Lois B. Roberts

This appeal arose from a dispute among siblings concerning the care and property of their nonagenarian mother.

The appellant challenged the application judge's decision, which declared the mother incapable, validated existing powers of attorney, and ordered the appellant to account for funds held on a resulting trust.

The appellant alleged procedural unfairness, including failure to consider his materials, denial of an adjournment, and improper dismissal of his counter-application, and sought leave to appeal the costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error or procedural unfairness, and denied leave to appeal costs, affirming the application judge's discretion.

This appeal concerned the breadth of the court's jurisdiction to address a breach of a Mareva order and abuse of process.

The appellant, Trade Capital Finance Corp., appealed a distribution order in favour of the respondent, Buduchnist Credit Union Limited (BCU).

BCU had made advances to clients in breach of a Mareva order and subsequently obtained consent judgments.

The motion judge found BCU breached the Mareva order, disallowed its secured claim for post-Mareva advances, but allowed it to enforce as an unsecured judgment creditor.

Trade Capital argued the enforcement should be delayed.

BCU cross-appealed its loss of priority.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in limiting his discretion.

It held that the court has broad inherent jurisdiction to respond to a breach of its orders, including delaying enforcement of claims arising from such breaches.

The Court allowed Trade Capital's appeal, ordering that BCU's judgment enforcement for post-Mareva advances be delayed until Trade Capital's action is determined, with both parties collecting pari passu if Trade Capital succeeds.

The cross-appeal by BCU was dismissed.

The issue of specific Woodland Property advances was remitted for further adjudication.

The appellants appealed an order vacating their possessory lien on an aircraft under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The application judge had erred by vacating the lien without fully determining whether the repair work was authorized and if any amounts were owing, despite acknowledging that litigation on these issues was possible.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge failed to make necessary findings and improperly applied the RSLA.

The appeal was allowed, the original order set aside, and the appellants' possessory lien was declared to exist until further court order, with the issues of authorization and amounts owing remitted to trial.

The appellants sought to overturn a summary judgment granted against them, which included full indemnity costs under a second mortgage, and the striking of their statement of defence and counterclaim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants were liable under the mortgage, their pleadings were unparticularized, and that other outstanding claims did not justify delaying judgment.

The court also upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend due to the unintelligible nature of the pleadings and the appellants' failure to seek amendment or provide proposed amended pleadings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for numerous offences, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, incest, and child pornography, committed against his biological daughter.

The grounds of appeal included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge, material misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias due to the trial judge's strong language.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed that credibility findings are entitled to significant appellate deference, that any misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome, and that while the trial judge's language was strong, it did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in the context of a thorough and even-handed analysis.

The Crown appealed T.L.'s acquittal for sexual assault.

The trial judge had a reasonable doubt regarding the first alleged incident.

For the second incident, the trial judge found the complainant was too intoxicated to consent.

The Court of Appeal found reversible legal error in the trial judge's analysis of the second incident, specifically the failure to address whether T.L.'s admitted actions (kissing, stroking, masturbating) constituted sexual assault and the lack of reasons for not finding party liability for the sexual assault carried out by another individual.

The acquittal was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of a "kitchen table" domestic contract signed by former common-law spouses regarding the transfer of property.

The trial judge found the agreement unenforceable due to non-compliance with formal requirements under s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, specifically the lack of a witness, and alternatively, that it would be set aside under s. 56(4) due to the respondent's lack of understanding of its vague terms and absence of independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to her findings of fact.

The court affirmed that a video recording of signing was not a substitute for proper witnessing and that the test for relaxing s. 55(1) formalities is distinct from the test for setting aside a contract under s. 56(4).

The appeal was dismissed, and the property sale was ordered.

This appeal concerned a real estate transaction where the purchaser missed the closing payment deadline by 35 minutes, leading the vendor to terminate the contract based on a "time is of the essence" clause.

The appellant purchaser sought a declaration that the vendor breached the agreement and that the contract was unconscionable, also seeking damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's decision that the strict enforcement of the payment deadline was valid.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the interpretation of the agreement, the application of the "time is of the essence" clause, or the finding that the contract was not unconscionable, emphasizing the clear contractual language and prior warnings given to the sophisticated parties.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a condominium corporation and unit owners regarding persistent non-compliance with fire safety rules, which led to a lower court order granting the corporation a writ of possession and the right to sell the unit.

The appellants (unit owners) appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by not applying the oppression test under the Condominium Act, failing to consider the corporation's enforcement obligations, and making errors in factual findings regarding their compliance efforts and exceptional circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the oppression arguments were new issues not raised in the lower court and that the motion judge's factual findings, which were entitled to deference, supported her conclusion that the appellants failed to comply with clear court orders.

The appellants, Rouzbeh Behrouz and Majestic Food Service Inc., appealed an order giving effect to a Letter Rogatory from a U.S. District Court, compelling testimony and document production for a U.S. proceeding alleging violations of Iran-trade embargo laws.

The appellants argued the application judge erred by admitting inadmissible hearsay and failing to properly apply the Friction factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The court affirmed the application judge's reliance on evidence for determining relevance and necessity, and his proper application of the Friction factors and balancing of Canadian sovereignty with the enforcement request.

The court also agreed that the evidence sought was not otherwise obtainable, deferring to the U.S. court's conclusion and noting that Canadian residents are not compellable witnesses in U.S. proceedings for testimony or document production.

The appellant, having initiated parallel spousal support proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice and divorce/equalization in the Superior Court of Justice, appealed the dismissal of her spousal support claim.

The initial dismissal was due to improper use of resources and jurisdictional issues.

The Superior Court appeal judge remitted the matter back to the Ontario Court of Justice for submissions on jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found this disposition failed to promote the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, which is to deal with cases justly and efficiently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lower appeal order, and transferred the spousal support application to the Superior Court of Justice to be heard concurrently with the equalization and divorce claims, imposing a stay on the Ontario Court of Justice application.

Costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant landlord appealed a judgment finding it in breach of a commercial lease, granting specific performance, and awarding damages to the respondent tenant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings, interpretation of the lease, grant of specific performance, or assessment of damages, noting the appellant failed to present expert evidence to challenge the damages methodology at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, Ping Deng, brought a motion to quash an appeal filed by the appellants, Danjing Han and Canamex Fire Protection International Inc., arguing that the Ontario Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The original trial judgment awarded damages of $39,797.26 and dismissed a claim for punitive damages of $50,000.

Citing sections of the Courts of Justice Act, the Court of Appeal determined that appeals involving single payments not exceeding $50,000 or dismissed claims for amounts not more than $50,000 fall under the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the motion to quash was allowed, and the appeal was quashed.

The court declined to transfer the appeal but allowed the appellants to seek leave to extend the time to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) brought a motion under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Paul Alexander Robson's motion to review a prior decision of a motion judge.

The LSO argued that Robson's motion was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that the LSO failed to provide sufficient background documents, such as Robson's original motion materials or proposed notice of motion for leave to appeal, which were necessary to determine if the motion was, on its face, an abuse of process.

Consequently, the LSO's Rule 2.1 request was dismissed without costs, and Robson was ordered to perfect his motion for review within ten days.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his challenge to his involuntary status and incapacity finding by the Consent and Capacity Board, arguing abuse of process due to alleged illegal detention and recertification after initial Board decisions in his favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process or res judicata, as new evidence of the appellant's deteriorating condition and previously unconsidered criteria justified the subsequent certification process.

The court emphasized the flexibility of the abuse of process concept in administrative proceedings and the importance of considering all circumstances, especially new and significant evidence, when determining capacity and involuntary status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application seeking an accounting of her late mother's estate.

The application judge had dismissed the application on two grounds: that a 2019 consent order concluded the matter, and that further litigation would constitute an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decision, upholding the interpretation of the consent order and the finding of abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This appeal concerned a dispute within the Medhanie Alem Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church regarding internal governance, specifically the holding of an overdue Annual General Meeting (AGM) and the application of canon law versus corporate bylaws.

The appellants, volunteer board members, challenged the application judge's order that mandated an AGM under the 2014 Bylaws with a court-appointed neutral chair, arguing these issues were non-justiciable matters of canon law or that the order conflicted with canon law.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the local Church, as an incorporated entity, is subject to civil law obligations like holding AGMs.

However, it found that the application judge's order unnecessarily conflicted with canon law by preventing the Church from amending its bylaws to conform with the 2016 Canon Law Promulgation before the AGM.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the conditions regarding the 2014 Bylaws and the court-appointed neutral chair for the AGM, and ordered a special or emergency meeting with a court-appointed neutral chair to allow the Church to vote on bylaw amendments before the AGM.

The appellant, Christopher Morris, appealed his convictions for firearm offences and his sentence.

The conviction appeal concerned whether an inoperable handgun, requiring a new firing pin, met the definition of "firearm" under the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal sought a reduction based on the principles of anti-Black racism established in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the handgun was adaptable as a firearm.

The court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence by one year, acknowledging the impact of anti-Black racism on the appellant's moral culpability and rehabilitation prospects, based on fresh evidence from an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report.

This appeal arose from a tragic boat accident involving multiple fatalities and injuries.

The Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals: liability of government respondents, interpretation of the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap, and costs.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the boat operators were solely liable for the accident, dismissing the appeal against the government respondents.

It also affirmed that the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap for maritime claims for loss of life or personal injury does not include costs and interest.

While leave to appeal the quantum of costs and the Sanderson Order was denied, leave was granted on one specific costs issue, resulting in both estates being held jointly and severally liable for one plaintiff's costs.

This costs endorsement followed a partial success on appeal where the appellant, Justice of the Peace Lauzon, had her appeal from the merits decision dismissed but her appeal from the disposition decision allowed, resulting in a reprimand and 30-day suspension instead of removal from office.

While the parties agreed on costs for the appeal, Divisional Court, and leave motion, they disagreed on the costs of the original hearing before the Hearing Panel.

The appellant sought full reimbursement for these hearing costs, arguing her appeal success effectively overruled the reasons for their previous reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this request, finding that the appellant had not sought leave to appeal the Divisional Court's decision on the Hearing Panel's costs recommendation, nor had she demonstrated any reversible error.

The court concluded that the partial success on appeal did not affect the reasonableness of the Hearing Panel's original costs recommendation, and therefore made no order regarding those costs.