Lois B. Roberts

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim due to their persistent failure to answer undertakings, produce relevant documents, and comply with multiple court orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The court found no reversible error, emphasizing the fundamental importance of disclosure, the prejudice caused by non-compliance, and the court's authority to impose proportionate remedies, including striking pleadings, for flagrant disregard of court process and orders.

The appellant, Dr. Kulvinder Kaur Gill, appealed the dismissal of her defamation, conspiracy, and negligence claims against four defendants (Dr. Angus Maciver, André Picard, Carly Weeks, and Alheli Picazo) under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act), and the associated costs order totaling over $1.1 million.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the claims were strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

The court affirmed that the "fair comment" defence was prima facie available to Picard, Weeks, and Picazo, and that the appellant failed to demonstrate "serious harm" causally linked to the defendants' expressions, which would outweigh the public interest in protecting free expression.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, distinguishing the case from general guidance due to its complexity and the number of defendants.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge’s order, and remitted certain issues for trial, declaring that the appellants had a possessory lien.

The appellants, having prevailed on the appeal and related motions, were awarded all-inclusive costs for the appeal, a panel motion, three pre-appeal motions, and the original application, totaling $143,977.79.

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of the Ontario court in a family law dispute over parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support.

The appellant father argued that the motion judge erred in finding the child habitually resident in Ontario, claiming he did not tacitly consent or acquiesce to the child's move from Montreal to Ottawa.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite a minor error by the motion judge in considering post-application conduct, sufficient evidence supported the finding of the father's tacit consent or acquiescence to the child's habitual residence in Ontario.

The appellants, estate trustees of Andrew Hrabovsky's estate, appealed a lower court order that set aside the testator's 2007 will due to lack of testamentary capacity and restored his 2006 will.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the respondent's (Gayle Shannon) challenge to the 2007 will was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, and whether the application judge erred in finding a lack of testamentary capacity.

The appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence on both grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding a lack of reasonable diligence and that the evidence would not be conclusive.

The court also dismissed the appeal on its merits, upholding the application judge's findings regarding testamentary capacity and the limitations period.

The 2006 will was confirmed as the true last will, and the certificate of appointment related to the 2007 will was set aside.

The appellant, Guarav Tewari, appealed the striking out of his statement of claim against the respondent lawyer and law firm, who had represented his former employer.

The motion judge had struck the claim, finding it disclosed no reasonable cause of action due to absolute privilege for litigation conduct and the absence of a solicitor-client relationship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, deeming it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court noted the appellant's history of relitigating similar claims against opposing counsel, which had been repeatedly found untenable.

The appellants, Gavin MacMillan and Enzo De Jesus Carrasco, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, and their nine-year sentences.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence, excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity, instructing the jury on consent (specifically regarding orgasms), and demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences.

The court affirmed the trial judge's rulings on expert evidence necessity and impartiality, the proper application of s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding consent and prior sexual activity, and found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The sentences were deemed fit and not demonstrably unfit.

This appeal concerned an estate dispute where the appellant sought to exercise dissent rights under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) in response to the liquidation of a family-owned holding company.

The application judge found these rights were waived by a Unanimous Shareholders Agreement (USA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the USA's provisions clearly waived dissent rights and that this interpretation was consistent with the company's purpose of managing estate assets.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion regarding the respondent's legal capacity to bring an action and the adjournment of their motion concerning abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the capacity issue, finding no error in the motion judge's determination that it was not plain and obvious the respondent lacked capacity.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the abuse of process issue, concluding that the motion judge erred by adjourning the matter sine die despite making findings that indicated an abuse of process.

The Court found the 'Milton Action' to be vexatious and an abuse of process, as it replicated a prior 'Toronto Action' without viable explanation, leading to unnecessary delay and expense.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the 'Milton Action'.

The appellants, proposed representative plaintiffs in a class action, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding leave to pursue claims against Barrick Gold Corporation for alleged misrepresentations under the Ontario Securities Act.

The appeal concerned the denial of leave for certain misrepresentation allegations related to Barrick's capital expenditure budget and production schedule, and the identification of public correction dates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that there was no reasonable possibility of success for the additional misrepresentation claims and that the earlier public disclosure fully corrected the alleged misrepresentations, thereby limiting the class period.

The appellant appealed a lower court's dismissal of her application against the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for dismissal of frivolous, vexatious, or abusive proceedings.

The appellant sought declarations regarding the disrepute of the justice system and breaches of Charter rights.

The motion judge dismissed the application without a hearing, finding it an attempt to relitigate similar allegations, lacking standing, and non-justiciable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the motion judge's discretion to proceed without submissions under Rule 2.1.01 and her finding that the application was an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against real estate agents was dismissed on summary judgment due to being commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued she did not discover the material facts until later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the discoverability period begins when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known the material facts, not the legal conclusion.

The court noted the appellant had previously pleaded the agents were her agents in a prior action, indicating knowledge of the material facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action, which was found to be statute-barred due to the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge concluded that the appellant's injuries were discoverable well within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's application of discoverability principles under the Limitations Act and the threshold for serious and permanent impairment under the Insurance Act.

The Court clarified that formal medical opinions required for a threshold motion are not necessary to trigger the limitation period.

The appellant, Medcap Real Estate Holdings Inc., appealed the dismissal of its motions to stay or dismiss actions brought by Bennington Financial Corp. and Heffner Investments Limited.

Medcap argued that the respondents breached the immediate disclosure rule by failing to disclose a verbal agreement requiring any settlement with Medcap to include all creditors.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the agreement did not need to be disclosed as it did not fundamentally alter the litigation landscape or the adversarial relationship between the parties.

The appeals were dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This is a panel review by the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning an appeal regarding the amount owing on an unpaid mortgage loan and possession of property.

The appellant, Juleth Dawson, sought to restore possession of the property after a single judge of the court had previously dismissed her motion for a stay of execution and granted possession to the respondents.

The appellant did not appear for the hearing, and the appeal proceeded on written materials.

The court found no basis to interfere with the single judge's order, noting the appellant's inability to raise funds or pay the mortgage.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order that upheld a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The Board found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment for antipsychotic medications and maintained her involuntary status.

The appellant argued a denial of procedural fairness, specifically that the Board failed to appoint amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the Board's determination of capacity or its decision to proceed without amicus, noting the appellant had access to counsel and chose to self-represent.

The appellant, as litigation administrator of her father's estate, appealed the dismissal of an action concerning an alleged unauthorized property transfer and a personal costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the property transfer was authorized, for valuable consideration, and that the action was statute-barred.

The court also dismissed the costs appeal, affirming the personal costs award against the appellant due to her unreasonable conduct and pursuit of litigation primarily for personal benefit based on unsubstantiated fraud allegations.

The appellants, S-Cosmetics Clinic Inc. and Kuilin Wang, appealed a portion of a summary judgment that required Mr. Wang to deliver corporate assets to the Royal Bank of Canada.

They argued that the bank had not pleaded personal liability for Mr. Wang regarding the corporate assets.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's determination that Mr. Wang, as the sole officer, director, and directing mind of the Corporation, and admitting possession and the bank's entitlement to the assets, must deliver them.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for delay and the dismissal of his motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no reversible error in the motion judge's decision, which concluded that the appellant's more than five years of delay was inordinate and inexcusable, causing prejudice to the respondents and the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss the entire action, even though only one respondent had sought dismissal for delay.

The applicant, Alex Martinez, brought a motion for a panel review of a single judge's dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal.

The respondent, Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), sought to dismiss the review motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's decision and noting the applicant's materials contained scurrilous insults.

The Review Motion was dismissed.