Charles William Hourigan

The Crown appealed a stay of charges granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial judge found that defence counsel acted reasonably in not accommodating earlier trial dates offered by the Crown, which would have brought the case within the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the delay was not attributed to the defence, and the charges were stayed as the original schedule exceeded the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact regarding defence counsel's reasonableness, noting it was entitled to deference, and found no error in the application of law, dismissing the appeal.

The Ontario Review Board failed to fulfill its obligation to impose the least onerous and least restrictive disposition by declining to implement a joint submission for a detention order with community living privileges without considering less onerous alternatives.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ordering the implementation of the joint submission with an additional condition for a three-month review by the Board to assess compliance and determine the appropriate disposition.

The appellant appealed a conviction for fraud, arguing that the trial judge erred in a factual finding regarding an interest rate.

The Crown conceded the error, but the Court of Appeal found that this mistaken finding played no material role in the trial judge's determination that the fraud charge had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant also abandoned a second ground of appeal.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mark Cameron, appealed his conviction for break and enter, firearm offences, and cocaine possession, arguing several Charter violations related to his detention, arrest, and search.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's Charter ruling.

The court upheld the lawfulness of taking keys during investigative detention, the sufficiency of information provided, the reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on cumulative circumstances, the lawfulness of the incidental search, and the justified delay in advising the right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm and driving offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, dangerous driving, and assaulting a peace officer.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard regarding mens rea for dangerous driving and assaulting a police officer, and that the firearm verdicts were unreasonable due to a lack of knowledge regarding the weapon's characteristics.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of mens rea or credibility of witnesses.

The court concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the appellant's possession and knowledge of the firearm's loaded and restricted nature, noting that modifications to the weapon suggested intent for it to be operable.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, Waqar Ali, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 22 months.

The appeal raised issues concerning an alleged s.11(b) Charter delay, the trial judge's decision to grant a similar fact application, the assessment of DNA evidence, and the credibility assessment of the appellant's testimony regarding his vehicle.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding a breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding both the conviction and the sentence, finding no errors in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

The appellant, Roger Wain Foreshaw, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising six grounds of appeal.

Key issues included the trial judge's prohibition of cross-examination on a witness's record suspension, the absence of a Mayuran instruction regarding an alleged confession, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule, alleged misstatements of evidence in the jury charge, errors in the third-party suspect instruction, and a finding of no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross-examination on the record suspension, this error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions on the other grounds, affirming the conviction.

Robert Mark Roe appealed a lower court decision that upheld his mother's 2005 Will, which disinherited him.

He argued that his mother, Beverly Grace Roe, lacked testamentary capacity due to insane delusions and was unduly influenced by his brother, Rick.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's findings, concluding that Beverly's beliefs, though at times irrational, had a factual basis, and that she was not unduly influenced.

The court also confirmed that a testator only needs a general understanding of their assets for testamentary capacity.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent Randall Scott Roe.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal by BridgePoint Financial Services, setting aside a motion judge's order that reduced interest payable on litigation loans obtained by Rudolf Steinberg.

The motion judge had found the loans not unconscionable but granted a "modest amount of relief" due to COVID-19 related delays.

The Court of Appeal held that once the loans were found not unconscionable under the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, there was no legal basis to vary the interest.

It emphasized that courts cannot rewrite contracts or relieve parties from improvident bargains, and that COVID-19 delay, while "legitimate" did not justify reducing contractual interest.

The court also noted procedural unfairness as the basis for the reduction was not argued by the respondent.

The appellants abandoned their appeal on the eve of the hearing.

The decision addresses the issue of costs arising from the abandoned appeal.

The appellants argued against a costs award, citing an offer to settle.

The respondents, specifically the Estate of YYY and XXX, sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis, alleging the appeal constituted an abuse of process.

The court rejected both arguments, finding the offer to settle did not preclude a costs award and that the appeal, despite its procedural history, was not an abuse of process.

The respondents Estate of YYY and XXX were awarded $30,000 in all-inclusive costs from the appellants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a contempt order and a costs order issued in an estate proceeding.

The appellant, an alternate executor and beneficiary, had been found in contempt for failing to comply with an order to grant access to an estate property and produce documents to the Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL).

The motion judge had ordered an earlier vacation date for the property and awarded $18,000 in costs against the appellant.

The appellate court found no error in the contempt finding, the substituted service order, or the costs award, noting the appeal was largely moot as the property had been sold.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address invited the jury to engage in impermissible reasoning, specifically by linking the absence of a motive to fabricate with the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing improperly invited the jury to equate the complainant's good relationship with the appellant and lack of motive to fabricate with the reliability of her evidence.

The court held that a corrective instruction was required, and its absence compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action, which was found to be statute-barred due to the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge concluded that the appellant's injuries were discoverable well within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's application of discoverability principles under the Limitations Act and the threshold for serious and permanent impairment under the Insurance Act.

The Court clarified that formal medical opinions required for a threshold motion are not necessary to trigger the limitation period.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, alleging the trial judge erred in treating similar fact evidence and analyzing the complainant's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the grounds raised did not constitute errors of law alone, which is the only basis for a Crown appeal of an acquittal.

The court affirmed that weighing evidence or assessing credibility, unless based on ungrounded stereotypical assumptions, are not errors of law.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of a Divisional Court order, pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court had dismissed their judicial review of an Animal Care Board decision approving costs for animal care.

The applicants sought the stay to prevent forfeiture of animals due to unpaid accounts.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test for stays, combined with principles for leave to appeal from Sault Dock Co. Ltd. The court found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm (as the animals had already been forfeited), and that the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a class proceeding claiming damages against the Crown for negligence related to the presence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada between 2003 and 2008.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding it barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and also that no duty of care was owed and no negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, focusing solely on the application of section 9.

It found that various government programs providing financial assistance to cattle farmers in response to the BSE outbreak constituted "compensation" under section 9, thereby barring the negligence claim as it sought double recovery for the same factual basis of loss.

The appellant, Michael Cady, appealed his convictions for possession of property obtained by crime and laundering proceeds of crime.

His wife had defrauded her employer of over $1 million, depositing funds into a joint account.

The trial judge found that the appellant either knew the funds were illegally obtained or was wilfully blind to their origin, citing several "red flags" including his wife's prior fraud conviction, bankruptcies, and the couple's lavish spending inconsistent with their declared income.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of wilful blindness, stating it was not inconsistent with the appellant's claim of deferring to his wife's financial management, especially given his admission of suspicion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant landlord sought to expand a shopping centre to accommodate a new LCBO store, which required reconfiguring 36 parking spaces.

The respondent grocery store tenant successfully applied for a permanent injunction, with the application judge finding the tenant had a leasehold proprietary interest in the common parking area.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in law, as the tenant lacked exclusive possession of the parking area.

Assuming the tenant held an easement, the Court found no substantial interference with the tenant's rights, as the reconfiguration did not significantly reduce available spaces and the tenant had no contractual right to specific spots.

The appeal was allowed and the injunction set aside.

This appeal concerned the limitation period for an underinsured motorist claim.

The appellant insurer sought summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred, asserting that a demand for indemnification was made in April 2016.

The motion judge, relying on *Schmitz v. Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada*, found that the first valid demand for compensatory damages was made in February 2019, thus the limitation period began running in February 2019, making the action timely.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the factual findings or the application of *Schmitz*.