Lois B. Roberts

This appeal concerned the quantum of class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium following a $153 million class action settlement for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge had awarded $25 million in fees and denied a $30,000 honorarium.

The appellants sought an increase in fees to $44 million and the honorarium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision on both fees and honorarium, finding no palpable and overriding error or misdirection on law.

The mother appealed an order denying her permission to relocate her three-year-old daughter from Toronto to Ennis, Ireland.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material errors, seriously misapprehended evidence, and committed legal errors in his "best interests of the child" analysis under the Divorce Act.

Specifically, the trial judge erred in assessing family violence allegations, making unfounded assumptions about the mother's family's attitude towards the child's biracial heritage, and concluding that the mother manipulated the court system.

The trial judge also erred by re-characterizing the relocation case as a "support case" and misapplying the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, the trial decision set aside, and a new trial ordered on an expedited basis, with costs awarded to the mother.

The appellants, a real estate agent and brokerage, appealed a trial judge's order requiring them to pay damages to their former clients, the respondents.

The trial judge found that the appellants negligently misrepresented the location of a proposed development, leading the respondents to enter an agreement of purchase and sale and forfeit a $120,000 deposit in a settlement with the developer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the misrepresentation was negligent (not requiring expert evidence for a non-technical matter) and that the respondents' damages were caused by the misrepresentation.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the respondents should have completed the purchase or failed to mitigate their losses.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a dangerous driving causing bodily harm case.

The trial judge had excluded Event Data Recorder (EDR) evidence, finding an unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8 Charter violation) and police bad faith.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that police lacked reasonable grounds to seize the vehicle under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in EDR data after lawful seizure, and in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Court held that EDR data, being objective and impersonal, does not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy post-lawful seizure.

It also found police acted in good faith given conflicting caselaw.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered with the EDR evidence admitted.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision to reduce prejudgment interest on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% to 1.3%.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the statutory scheme under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, failing to consider all mandatory factors under s. 130(2), and misinterpreting "changes in market interest rates." The Court clarified that the 5% rate is presumptive and can only be deviated from in unusual or special circumstances, with the onus on the party seeking deviation.

The appeal was allowed, and the 5% rate was reinstated.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's prejudgment interest order, arguing errors in applying statutory rates and discretion under the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misapplying the presumptive 5% rate for non-pecuniary damages, misconstruing the purpose of non-pecuniary damages, and misinterpreting "market interest rates" by equating them with statutory prejudgment rates.

The trial judge also improperly rejected evidence of the insurer's and appellants' actual investment returns.

The appeal was allowed, and the prejudgment interest rate for both non-pecuniary and past pecuniary damages was increased to 8.46%.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute concerning financial advances and child support.

The Estate of T.O. (husband) appealed the trial judge's dismissal of a claim for $341,000 in advances to Ridgeway (a corporation indirectly owned by D.O., the wife), arguing the limitation period was misapplied.

D.O. cross-appealed the finding of her liability for a $40,346 advance made by the husband's corporation and a child support calculation error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Estate's appeal against Ridgeway, finding the 2013 advances were demand loans and thus not statute-barred.

It dismissed the appeal against D.O. and 201.

The cross-appeal was allowed, setting aside D.O.'s liability for the $40,346 advance (as the creditor was a non-party corporation) and correcting the child support calculation.

This is a costs endorsement following a grouped set of appeals and cross-appeals where all parties were entirely unsuccessful.

The court declined to award costs, rejecting the franchisor parties' argument to parse success across various elements of the appeals and cross-appeals.

The court found it inappropriate to do so, concluding that since no party achieved any degree of success, no costs should be awarded.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard appeals and a cross-appeal concerning a franchise dispute under the Arthur Wishart Act.

Franchisees Versatile Holdings Inc. and Everest Group Inc. appealed the dismissal of their rescission actions, arguing errors in the burden of proof for disclosure deficiencies and the determination of franchisor's associates.

The franchisor, Paramount Franchise Group Inc., cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that Premium Host Inc. was entitled to statutory compensation, challenging disclosure exemptions, the effect of contract termination on rescission rights, material omission of financial statements, and the finding that Holly Graham and Paramount Leasing were franchisor's associates.

The Court dismissed all appeals and the cross-appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on the burden of proof for rescission, the non-applicability of disclosure exemptions, the right to rescind despite prior termination for breach, the materiality of the financial omission, and the determination of franchisor's associates.

The appellant, Michael John William Ball, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's jury charge on two grounds: the standard of proof regarding the cause of death and the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in handling the jury's request to review expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court concluded that the jury charge, when considered holistically, adequately equipped the jury, and the Vetrovec warning fulfilled its purpose.

Furthermore, the trial judge's decision to cease playback of expert testimony upon the jury's indication that their questions were resolved was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the reviewed evidence was uncontroversial and did not require further contextualization.

The appellant, convicted of firearms offences including intentional discharge of a restricted firearm, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He challenged the trial judge's W.(D.) instruction and treatment of defence expert evidence in the jury charge, arguing they were inconsistent with the defence theory and confusing, especially given the Crown's closing submissions.

Alternatively, he sought leave to appeal the five-year custodial sentence, contending the trial judge erred by not considering a sentence below the mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible error in the jury charge or the sentencing decision.

Travelers Insurance Company of Canada appealed the dismissal of part of its subrogated claim for payment from proceeds of crime forfeited to the Crown.

The core issue was whether Travelers had an interest in the forfeited property by way of a constructive trust due to the Crown's erroneous failure to include Travelers' subrogated claim (Xpertdoc) in the initial restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's erroneous omissions, combined with the near certainty that restitution would have been made, amounted to unjust enrichment, supporting a constructive trust in Travelers' favour.

The appeal was allowed, and Travelers was granted relief from forfeiture for the full amount of the Xpertdoc claim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her dental negligence action via summary judgment.

She alleged procedural unfairness, insufficient disclosure, and conflicting expert evidence regarding the amount of anesthetic administered and resulting injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness or reversible errors, affirming the motion judge's use of enhanced fact-finding powers.

The court upheld the preference for the respondent's evidence on anesthetic dosage and lack of causation, and the rejection of the appellant's expert evidence due to admissibility issues.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant sought to recognize a verbal talaq divorce from 2010, arguing it was a legal divorce in the United Arab Emirates.

The motion judge dismissed the recognition motion, finding it did not conform with s. 22 of the Divorce Act and principles from Abraham v. Gallo, lacking judicial oversight or satisfactory evidence of foreign law.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision, affirming that no admissible evidence was provided to show the divorce was overseen by a judicial body or otherwise recognizable in Canada.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offences against his niece.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of evidence regarding the appellant's reaction/inaction when confronted with allegations, improper Crown submissions inviting the jury to infer the appellant lied to secure an acquittal, and failure to caution the jury on extrinsic misconduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury was not sufficiently instructed on the lack of probative value of the reaction evidence and on the impermissible reasoning regarding the appellant's motive to lie.

These errors undermined the presumption of innocence and left the jury unequipped to fairly decide the case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal concerned a failed agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential development, where the appellant (buyer) had an express obligation to obtain severance approval but failed to communicate or take steps for almost five years.

The respondent (seller) subsequently refused access to the property, deeming the APS terminated.

The appellant sought declarations that the APS was valid and for specific performance.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding the appellant in breach due to inordinate delay and the respondent justified in treating the APS as ended.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that where an APS has no fixed deadline, performance must occur within a reasonable time, and that inordinate, unexplained delay can constitute a fundamental breach justifying termination without a prior notice of a new deadline, depending on the circumstances.

The appellant, Terrance Nahmabin, appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) for various offences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found procedural deficiencies in the original NCRMD proceedings, including an improper plea, lack of inquiry into the appellant's understanding of the NCRMD consequences despite his expressed distress, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge explaining the application of s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court emphasized the strict requirement for procedural fairness in NCRMD cases due to the serious liberty deprivations involved.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD finding was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm and his 7-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds included inadequate jury instructions on eyewitness identification (including recognition and in-dock ID), insufficient caution on after-the-fact conduct, and inflammatory Crown closing remarks.

The sentence appeal grounds challenged the finding that the unrecovered gun was a "firearm" and the imposition of a consecutive sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible errors given the trial context and the evidence.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of an agreement of purchase and sale with an ambiguity regarding the calculation of the purchase price, which included Harmonized Sales Tax (HST).

The appellant vendor sought payment of remaining escrow funds.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by failing to properly interpret the agreement according to the principles of contractual interpretation and by relying on inadmissible expert appraisal evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower court's judgment and costs order were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.

The cross-appeal was not addressed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal from a Divisional Court order that had allowed appeals from a Superior Court order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court's reasoning and conclusions, dismissing the appeal.

The parties also agreed on an all-inclusive costs award of $35,000 payable by the appellant to the respondents, covering all levels of court proceedings, including the motion for leave to appeal.