,000 posted by the appellant, Sergio Grillone, as security for costs on appeal, following his bankruptcy.

The appellant argued the funds were assets of his estate to be distributed to creditors, while the respondent, Bluecore Capital Inc., sought payment of outstanding costs from the security.

The court rejected the appellant's submission, concluding that the security for costs was not an asset of the bankruptcy estate but was specifically posted to secure the costs of the appeal and related motions.

The respondent was found entitled to the full amount of the security to cover its outstanding costs.

CentriLogic appealed a trial order requiring it to pay Infor Financial Inc. damages for a financing fee and trial costs.

The appeal centered on the interpretation of an engagement agreement, specifically whether Infor was entitled to the financing fee and if CentriLogic breached a confidentiality clause by sharing Infor's proprietary materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that CentriLogic breached the agreement and that Infor was entitled to the financing fee based on a commercially reasonable interpretation of the contract.

The court also affirmed the substantial costs award, finding no error in principle.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearms possession, arguing the vehicle search was unlawful under the Liquor Licence Act (LLA), the traffic stop was a pretext, and the evidence did not prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search lawful under the LLA, rejecting the pretext argument (including a new racial profiling claim), and affirming the trial judge's finding of possession based on ample evidence.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal where VAC Developments Limited's counterclaim against Mr. Williams was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed VAC's appeal from that judgment.

Mr. Williams sought full indemnity costs for the appeal and a fresh evidence motion, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding no grounds for a heightened award.

For the fresh evidence motion, which was occasioned by an unsupported allegation in Mr. Williams' factum, the court awarded reduced costs to Mr. Williams and also to Mr. Lakhani, a third party who intervened, acknowledging their partial responsibility for the motion's necessity.