Eleanore A. Cronk

The parties separated, executed a separation agreement dividing their property, and later reconciled.

The trial judge found they reconciled in February 1998 and that the property division in the separation agreement survived the reconciliation, resulting in no equalization payment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the reconciliation date but found the trial judge erred in concluding the entire property division survived.

The Court held that while the specific transfer of the matrimonial home was intended to be final, the rest of the agreement was voided by the reconciliation.

The appeal was allowed, and an equalization payment was ordered based on a modified Net Family Property Statement.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion for a stay, the Crown sought its costs of responding to the motion.

The moving party did not file costs submissions.

The court awarded the Crown its costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at the requested amount of $500, noting the Crown's preparation of materials and multiple appearances.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and possession of a restricted weapon.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the evidence seized from her residence under a general warrant violated her section 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal found that the general warrant was invalid because the police could have obtained a conventional warrant, rendering the search warrantless and a breach of section 8.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), concluding that the police acted in good faith and the exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than its admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside an ex parte order.

The ex parte order had dismissed their underlying motion regarding entitlement to sale proceeds because they failed to deliver expert material by the deadlines set in two consent scheduling orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly exercised his supervisory discretion over the receivership and correctly emphasized the need for compliance with court orders and the integrity of the Commercial List.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by using rehabilitation as a reason for imposing a custodial sentence.

The majority held that a custodial sentence was still appropriate but reduced it to time served (53 days) plus an additional six months in custody, with probation unchanged.

The dissenting judge would have reduced the sentence to time served due to the two and three-quarter years the appellant spent on bail pending the appeal.

The appellant appealed a 15-month custodial sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had made $103,000 in restitution and had successfully served a 12-month conditional sentence for an unrelated fraud charge since the original sentencing.

Relying on the fresh evidence and the Crown's previous position that the appellant was a suitable candidate for a conditional sentence, the Court allowed the appeal.

The custodial sentence was set aside and replaced with a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, with ongoing restitution requirements.

The appellant surgeon appealed a finding of negligence after he mistakenly cut the respondent's aorta during a laparoscopic hiatus hernia operation.

The trial judge drew an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence, rejecting the appellant's explanations of medical misadventure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or inference-drawing process.

The appellant municipality appealed a declaration that the respondent's proposed emergency youth shelter was a permitted use under the city's zoning by-law.

The applications judge found the shelter fell within the definition of a 'Community Building' because it provided social and charitable community activities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision of sleeping accommodation alongside other services constituted a community activity, and the shelter's operations fell squarely within the charitable purposes contemplated by the by-law.

The appellants appealed an order approving the sale of assets by the trustee in bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to favour the successful tender on a de novo application brought under the Act.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a motions judge's order regarding a third party claim for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a claim for contribution and indemnity is not a claim for the recovery of damages within the meaning of s. 14(1) of the Condominium Act.

The court set aside the relevant paragraph of the motions judge's order and awarded costs to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding an employment contract and a Leave of Absence Agreement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a guardianship order that was granted without notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order to permit a new hearing, noting that while everyone acted out of concern for the appellant, the order was obtained without notice.

The court ordered that the status quo be maintained and that the appellant not be moved from his present residence without further court order.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact were open to him on the evidence and were fatal to the issues raised.

The court also held that the issue of interest was a question of contract and was properly pleaded.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order continuing spousal support at $3,500 per month, refusing to rescind arrears, awarding a $10,000 lump sum, and ordering 10% of future bonuses to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the monthly support and the refusal to rescind arrears, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the significant disparity in the parties' standards of living.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the lump sum, finding no unusual circumstances to justify it, and struck the 10% bonus provision as it constituted double-counting since bonuses were already factored into the monthly support amount.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

At the opening of the hearing, the appellants brought a motion to amend their factum to plead a new ground of appeal that was not raised before the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion, finding it would change the fundamental nature of the case.

The court found no error in the motion judge's detailed reasons and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $7,000.

The appellant appealed a finding of contempt and the resulting sanction related to child access exchanges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere as the contempt finding was based on credibility and the sanction was fashioned in the best interests of the child to address the root problem of the access exchanges.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The parties settled the appeal.

The Court of Appeal disposed of the appeal in accordance with the Minutes of Settlement filed by the appellant.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences arising from alleged genital touching during karate stretching demonstrations involving former students.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed serious legal error by failing to properly analyze the effect of possible collusion and inadvertent tainting caused by an organizing witness's extensive involvement and repeated meetings among complainants.

The court also found that the trial judge improperly reversed the burden of proof, scrutinized defence evidence more harshly than Crown evidence, relied excessively on demeanour, and misapprehended significant parts of the record.

Although the verdict was not found unreasonable, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and numerous other offences arising from a robbery and shooting at a sporting goods store.

At trial, the Crown relied on similar fact evidence from five other armed robberies to prove the identity of the appellant as the shooter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of two of the other robberies, as they lacked striking similarity to the charged offences and failed to establish a nexus to the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, robbery, and other offences following a jury trial.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and on first degree murder during the course of a forcible seizure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the required standard and that there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude the appellant was a substantial and integral cause of the victim's death during a forcible seizure.