Harry S. LaForme

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge acquitted on both counts, finding the Crown could not prove impairment and could not rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) to establish the blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown sought to rely on the included offence of care or control over 80, but the trial judge rejected this, holding that s. 258(1)(c) applied only to the charged offence.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the acquittals on fairness grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the included offence issue, holding that the presumption of identity applies to included offences and that it is not unfair to convict on an included offence arising from the same facts as the charged offence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was consent.

The complainant testified she did not consent to sexual intercourse that occurred in her dormitory room.

The appellant did not testify but provided a police statement claiming the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the appellant's statements unbelievable, convicting him based on the circumstances of the incident and the appellant's pattern of dishonesty.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The trial judge found that while the appellant initially acted in self-defence during an altercation with an intruder in his apartment, he went beyond the limits of self-defence by continuing to strike the victim with a metal object after the threat had diminished.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the significant mitigating factors arising from the appellant's initial justification in self-defence and the victim's role as an aggressor and trespasser.

The sentence was reduced from six years to time served (approximately two and one-half years).

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its claims against multiple respondents related to alleged breaches of exclusion and limitation of liability clauses in entertainment contracts.

The appellant raised an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias based on comments made by the motion judge regarding a public policy argument.

The Court of Appeal rejected the bias allegation, finding the judge's comments were directed at the merits of the unsupported public policy claim, not at the appellant's indigenous culture or beliefs.

The Court upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contractual provisions and rejection of the unconscionability argument.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing an application for judicial review of a Crown decision to stay a private prosecution.

The appellant alleged that the Crown's decision to stay the prosecution constituted an abuse of process, arguing that the decision was not evidence-based and that failing to prosecute what the appellant characterized as indisputable perjury harmed the integrity of the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that abuse of process is not a tool for assessing the quality or reasonableness of prosecutorial decisions, but rather addresses egregious Crown conduct that seriously undermines the fairness of proceedings or the integrity of the administration of justice.

The court found no foundation for an abuse of process finding.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that set aside a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal found no legal or factual basis for the stay of charges based on the police's failure to lay the information within the statutory time limit or serve the summons timely.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the possibility of mitigating a driving suspension sentence constituted a credible Charter violation justifying a stay of serious criminal charges.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal of a conviction.

The appellant raised two grounds: an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and an argument that the fee arrangement with his counsel constituted a prohibited contingency fee under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's evidence regarding ineffective assistance to be totally incredible and rejected the contingency fee argument as having no basis on the record.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissal of their action against a construction management company for alleged overpayments and damages under a penalty clause for construction delays.

The motion judge had rejected the overpayment claim and found the penalty clause did not apply to a feature wall.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's credibility assessment of the appellant was impaired by serious misapprehensions of evidence, including confusing testimony between witnesses and erroneously finding a non-existent invoice.

The court also found the motion judge erred by dismissing the action entirely despite the respondent's concession of a modest overpayment.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order determining that claims for recovery of legal expenses incurred in connection with a coroner's inquest into the death of a family member were potentially recoverable under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in answering the question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a) without proper pleadings raising the issue.

The pleadings predated the inquest and contained no reference to legal expenses.

The motion judge's answer that the expenses were "potentially recoverable" if they qualified as pecuniary loss did not advance the litigation or satisfy the purposes of Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

The Children's Aid Society appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a Crown wardship declaration and directed the matter proceed to trial.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Superior Court order was interlocutory, not final.

An order directing that a matter proceed to trial, even when it sets aside a prior final order, does not itself constitute a final order for appellate jurisdiction purposes.

The appeal was quashed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated March 29, 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had not demonstrated any error in the court below and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 8, 2016, challenging the motion judge's assessment of damages and raising allegations of negligence and dishonesty against the respondent's lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's assessment of loss.

The court rejected the appellant's claims regarding solicitor negligence, noting that such claims raised in the context of an appeal can only succeed in the rarest of cases and would require evidence of collusion, which was absent here.

The court held that solicitor negligence claims are not the appropriate subject of an appeal and should be pursued through separate litigation against the lawyer.

A motion to reconsider an order by Justice Gloria Epstein dismissing an appeal for delay.

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal, arguing inadequate notice and that the time for perfection should be extended.

The Court of Appeal upheld Epstein J.A.'s decision, finding no merit in the appellant's submissions and confirming that the entire history of the proceeding could be considered in assessing delay.

The appeal was properly dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice refusing to adjourn an application.

The appellant argued it was denied procedural fairness as it was unrepresented, had taken steps to prepare a response, and there had been no prior adjournments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's discretionary decision to refuse the adjournment, finding that the request appeared to be an attempt to delay proceedings.

The court noted the appellant's pattern of resisting performance of contractual obligations through litigation and its relative inaction in the seven weeks between service and the return date.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judge's decision on a change motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, increasing the additional spousal support awarded by the trial judge due to the husband's early retirement and lump sum pension payout and other changed circumstances.

The court dismissed the wife's appeal challenging the denial of ongoing child support.

The parties were unable to agree on trial costs, and the court addressed this issue in a costs endorsement.

The appellant was charged with importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

She was acquitted on the importing charge but convicted on the conspiracy charge and sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the acquittal on the importing charge was irreconcilably inconsistent with the conviction on the conspiracy charge, rendering the conspiracy conviction unreasonable.

Alternatively, she argued the trial judge erred in sentencing by treating her as a party to the importing charge on which she was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences against his cousin committed when she was a young girl.

He was sentenced to two years less a day in jail and three years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction arguing the trial judge engaged in an unbalanced approach to evidence resulting in a reversal of the burden of proof and failure to give effect to the presumption of innocence.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly applied Gladue principles and underemphasized deterrence and denunciation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement entered after a jury trial.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for sexual assault as part of similar fact evidence, and also challenged the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the use of such evidence on the issue of consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the prior conviction was properly admitted as part of a package of similar fact evidence and that the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The conviction was for robbery with a firearm, where the Crown's case relied on a BB gun.

The appellant argued that a BB gun did not fall within the definition of firearm under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that on the evidence accepted by the trial judge, the BB gun fell within the definition of firearm in section 2 of the Criminal Code and that this definition applies throughout the Act, including to the robbery provision.

The Court also found the sentence imposed was not unfit and declined to interfere.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of perjury for giving evasive and deliberately misleading testimony at another trial.

While the appellant was never directly asked whether he associated the nickname "Carlito" with Pierre Aragon, the trial judge found that the appellant deliberately refrained from identifying Aragon by that nickname despite knowing the questions were directed at soliciting that information.

The appellant's inadvertent reference to Aragon as "Carlito" and subsequent attempt to cover up the mistake further demonstrated deliberate intent to mislead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence and that the Crown had established all requisite elements of perjury.