Gary T. Trotter

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Keith Brissett.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on four grounds: (1) the instruction on the use of a KGB statement containing hearsay evidence of motive; (2) the provision of Vetrovec warnings regarding two disreputable witnesses despite defence objection; (3) the handling of third party suspect evidence regarding Curtis Murray; and (4) the treatment of eyewitness evidence regarding the shooter's skin colour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were legally sound and fair.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement appealed two directions issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge.

The first direction prohibited the appellant from participating in three appeals and ordered him to withdraw his facta, finding him insubordinate and in defiance of the supervising courts.

The second direction rescinded the first and appointed an amicus curiae to bring a Request for Direction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside both directions, finding that the appellant was owed procedural fairness and natural justice, which were not afforded.

The court also found the second direction violated the principle of functus officio.

The court held that any future proceedings regarding the appellant's conduct must follow the mandated Request for Direction process and be conducted by a different supervising judge.

Appeal from conviction on five counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual exploitation under s. 153.

The appellant, a modeling agent, was convicted of sexual offences against three male models.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including failure to grant severance, failure to declare a mistrial, directed verdict applications, prior consistent statements, and Crown closing address issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant, a leader of the Galloway Boyz gang, appealed his convictions for attempted murder and firearms offences arising from a drive-by shooting in April 2004.

The Crown conceded that warrantless wiretap evidence obtained under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code breached the appellant's section 8 Charter rights.

The sole issue was whether the intercepted communications should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The motion judge admitted the evidence, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal conducted a fresh section 24(2) analysis under the Grant framework and upheld the admission of the evidence, dismissing the appeal.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of robbery with a firearm, three counts of forcible confinement, and one count of breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including text messages discussing obtaining a firearm, cell phone tower evidence placing the "Flyd" phone near the robbery location, fingerprint evidence linking Miles to the scene, and Miles' prior employment at the store.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, finding that despite a hearsay error regarding the post-it note evidence linking Miles to the phone, the curative proviso applied as the evidence against Miles was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a party at a mutual friend's home.

The appellant did not dispute that sexual intercourse occurred but claimed it was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant was too intoxicated to consent to sexual activity and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's capacity to consent, the use of a toxicology report, DNA evidence, and the consideration of his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and dismissing all grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a jury trial.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had knowledge of 100 kg of cocaine secreted in his truck at a border crossing.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he made an incriminating statement to CBSA agents; (2) that the trial judge erred in leaving willful blindness with the jury; and (3) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof in her re-charge on possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for aggravated sexual assault in 2013, appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board requiring his detention in the secure unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant challenged the order as unreasonable and argued the Board should have intervened to break a treatment impasse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the disposition, finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety based on his history of elopement, substance use, and limited understanding of sexual consent.

The court determined that detention in the secure unit was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition and that rehabilitative programming was available in that setting.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing the deceased 19 times during a fight.

The appellant had armed himself with a steak knife in anticipation of a confrontation and carried it openly as he approached the deceased.

When the deceased said "you're dead," the appellant responded "bring it . . . game on." The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the words "you're dead" did not cause the appellant to lose his power of self-control and act on the sudden, as required by the provocation defence.

The appellant's preparation for the confrontation and his state of readiness negated any element of surprise necessary for provocation.

An estate trustee sought to strike out a beneficiary's notice of objection to accounts on the grounds that the objections were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that a notice of objection to accounts filed in response to an estate trustee's application to pass accounts does not commence a proceeding within the meaning of the Limitations Act and therefore is not subject to the basic two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the estate trustee to pay costs personally, finding his motion to strike was unreasonable and designed to delay the passing of accounts hearing.

The appellant corporation sought to overturn a lower court decision that dismissed its trespass claim and granted the respondent a declaration of title through adverse possession over encroachments created by a parking platform built on the respondent's land.

The platform's support timbers encroached onto the appellant's roadway and drainage area.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the respondent had established all three elements of adverse possession: actual possession for the statutory period, intention to exclude the true owner, and discontinuance of possession by the owner.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding a modified test for adverse possession in cases involving pre-existing easements and found that the encroachments were trifling and did not warrant injunctive relief.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision that it was obliged to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the respondent truck driver under an OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement on his personal automobile policy.

The respondent operated a tractor owned by his corporation and leased to a transport company under fleet insurance.

He suffered serious injuries when struck by an underinsured driver in Florida.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die to allow the parties to enlarge the record with evidence regarding how Ontario-based truck drivers obtain underinsured coverage, recognizing that a ruling could affect thousands of commercial vehicle drivers and their families.

The respondent provided maintenance services to ten condominium corporations under two maintenance contracts.

The appellants terminated the winter maintenance contract but delayed notifying the respondent for several months to avoid jeopardizing completion of the summer contract.

The respondent performed extra unpaid work during this period in hopes of contract renewal.

The trial judge found the appellants breached the duty of honest performance by withholding termination information and accepting the unpaid work while knowing the contract would not be renewed.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the duty of honest performance does not require disclosure of termination decisions or restrict the exercise of contractual termination rights, and that the appellants' conduct, while potentially dishonourable, did not rise to the level of breach required under the good faith performance standard established in Bhasin v. Hrynew.

Appeal of summary judgment dismissal in a negligence action arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff's estate and family sued social hosts for damages, alleging the hosts owed a duty of care when the intoxicated guest drove home and subsequently drove his children and their babysitter, resulting in a fatal collision.

The motion judge dismissed the claims, finding no duty of care existed and alternatively that any duty ended when the guest arrived home safely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding genuine issues of fact regarding foreseeability and proximity that required trial, and rejecting the proposition that a social host's duty of care automatically expires upon an intoxicated guest's safe arrival home.

Three appellants appealed their convictions for drug trafficking offences arising from Project O'Bunker, a large joint forces investigation in London, Ontario.

The appellants challenged the dismissal of their s. 11(b) Charter applications alleging unreasonable delay, and one appellant also challenged his conviction on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that while the total delay of 39-40 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan, the delay was justified by the exceptional complexity of the prosecution and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on reasonable reliance on the previous Morin framework.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favor of Copperfin Credit Union against Rosalba Cupello on a personal guarantee of corporate indebtedness.

The appellant argued that Copperfin materially varied the loan agreement by advancing funds before obtaining all security documentation, thereby releasing the guarantor from liability.

The appellant also claimed a collateral agreement limited advances to $200,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the guarantee expressly protected the lender from liability variations, that no evidence supported the alleged collateral agreement, and that the entire agreement clause and parol evidence rule precluded such modifications.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated January 26, 2018 (amended February 26, 2018).

The appellant challenged the Board's order regarding his detention and conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision fell within the range of reasonable orders having regard to the totality of evidence and the Board's expertise.

The treating psychiatrist's concerns about the appellant's lack of initiative in addressing medical needs and absence of insight into his condition supported the Board's order to maintain hospital oversight to prevent the appellant from disengaging from treatment and presenting a significant risk of serious harm to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

On appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, the appellant sought a variation of the sentence.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to 133 days.

The appeal was heard on the same date as the decision was rendered.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 2, 2018, which maintained the same order as the previous year.

The Board concluded that despite the appellant's positive steps, events in spring 2017 and the appellant's lack of insight demonstrated that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's conclusion was open to it on the evidence and that there was no material misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal of a Criminal Code section 672.54(c) detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in concluding that he poses a significant risk to the public and that the Board committed a Carrick error by failing to make this determination independently of his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while a Board must make its own determination of dangerousness, it is entitled to rely on counsel's credible acknowledgement that the significant threat standard has been met, provided the Board does not abdicate its responsibility to assess the evidence.