Harry S. LaForme

Five appellants were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case alleged a planned robbery with violence, while the defence maintained the incident arose from a drug transaction that escalated when the victim produced a firearm.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair, that jury selection instructions were inadequate, and that prior consistent statement instructions were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's questioning of defence witnesses and extemporaneous comments during jury instructions created a cumulative appearance of bias toward the prosecution, seriously compromising the fairness of the trial.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial.

The SCAJ had found that the trial judge improperly interfered with the respondent's right to make full answer and defence by preventing cross-examination on 45 photographs.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCAJ erred in interfering with the trial judge's discretion to control the trial process.

The trial judge had properly vetted the photographs to prevent redundant and repetitive evidence.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions on five counts of assault, three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of theft under $5,000.

The appellants sought summary judgment to determine whether an insurance policy obtained by the mortgagees covered the mortgagors' interest in the property and whether the insurer could exercise subrogation rights.

The mortgagors had failed to obtain property insurance after their existing policy was cancelled.

The mortgagees obtained a policy in their own names covering only their mortgagee interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the policy was for the sole benefit of the mortgagees and that the mortgagees were entitled to pursue subrogation rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Standard Charge Term 16 of the mortgage imposed the obligation to insure on the mortgagors and that any insurance obtained by the mortgagees was permissive and for their benefit alone.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent, sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, unlawful confinement, and possession of the proceeds of crime arising from a planned home invasion robbery against two women.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, falling between the Crown's submission of 12-15 years and defence counsel's submission of 5-7 years.

The appellant appealed, arguing that if the trial judge erred in treating aggravating factors, a 7-year sentence would be more proportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 9-year sentence was fully reasoned, within the appropriate range, and within the trial judge's proper discretion.

The appellant sought a review of a chambers judge's decision dismissing his motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, which he had missed by two weeks.

The chambers judge found that while the appellant had formed the requisite intention to appeal and provided an adequate explanation for the delay with no prejudice to the respondent, he failed to demonstrate that there was merit to the proposed appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's decision, finding that the conclusory statements in the appellant's affidavit did not support an error and that the core findings on the summary judgment motion regarding the expiration of the limitations period and the appellant's lack of standing were unassailable.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

He was convicted in absentia at trial and his conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, a statutory declaration from an insurance company employee established that the vehicle was covered by a valid policy of insurance at the time of the alleged offence.

The Crown conceded that the statutory declaration was admissible evidence and that it proved the appellant did not commit the offence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to one year in custody.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The appellant claimed that additional paycheques she received were payments for files she had brought to the lawyer's practice, allegedly pursuant to an agreement for 10% of earnings.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence as internally inconsistent, unsupported, and unreliable, while accepting the lawyer's evidence as credible and supported by bank records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W. (D.) test, no misapprehension of evidence, and no basis for interfering with the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 13.5 months' imprisonment followed by 2 years' probation for fraud over $5,000.

The appellant had defrauded a family friend and client of $110,000 through a fabricated immigration scheme.

The trial judge found the fraud was planned and involved a breach of trust but lasted only a few days.

The appellant argued that a non-custodial sentence could meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, proposing either a suspended sentence or a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the non-custodial alternatives and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellants appealed a judgment ordering them to repay $120,000 to the respondents.

The parties had entered into a property sale agreement, and the appellants had borrowed $120,000 from the respondents, which was to be repaid through the closing of the sale.

When the sale did not close, the respondents sought return of the funds.

The application judge found the $120,000 was a loan, not a deposit, and ordered repayment.

The appellants argued the entire sum was a forfeited deposit and that the respondents failed to demonstrate readiness to complete the purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, finding the evidence clearly established the $120,000 was a loan to be repaid either through the sale or directly if the sale did not complete.

The appellant mortgaged a golf course property to the respondent for $2,700,000.

After the appellant defaulted on the mortgage, the respondent obtained a default judgment for foreclosure and took possession of the property.

The appellant subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment and sought relief from forfeiture.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable prospect of payment, no evidence of ability to redeem, and no special circumstances warranting equitable intervention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, distinguishing the case from Winters v. Hunking on the basis that the appellant provided no appraisal evidence of property value or equity, the property was investment property rather than a family homestead, and the appellant's delay was inadequately explained.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing its action for delay and awarding costs to the respondents.

The action, commenced in 2005 for negligent engineering work on natural gas turbines, had been dormant since 2009 following a successful appeal of a summary judgment dismissal.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 24.01 to dismiss for delay and recover costs.

The appellant argued that Rule 48.14, which mandates automatic dismissal of actions five or more years old without trial, should have applied without costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and costs award, finding that Rule 24.01 and Rule 48.14 operate concurrently with no hierarchy between them, and that the court retained jurisdiction to award costs under Rule 24.01 despite Rule 48.14's silence on costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence and occupiers' liability claim arising from a fall down stairs at a restaurant.

The motion judge dismissed the original claim based on the condition of the stairs but permitted amendment to plead an alternative theory based on failure to advise of an accessible washroom on the main floor.

A second motion judge dismissed the amended claim, finding it did not constitute a new cause of action and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal but found the motion judge erred in his reasoning.

The amended claim did constitute a new cause of action based on a different duty of care and was properly barred by the Limitations Act as it was raised outside the two-year limitation period.

Appeal from a trial judgment awarding damages for birth injuries caused by hospital negligence.

The trial judge found that hospital nurses negligently ruptured the membranes during delivery, causing the plaintiff to suffer hypotonic cerebral palsy with serious and permanent impairments.

The appellants admitted falling below the standard of care but contested causation and damages.

The trial judge awarded $5,568,393 in total damages, including $1,881,846 for future loss of income, and costs of $2,201,259.

The appellants appealed the damages award and costs decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a family court order relating to a motion to change child and spousal support obligations under Part III of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because appeals from family court decisions under Part III of the FLA must be brought to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed on jurisdictional grounds.

The appellant was convicted of unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and uttering a death threat following a jury trial.

Approximately three years later, he was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration.

His appeal was initially abandoned but subsequently reopened.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial Crown's closing remarks, while potentially problematic, did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge violated procedural fairness by denying the appellant the right to make oral submissions during the dangerous offender hearing, instead requiring written submissions only.

A new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking out their negligence claim against the Toronto Police Services Board without leave to amend.

The appellants alleged the police owed them a duty of care in investigating a crime affecting their family.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the precedent in Wellington v. Ontario established that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime and their families in relation to police investigations.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments that their case was distinguishable based on their lack of certain victim remedies or their assistance to police in the investigation.

The appellant, a member of a not-for-profit corporation, challenged a bylaw that rendered members involved in litigation with the Board ineligible for nomination, election, or appointment to the Board.

The appellant had unsuccessfully campaigned for election in 2013 and subsequently engaged in litigation with the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the application under section 253 of the Canada Not-For-Profit Corporations Act, finding that the Limitations Act, 2002 applied and that the application was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's procedural approach and determining that the application was properly time-barred.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing an appeal of an arbitrator's preliminary award.

The franchisor appealed the arbitrator's determination that the limitation period for arbitration had not expired.

The dispute arose from a franchisee's notice of rescission of a franchise agreement based on alleged non-disclosure by the franchisor.

The central issue was whether a mediation requirement in the franchise agreement constituted a precondition to arbitration that suspended the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The arbitrator severed the requirement that mediation occur in Delaware, finding it contrary to the Arthur Wishart Act, and determined that the limitation period commenced only after mediation was deemed completed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arbitrator's decision, applying a reasonableness standard of review.

The appellant displayed a sign reading "Trump is right.

Fuck China.

Fuck Mexico" in Grand View Plaza within Niagara Parks.

The Niagara Parks Police issued a summons for violations of section 2(9)(a) of Ontario Regulation 829 under the Niagara Parks Act, which prohibits abusive or insulting language that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parks.

The appellant was also issued an oral trespass notice.

The application judge dismissed the constitutional challenge.

On appeal, the court held that while section 2(9)(a) does limit freedom of expression under the Charter, the limitation is justified under section 1.

However, the court found that the trespass notice was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's political expression.

An appeal of a wrongful dismissal judgment where the trial judge awarded an investment banker 18 months' reasonable notice damages following his dismissal without cause due to the closure of his employer's Mergers & Acquisitions division.

The principal issue on appeal concerned whether damages should include the deferred portions of the employee's bonus (60% of annual bonuses paid as notional shares that would vest over time).

The appellants also challenged the trial judge's awards for vacation pay, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision in all respects.