Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed an order finding her in contempt of three court orders regarding the respondent's access to their infant child.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a finding of contempt could not be made beyond a reasonable doubt without the trial of an issue, given the significant conflicting evidence and the fact that access had been properly provided in the four weeks prior to the hearing.

The appellant was convicted of possession of property obtained by crime relating to stolen motor vehicles.

During the investigation, a police officer searched a briefcase found in a stolen van incident to the arrest of a co-accused.

The appellant claimed ownership of the briefcase, but the officer continued the search, finding incriminating documents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the search as a valid incident to arrest, finding the officer had a duty to discover and preserve evidence.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal in part, setting aside a $20,000 restitution order due to insufficient proof of loss.

The appellants, two trusts and their trustee, appealed a bankruptcy judge's decision dismissing their appeal from a Registrar's decision.

The Registrar had confirmed the trustee in bankruptcy's disallowance of the trusts' proofs of claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the bankruptcy judge that there was no evidence the cheques deposited into a numbered company controlled by the bankrupt were intended as loans.

Costs were awarded against the trusts and their trustee personally on a joint and several basis.

The Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc. was petitioned into bankruptcy and Ernst & Young was appointed as trustee.

The trustee sought an order that it not be bound by the collective agreements and not be deemed a successor employer.

The unions brought a cross-motion seeking leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to pursue an application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board to designate the trustee as a successor employer.

The bankruptcy judge dismissed both motions as premature.

The unions appealed the dismissal of their cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bankruptcy judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion by deciding that the cross-motion was premature.

The United States of America appealed the dismissal of an application to extradite the respondent for prosecution on charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

The extradition judge had discharged the respondent because there was no evidence that the alleged conduct occurred within the United States.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the extradition judge misinterpreted section 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court held that the extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether there is evidence of conduct that would amount to the Canadian offence described in the authority to proceed, regardless of where the conduct occurred.

The order of discharge was set aside and an order for committal was substituted.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of contract.

The dispute centered on whether the appellant knew the building was not to involve post and beam construction and whether it breached the contract by unilaterally changing the design.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, agreeing that the parties were ad idem on the terms and that the appellant's delivery of draft drawings using an uncontracted construction technique constituted a breach.

The court also upheld the trial judge's measure of damages, which aimed to put the respondent in the position it would have been had the contract not been breached.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant purchased the respondent's insurance brokerage business from a trustee in bankruptcy.

The agreement of purchase and sale did not contain a non-solicitation clause.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's declaration that the respondent was entitled to solicit his former clients.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in an involuntary alienation of assets in a bankruptcy, there is no common law implied obligation on the part of the bankrupt not to compete and solicit former clients.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography based on files extracted from his computer hard drives using specialized software.

The trial judge ordered the Crown to disclose copies of the hard drives, the software programs, and pay for training, and subsequently stayed the charges when the Crown refused.

On appeal, the Crown conceded its initial refusal to provide access to the hard drives was erroneous, while the accused conceded that supervised access to the software at police premises was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge's disclosure order went too far, the stay of proceedings should be upheld because the Crown's pursuit of an appeal while maintaining a constitutionally inadequate disclosure position for two years constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed various aspects of the trial judge's judgment, including child support, spousal support, equalization payment, RRSP transfers, costs, and custody.

The appellant failed to provide a trial transcript.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of fact supported her legal conclusions, including imputing income and finding a traditional marriage.

Finding no errors in principle or misapprehension of evidence, the Court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered on a Canadian Forces base.

The defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was statute-barred by the six-month limitation period in s. 269(1) of the National Defence Act.

The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the discoverability principle applied because the injured plaintiff had received erroneous advice from the Canadian Forces and his Pensions Advocate that he could not sue while his military pension claim was pending.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the uncontradicted evidence of this erroneous advice raised a genuine issue for trial regarding the commencement of the limitation period.

The respondents in a civil appeal brought a motion to quash the part of the appeal that relied on the alleged incompetency of the appellant's trial counsel.

The moving parties argued that incompetence of counsel is not a recognized ground for a civil appeal, that the appellant had already recovered damages from his former lawyer, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the ground relating to a mistrial was sufficiently interrelated with the other grounds and should be considered by the panel hearing the appeal.

The court also directed that the appellant's former counsel be served with the materials and given an opportunity to respond.

The appellants appealed the judgment of Justice C.S. Glithero.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, agreeing with the analysis and conclusion of the lower court judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $6,200.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a Highway Traffic Act offence and was fined.

Due to a clerical error by the justice of the peace, the committal warrant incorrectly stated the appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, leading to his arrest and alleged assault in jail.

The appellant sued the justice of the peace, correctional officers, and others for wrongful arrest and imprisonment.

The motions judge struck the claims against the justice of the peace and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to plead malice or bad faith with particularity as required to overcome judicial immunity.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving over eighty, dangerous driving, and impaired driving.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by placing Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on vials of his blood, which had been drawn for medical purposes, prior to obtaining a search warrant.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the brief sealing of the vials did not interfere with the appellant's spatial, physical, or informational privacy interests and thus did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The court also found the jury charge on the burden of proof regarding bolus drinking was sufficient.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor, who had prescribed Garasone for ear infections, allegedly causing ototoxicity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on credibility, standard of care, and causation, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and varied the trial costs award to disbursements only, reflecting the respondent's change in evidence from discovery to trial and conduct that attracted negative comment.

The young person appealed an order denying the transfer of his case to youth court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that the objectives of protecting the public and rehabilitating the young person could not be reconciled if the matter were tried in youth court, given the horrendous acts alleged and the young person's personal background.

The appellants appealed an order of the motions judge which found that a previous order was not for the payment of money and therefore did not attract an automatic stay pending appeal under Rule 63.01.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, distinguishing prior case law on the basis that the holder of the funds was not an independent third party and there was a dispute concerning the debt.

The Court concluded the order practically required the payment of money between the parties and directed that the order be stayed pending appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder.

The deceased was found with an electrical cord around her neck, initially thought to be suicide.

The Crown alleged the respondent strangled her and staged the suicide.

The trial judge excluded evidence of the respondent's former girlfriend regarding a prior incident where he tied her up with a phone cord.

The trial judge also allowed cross-examination of the deceased's sister about suicide letters and failed to instruct the jury on s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in excluding the former girlfriend's evidence, no reversible error in the cross-examination, and that while the trial judge should have instructed on s. 229(a)(ii), the non-direction did not amount to reversible error.

The appellant, a used car dealer, was convicted of fraud and possession of stolen property relating to the sale of stolen and revinned vehicles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the wilful blindness doctrine and failed to consider significant evidence probative of his state of mind.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge correctly articulated the wilful blindness doctrine, he failed to address a large body of potentially significant evidence that pointed away from a finding of wilful blindness.

This deficiency in the reasons foreclosed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown sought a review of an order granting judicial interim release to a 17-year-old charged with first degree murder.

The motion judge had considered the youth's detention conditions, including the lack of a local youth facility and the resulting impairment of his ability to instruct counsel, under the tertiary grounds for bail.

The Court of Appeal confirmed the release order, holding that detention conditions can be a relevant consideration when assessing whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.