Lois B. Roberts

The accused appealed a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), arguing procedural unfairness and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Crown conceded the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the NCRMD finding, and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the critical importance of procedural fairness in NCRMD cases due to the significant deprivations of liberty involved.

The appellant, Gerald Sternberg, appealed the dismissal of his action against Cresford Capital Corporation, seeking payment as a guarantor for a vendor take-back mortgage.

Sternberg had sold land to Cresford, which then assigned the agreement and mortgage to a single-purpose corporation that defaulted.

Cresford's name appeared as guarantor on the electronic mortgage registration, but Cresford argued this was an error and that no guarantee agreement existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to Cresford, finding no guarantee agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge correctly interpreted the agreements and that the electronic registration was an error inconsistent with the parties' bargain.

The Court emphasized the high standard of deference to the motion judge's contractual interpretation and found no reversible error.

The moving parties brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside or vary the dismissal of their appeal and for an extension of time.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed their appeal.

The court found that Rule 59.06 is for rare circumstances and not for relitigation of matters already determined.

The moving parties' allegations regarding their lawyer's representation were not accepted and did not alter the uncontroverted fact of their mortgage default.

The motion was deemed an abuse of process, being the latest in a series of unsuccessful attempts to delay enforcement of their mortgage responsibilities.

The motion was dismissed, and the responding parties were awarded costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court declined to make a Rule 2.1 order.

The appellant, Rowan Gray, appealed a Superior Court decision that removed him as Executor and Estate Trustee of his mother's estate due to his failure to administer estate assets.

The motion judge had also declined to appoint one of the respondents as a replacement, instead opting for a professional executor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's application of the high threshold for removing an estate trustee, the determination that certain claims were not statute-barred under the Trustee Act, or the finding of sufficient corroboration under the Evidence Act.

The court affirmed the motion judge's decision as legally sound and practical, and awarded costs against the appellant personally.

The appellant, Trevor Goble, appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the motion judge erred in assessing evidence, credibility findings, and that Marie Pyper lacked authority to bring the application for Onyx Community Services, and that there were no prior matters to support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of principles or assessment of evidence, including the appellant's long history of vexatious proceedings.

The court also found the application was properly authorized.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis, deeming the appeal frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment.

By the time of the appeal to the Superior Court, her condition had significantly improved, and she had regained capacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, affirming that capacity is assessed at the time of the Board's hearing and that future capacity assessments are distinct.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal despite its mootness, finding no special circumstances to warrant intervention.

Stelco Inc. sought leave to appeal an order from the CCAA supervisory judge concerning the reconveyance of land (the "DGAP Parcel") to LandCo, a precondition for DGAP Investments Ltd. to purchase the land.

Stelco had previously been ordered to specifically perform this obligation but failed to do so.

The motion judge affirmed the court's authority to impose terms for reconveyance if the parties could not agree.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, given prior judicial determinations and Stelco's previous concession that the court could determine the agreements.

The court also considered the significance of the issues to practice and the action, and the undue hindrance that an appeal would cause to the progress of the CCAA proceeding.

This appeal concerned a failed real estate transaction where the appellant sought the return of a $70,000 deposit after failing to close due to financing issues, despite the respondent subsequently selling the property at a profit.

The appellant argued that retaining the deposit was unconscionable, citing the respondent's lack of loss and the appellant's alleged lack of capacity due to mental health struggles and bereavement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that it was not unconscionable for the respondent to retain the deposit, as there was no inequality of bargaining power or improvident bargain, and the appellant had intended to close the transaction.

The appellants appealed an order striking their Statement of Defence for failing to comply with interlocutory orders and documentary disclosure obligations.

The motion judge had found deliberate non-compliance over 2.5 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, upholding the striking of the Statement of Defence, finding the motion judge's decision was open on the record, legally sound, appropriate, and proportionate given the lengthy and deliberate delay.

The court also dismissed the argument for a "last chance" order.

However, the court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the costs of the action from $5,000 to $3,000 due to a calculation error.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's determination of the parties' separation date, arguing it was 2011 instead of 2019.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's weighing of evidence and credibility findings, specifically regarding income tax returns, residence representations, and domestic violence evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, deferring to the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, which were supported by the record.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

K.F. sought an extension of time to file her notice of appeal regarding a family law order concerning parenting, child, and spousal support.

The underlying trial involved allegations of domestic violence, coercive control, and sexual assault against J.J.W., which the trial judge rejected, finding K.F.'s evidence unreliable and that she had influenced their child's narrative.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The court found the proposed appeal lacked merit, appearing frivolous and vexatious, and that granting the extension would cause significant prejudice to the child and J.J.W. by hindering the reunification process and re-litigating previously rejected allegations.

The appellant, Stephen B. Sutherland, appealed the dismissal of his action by a motion judge, who found it barred by res judicata and abuse of process.

The action was identical to a counterclaim previously dismissed in a collection action by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the principles of res judicata and abuse of process correctly prevented relitigation.

The court found no evidence of unfairness or injustice to warrant intervention.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order, raising two issues: the respondent's failure to produce foundational expert documents and the untimely disclosure of a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision not to dismiss or stay the action on either ground.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the settlement agreement did not "entirely change the litigation landscape" and was not a Pierringer agreement requiring disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the applicants had a timely intention to appeal, their explanation for the delay was inadequate, there was continuing prejudice to the public interest due to delayed enforcement of an environmental order, and the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court emphasized that lack of merit alone can be determinative in such motions.

The moving parties sought security for costs of an appeal arising from mortgage disputes.

The responding parties (appellants) had defaulted on mortgages, and proceeds from power of sale were paid into court.

The motion judge ordered payment of these funds to the moving parties, which the responding parties appealed.

The Court of Appeal granted security for costs under Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c), finding the appeal frivolous and vexatious with a low prospect of success, and that the appellants had insufficient assets or would be difficult to collect from.

This costs endorsement followed an appeal where the damages awarded to the respondents were significantly reduced from $975,000 to $45,000.

The Court of Appeal determined the prejudgment interest and costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The respondents' claim for prejudgment interest was recalculated based on the reduced damages.

Their original substantial indemnity costs award for trial was reduced from $136,971.02 to $75,000, though still granted on a substantial indemnity basis due to the appellants' egregious conduct during litigation.

The appellants were awarded $15,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal, which were deducted from the respondents' trial costs.

The respondent brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal, arguing the appellant's appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that she had insufficient assets to pay costs.

The court found the appeal weak but not frivolous or vexatious, and determined that the appellant's 50% interest in the matrimonial home provided sufficient security for potential appeal costs and outstanding costs orders.

The court also noted the respondent's own outstanding child support arrears, which weighed against the equitable discretion to order security for costs.

The motion for security for costs, payment of outstanding costs orders, and sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed.

The moving party, a self-represented appellant, sought permission to obtain a transcription of a digital recording of a security for costs hearing to support his review motion.

The responding parties objected to the delay a transcription would cause but agreed to the provision of the digital recording if the review motion was expedited.

The motion judge ordered that the parties be provided with a copy of the digital recording at no cost, subject to an undertaking, and directed an expedited written hearing for the review motion.

Jamal Mohamed sought an extension of time to appeal a forfeiture order made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, which directed the forfeiture of $38,570 in Canadian currency and awarded costs against him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that Mr. Mohamed failed to satisfy the well-established criteria for granting an extension of time.

Specifically, he did not demonstrate a timely intention to appeal, provide an adequate explanation for the seven-month delay, or show apparent merit to his proposed appeal.

The court emphasized that a lack of merit alone can be a sufficient basis to deny such an extension.

Following an appeal where a new trial was ordered, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement regarding the costs of the first trial.

The parties had agreed on appeal costs but not on trial costs.

The Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the disposition of the costs of the first trial should be left to the trial judge hearing the new trial, as that judge would be in the best position to determine the issue.