Harry S. LaForme

The appellants sought to challenge legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm to their creditor, Sun Life, in connection with enforcement of a secured loan.

The appellants had signed three successive release agreements that purported to preclude assessment of the accounts.

The motion judge held that the releases were effective to bar assessment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but on different grounds.

While expressing concerns about the motion judge's reasoning regarding the Solicitors Act, the appellate court held that the appellants failed to establish special circumstances required under section 11 of the Solicitors Act to justify assessment of accounts already paid by a third party.

The appellant Economical Insurance appealed a motion judge's determination of the priority in which three insurance policies would respond to a motor vehicle accident claim.

The driver was covered under the vehicle owner's State Farm automobile policy, the owner's State Farm personal liability umbrella policy, and the driver's own Economical automobile policy.

The motion judge ordered that the State Farm auto policy respond first, followed by the Economical auto policy, and then the State Farm umbrella policy.

Economical argued that the umbrella policy was an owner's first loss policy under section 277(1) of the Insurance Act and should respond before the Economical policy, or alternatively, that both policies should respond rateably under section 277(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the umbrella policy was not an owner's first loss policy as defined by the Act and that section 277(2) did not apply to the Economical policy.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring her to be a vexatious litigant.

The appellant raised over 20 grounds of appeal, arguing that her various actions, proceedings, and appeals against the respondent condominium corporation and related parties were warranted and did not constitute misuse of the court process.

The appellant also alleged systemic bias against self-represented litigants and argued that the application judge should have recused herself.

The Court of Appeal upheld the vexatious litigant designation, finding that the appellant's proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, and constituted collateral attacks on finally determined matters.

The court rejected allegations of bias and found no basis to interfere with the application judge's findings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for wrongful termination of a promotional contract.

The trial judge found that the contract required the respondent to promote the appellant's product, not serve as a brand ambassador, and that the morals clause was not violated by the private transmission of nude photographs within an intimate relationship, particularly where the act occurred before the contract was executed.

The trial judge awarded $162,500 in damages representing outstanding periodic payments over the four-year contract term.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on a motion to extend time to perfect an appeal.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that counsel's inadvertence had prevented important evidence from being presented to the motion judge regarding the test for extending time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the interests of justice required admission of the fresh evidence and that it called into serious question the motion judge's conclusions on the merits, particularly regarding whether a reasonable explanation for the appellant's delay existed.

The Court set aside the motion judge's order dismissing the appeal for delay and extended the time to perfect the appeal to February 16, 2018.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offence charges on the basis that the trial judge erred in denying two s. 11(b) Charter applications regarding unreasonable delay.

The first application was decided under the Morin test, and the second under the Jordan test.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in calculating the delay period and in assessing the relevant factors.

The trial judge incorrectly attributed delay to the defence when much of it was attributable to Crown disclosure practices and procedural issues.

The properly calculated delay of over 17 months substantially exceeded the Morin guideline of 8-10 months for provincial trials.

The case was not complex, and the prejudice to the accused was not modest as the trial judge had found.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant, Turtle Creek Landscape Inc., appealed the dismissal of its action on summary judgment.

The appellant had sued the respondents for damages alleging defects in a truck it claimed to have purchased.

The motion judge found that the actual purchaser of the vehicle was Roberto Imbiscuso, not Turtle Creek, as evidenced by the vehicle purchase agreement, warranty documentation, and title registration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles and no evidence supporting the appellant's claims regarding required repairs, payment for repairs, or odometer tampering.

The Ontario Provincial Police and the Crown appealed an order by Nordheimer J. determining that certain materials seized under a search warrant were subject to litigation privilege and therefore not potentially evidence in any criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that the order affected the enforcement or implementation of the search warrant, which is a judicial order made in a criminal investigation.

The court determined that judicial orders directed at the enforcement or implementation of a criminal order are themselves criminal in nature.

Consequently, no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal in a criminal proceeding under the Courts of Justice Act, and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action against the Toronto Police Services Board and an insurance company on the basis that the claims were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant was aware of all facts supporting his claims by June 2010 (regarding the insurance company) and January 2011 (regarding the police board), and that he commenced his action more than two years after those dates.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that discoverability for limitation purposes is based on knowledge of the facts necessary to support a claim, not knowledge of the applicable law.

An appeal from a trial judgment concerning a construction contract dispute.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings regarding responsibility for drywall deficiencies and the labour rate credited to the appellant.

The appellate court found the trial judge's determination that the appellant assumed responsibility for drywall installed by third parties was fully supported by evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the labour rate issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was reclassified back to medium security and subsequently released on parole while the appeal was pending.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issues sought to be raised were not properly raised before the application judge and that attempting to expand upon the legal principles established in Mission Institution v. Khela without a proper factual foundation would provide limited assistance.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was transferred back to medium security prior to the extension of time being granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the current habeas corpus proceeding was the preferable forum to address the lawfulness of the appellant's present detention.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by Justice Chapin of the Ontario Court of Justice on July 15, 2014.

The appeal was allowed on consent.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing an application.

The Court of Appeal reversed the application decision.

As a result, the costs order awarded to the respondent in the amount of $45,000 was set aside, and costs in the application were awarded to the appellant on a partial indemnity basis in the same amount, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

An insured brought an action against international insurers for breach of an insurance contract.

The insurers moved to stay the action and refer the dispute to arbitration in London, England pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policy.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding that the "Action Against Insurer" endorsement provided an alternative method of dispute resolution allowing domestic court proceedings.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was mandatory and the sole method of dispute resolution, and that the "Action Against Insurer" clause was a service of suit provision that did not conflict with the arbitration clause.

The court also clarified that the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration applies to agreements providing for arbitration of certain disputes, not only those providing for arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution.

A utility company and rural municipality disputed cost-sharing for gas pipeline relocation necessitated by municipal drainage works.

The utility sought 35% cost contribution from the municipality under a franchise agreement, while the municipality argued the utility should bear the full cost under section 26 of the Drainage Act.

The application judge held that section 26 of the Act overrode the franchise agreement's cost-sharing provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not prohibit contracting out of its cost-allocation provisions and that the franchise agreement's cost-sharing mechanism applies to drainage works undertaken by the municipality.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge for breach of a court order.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's position without providing the appellant's counsel an opportunity to make further submissions regarding the trial judge's inclination to impose a greater sentence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in procedure.

On review of the fitness of the sentence de novo, the court determined that the Crown's requested sentence was fit and varied the sentence to 12 months less pre-trial custody of 219 days.

The respondent was arrested for robbery and released on bail.

While on bail, he committed a second offence (procuring sexual services) and was denied bail for that charge.

He was subsequently convicted of the robbery offences and sentenced with credit for pre-trial custody accumulated after his detention on the second offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing that pre-trial custody incurred following a later, unrelated charge could not be credited against the sentence for the earlier robbery offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code do not limit credit for pre-trial custody only to the offence that directly triggered detention.

Rather, courts must assess whether a sufficient causal link exists between the pre-trial custody and the offence being sentenced, which may encompass custody arising from later charges if those charges contributed to the denial of bail or the offender's decision not to seek bail.

The appellant purchased a cottage property through an online auction conducted by the respondent auction company.

After the high bid was accepted and a purchase and sale contract executed, the sellers refused to close.

The appellant subsequently negotiated a second purchase and sale contract directly with the sellers and the sale closed.

The auction company claimed entitlement to the buyer's premium from the appellant's escrow deposit, arguing the two contracts were effectively one continuous agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the buyer's premium was not payable when the sale failed to close due to the seller's default, and that the subsequent direct purchase did not trigger the obligation to pay the premium under the auction contract.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge acquitted on both counts, finding the Crown could not prove impairment and could not rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) to establish the blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown sought to rely on the included offence of care or control over 80, but the trial judge rejected this, holding that s. 258(1)(c) applied only to the charged offence.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the acquittals on fairness grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the included offence issue, holding that the presumption of identity applies to included offences and that it is not unfair to convict on an included offence arising from the same facts as the charged offence.