Charles William Hourigan

The appellant appealed a divorce order, arguing improper service of the Notice of Application and alleging the divorce was fraudulent, relying on a signature comparison and postage irregularities.

The Court of Appeal found no credible evidence to support the appellant's claims of fraud or service issues, noting the signatures appeared similar and there was no support for postage irregularities.

The court also considered that the parties had been separated since 2014 and a prior order granted the respondent sole decision-making responsibility for the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

Downing Street Financial Inc. sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the responding parties, which dismissed an action related to a co-tenancy agreement and alleged fraudulent conveyances/preferences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and other provincial statutes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

The court upheld the motion judge's findings that the parties dealt at arm's length and that deadlocked shareholders do not have de jure control for the purposes of the BIA, and that there was no intent to defeat creditors.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that found them jointly and severally liable for $120,000 plus prejudgment interest to the respondent.

The appeal primarily focused on the personal liability of one appellant under a personal guarantee related to a joint venture agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the case was suitable for summary judgment despite being a simplified procedure action, and upholding the validity and enforceability of the personal guarantee, which imposed personal liability.

The appellants, purchasers of a residential property, appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to the respondent vendor.

The action, commenced under Simplified Procedure, alleged breaches of warranties in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale concerning the pool, hot tub, and heating systems.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial, concluding the appellants failed to establish liability based on warranty wording and lacked admissible evidence of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings on liability and damages, and upholding the decision that examinations conducted were inadmissible under Rule 76.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent was awarded costs on appeal.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) sought to dismiss Canadian Tire's fraud action, arguing it arose from their expressions related to public interest (complaints about privacy violations and defective products).

The motion judge found the action did not arise from an expression and that the plaintiff's motive was irrelevant at the threshold stage of a SLAPP analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a plaintiff's motive is not a relevant factor at the first stage of the SLAPP analysis, which is restricted to determining if the action arises from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the motion judge properly exercised discretion.

The appellant, a speech language pathologist, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for intentional infliction of economic harm, interference with economic relations, PHIPA retaliation, and conspiracy, stemming from Sun Life's delisting of her services after an audit dispute.

The motion judge found the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, rejecting arguments for a rolling limitation period and that the discovery of the claim was contingent on a College investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing with the motion judge's analysis on the limitation period and the appropriateness of summary judgment.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's order regarding a class action.

The core issues were whether a discontinued cause of action and defendants could be added to an existing class action (the Martin action) and whether that action would then be governed by the old Class Proceedings Act, 1992, or the amended Act.

The motion judge had ordered the "recast" Martin action to proceed under the amended Act and denied leave to add a party (MicroPort Orthopedics Inc.) based on limitations.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in ordering the Martin action to be governed by the amended Act, as Section 39 of the amended Act clearly dictates that actions commenced before October 1, 2020, remain under the old Act.

The court also found an error in dismissing the motion to add MicroPort Orthopedics Inc. based on the Limitations Act, stating that limitation periods are typically individual issues in class actions.

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed in part, clarifying that the Martin action continues under the old Act, and a re-filed Rowland action (including MicroPort Orthopedics Inc.) would proceed under the amended Act.

The appellant brought a simplified procedure action against Kia Canada Inc. related to his purchase of a Kia Sorento in 2016.

The action was dismissed at trial, with the trial judge finding no breach of contract or the Sale of Goods Act, and that the appellant failed to prove compensable damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or credibility assessments.

The court agreed that the appellant failed to prove compensable damages, noting his lost wages claim contradicted his declared income and he failed to lead evidence regarding any loss on the sale of the vehicle.

The respondent, Sara Baker, suffered a stroke and was denied long-term disability benefits by the appellant, Blue Cross Life Insurance Company of Canada.

A jury at trial found in favour of Baker, awarding retroactive benefits, aggravated damages, and $1.5 million in punitive damages, along with full indemnity costs.

Blue Cross appealed the punitive damages award and sought leave to appeal the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the punitive damages, finding ample evidence of Blue Cross's reckless indifference or deliberate strategy to deny benefits, and that the quantum was rationally connected to deterrence.

The Court granted leave to appeal costs but ultimately dismissed the costs appeal, upholding the full indemnity costs based on Blue Cross's misconduct and the respondent's settlement offer, correcting the trial judge's reasoning for the costs award.

This appeal concerns a dispute between two condominium corporations regarding the cost of replacing shared electrical infrastructure (electric switchgear or ESG).

The appellant, Ottawa-Carleton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 656 (656), refused to contribute to the replacement cost, arguing that the ESG was the property of the respondent, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 519 (519), and its maintenance was 519's sole responsibility under their respective Declarations and the Condominium Act, 1998. 519 had successfully brought an application based on unjust enrichment, arguing that 656 would be enriched by continuing to receive electricity without contributing, 519 would be deprived, and there was no juristic reason for the enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that all elements of unjust enrichment were met, specifically agreeing that neither the Condominium Act nor 519's Declaration imposed a statutory obligation on 519 to maintain the ESG for 656's benefit without compensation, and that the absence of a cost-sharing agreement did not constitute a juristic reason to justify the enrichment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed four summary judgments granted against him for various debts (mortgages, lines of credit, credit card).

The appellant's arguments, consistent with "pseudolegal" theories, asserted that he was not subject to Canadian law by attempting to separate himself from his legal personhood.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that no legally tenable defence was advanced.

The court reiterated that such arguments consistently fail and consume court resources.

The court also confirmed the admissibility of the bank's business records under the Evidence Act.

This appeal arose from a tragic boat accident involving multiple fatalities and injuries.

The Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals: liability of government respondents, interpretation of the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap, and costs.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the boat operators were solely liable for the accident, dismissing the appeal against the government respondents.

It also affirmed that the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap for maritime claims for loss of life or personal injury does not include costs and interest.

While leave to appeal the quantum of costs and the Sanderson Order was denied, leave was granted on one specific costs issue, resulting in both estates being held jointly and severally liable for one plaintiff's costs.

The appellant sought to enforce an alleged agreement, contained in an email exchange, for the acquisition of shares in a family corporation and a declaration that the respondent had consented to the sale of shares owned by one of her brothers.

The motion judge found no binding agreement, determining that essential terms regarding the transaction's structure, method of payment, and dividend payments were not settled.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the structure and method of payment, which directly impacted the net-of-tax amount, and the precise terms of dividend payments were essential terms that had not been agreed upon.

The Court of Appeal considered appeals regarding the priority of claims in the receivership of Bridging Finance Inc. and its investment funds.

The motion judge had previously granted priority to Statutory Rescission Claims but denied it to Redemption Claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by Redemption Claimants, affirming that their claims had not crystallized and were subject to Bridging's discretion, thus lacking priority.

It allowed the appeal by General Unitholders, reversing the priority granted to Statutory Rescission Claims.

The court held that neither the language of the Ontario Securities Act (s. 130.1) nor the inherent nature of the rescission remedy provided a basis for statutory or de facto priority.

Consequently, the court ordered that all Unitholders, including Redemption Claimants, Statutory Rescission Claimants, and General Unitholders, shall rank pari passu with respect to the distribution of proceeds from the Bridging Funds.

The appellants sought to set aside a 2009 default judgment, arguing that a subsequent 2019 release, related to other actions, also released the default judgment.

The motion judge rejected this interpretation, finding the release unambiguously did not refer to the 2009 default judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the release was not ambiguous and the contra proferentem principle did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal arose in the context of estate litigation and focused on a procedural point regarding the service of a notice of application.

The appellants, who were the original respondents, sought to set aside a prior order (the March Order) on the basis of improper service, a motion they had previously brought and lost.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it an impermissible collateral attack on the earlier October Order, which had declined to set aside the March Order.

The court noted that the appellants had fully participated in subsequent proceedings and were not prejudiced by the initial service.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision concerning the assessment of a solicitor's bill.

The appellant, a former client, challenged the reversal of two reductions made by an assessment officer: one for annual hourly rate increases without sufficient notice, and another for the law firm's failure to pursue a costs award at the Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the retainer agreement provided adequate notice for rate increases up to $25 per year, especially given the client received independent legal advice.

The court also found the assessment officer erred in principle by granting a reduction for a claim of professional negligence that the client was already pursuing in a separate civil action and had not sought in the assessment hearing.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that granted forfeiture of their deposit and damages for breach of a pre-construction Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellants had advised the respondent they were unable to close and claimed a separate oral contract existed allowing assignment.

They also argued the respondent failed to mitigate damages by selling the property for significantly less.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision that no oral contract was proven and that the respondent's mitigation efforts were reasonable, as the appellants provided no evidence to the contrary regarding property valuation or market prices.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt and dismissing his action for persistently refusing to attend court-ordered medical examinations in Toronto.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not treating contempt as a last resort and by failing to accept his legitimate excuse for non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to find the appellant in contempt and to dismiss the action, emphasizing the appellant's deliberate non-compliance and the futility of further opportunities to comply.

IBM Canada Inc. appealed a summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal claim, challenging the 26-month reasonable notice period and the award of damages for Restricted Stock Units (RSUs).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that non-transferrable skills and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted exceptional circumstances justifying a notice period exceeding 24 months.

The court also upheld the RSU damages, finding the termination clause ambiguous and thus ineffective in limiting common law rights.