Eleanore A. Cronk

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for first-degree murder.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based on a full confession he gave to American investigators while in custody in a Canadian jail.

The appellant appealed, arguing his statement was obtained in violation of his s. 10(b) Charter rights because he was given American Miranda warnings rather than full Canadian Charter warnings.

Assuming a Charter breach occurred, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statement was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the breach was not serious, the appellant had an almost irresistible desire to confess, and admitting the highly reliable evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting his statement to the police in violation of his s. 10(b) Charter rights and by failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding his statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant unequivocally waived his right to counsel.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was not required as a matter of law, and even if it were, the proviso would apply given the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for repeated acts of sexual abuse against his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in refusing production of therapist notes, and erred in treating after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 18-month custodial sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to poor identification evidence and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate under Sheppard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the identification by a witness who had previously met the appellant, along with circumstantial evidence, reasonably supported the verdicts.

The Court also held the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit appellate review.

Air Canada applied for relief under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The initial stay order required the appellant to continue providing credit card processing services to the respondent.

The appellant appealed, arguing the order violated s. 11.3(b) of the CCAA by requiring a further advance of money or credit due to its exposure to chargebacks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the risk of chargeback exposure was a contingent liability, not an extension of credit, and that receiving immediate payment for future services did not constitute a further advance of money or credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed himself on the law and that his findings of fact were supported by the evidence, making the convictions reasonable.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's uncorroborated evidence, failing to consider inconsistent independent evidence, and ignoring the absence of physical injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge sought corroboration, it is not legally required in sexual assault cases.

The trial judge's approach benefited the appellant, and there was ample corroborative evidence on the essential elements of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial because it could not be certain from the trial judge's reasons that the defences of reflex response or self-defence were properly addressed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed a disposition of 6 months secure custody, imposed in addition to 2 months of pre-disposition custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, noting the father's responsible and caring commitment to his son.

The court reduced the custodial disposition to time served (seven months) and varied the terms of the one-year probation order.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendant driver.

The defendant later brought third party proceedings against two municipalities, alleging snow banks obstructed her view.

The plaintiff sought to amend her statement of claim to add the municipalities as defendants after the three-month limitation period under the Municipal Act had expired.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application of the discoverability principle to postpone the limitation period is a question of fact to be determined at trial.

The municipalities were added as defendants with leave to plead the limitation period.

The appellant, acting in person, appealed his conviction for taking his child in contravention of a custody order, contrary to s. 282(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and sought leave to appeal his sentence regarding probation terms.

The appellant had failed to return the child after an access visit and took her to another province.

On appeal, amicus curiae argued the trial judge erred by not leaving the defences of colour of right and imminent harm to the jury, by misdirecting the jury on 'taking' versus 'detaining', and by imposing probation conditions restricting civil litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the proposed defences, applying the curative proviso for any jury instruction error, and upholding the probation conditions as reasonable given the appellant's history of vexatious litigation.

The appellant appealed from an order of Justice K. Pedlar dated October 18, 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs, with reasons to follow.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his statement of claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The motions judge found that the essential character of the appellant's claims fell within the scope of the grievance and adjudication process under the Public Service Staff Relations Act and the applicable collective agreement, and had already been decided by a labour adjudicator.

The Court of Appeal agreed, applying the Weber framework, and dismissed the appeal, also rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding procedural fairness, Charter violations, and bias.

The appellant appealed from a judgment following an uncontested trial, challenging the trial judge's decision to preside, the imputation of $65,000 in annual income, the award of lump sum spousal support, the valuation of the wife's pension, and the costs award based on bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or factual findings, and awarded costs of $3,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it breached an exclusive supplier agreement and awarding the respondent nearly $5 million in lost profits.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to imply a term requiring customer consent, finding a breach regarding a specific contract, and excluding certain evidence on damages.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking an additional $1 million in damages, arguing the trial judge arbitrarily increased the calculation of incremental overhead expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence and his legal conclusions were correct.

The appellants suffered losses in their margin accounts with a securities dealer and sued the dealer.

They later sought to amend their claim to add the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) as a defendant, alleging negligence in its regulatory oversight.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the IDA, as a voluntary regulator, owes its duty to the public at large rather than to individual investors, and that policy considerations such as indeterminate liability negate any prima facie duty of care.

John Nikitin was convicted of manslaughter after his truck struck and killed a child who was crossing the road to a stopped school bus.

He appealed his conviction on grounds including the admission of police re-enactment evidence, Crown counsel's closing address, and an unreasonable verdict.

The Crown appealed the 22-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the experiment evidence was properly admitted as factual evidence, the trial was fair, and the sentence was entitled to deference given the offender's age, health, and lack of criminal record.

A young person appealed both a finding of guilt for sexual interference and the custodial disposition imposed after a cadet camping trip incident.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating an evidentiary burden as having shifted to the accused and by linking the accused's failure to meet that burden to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, contrary to the W.(D.) framework.

The court also accepted that it was an error to permit use of the accused's statement to police without first holding a voir dire on voluntariness.

A new trial was ordered, rendering the disposition appeal moot.

Following the dismissal of the appellant insurer's appeal regarding its duty to defend the respondent insured, the Court of Appeal determined the scale and quantum of costs.

The court declined to award costs on a substantial indemnity basis, noting that the significant issue of insurance coverage remained to be determined at trial.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $11,500 for the respondent insured and $10,000 for the respondent co-insurer, inclusive of disbursements and GST.