Eleanore A. Cronk

The young person appealed her convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) test, finding the trial judge properly rejected the defence evidence as fabricated.

However, on consent, the court stayed the conviction for assault with a weapon as it arose from the same delict as the other charge.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge failed to consider the principles for young offenders.

While incarceration was necessary for general deterrence, the court reduced the sentence to time served (approximately one month) followed by 18 months of probation.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were careful, revealed a full consideration of the relevant principles, and that the sentence fell within the recognized range.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence, misapprehended evidence regarding representations made to induce a loan, and misapprehended evidence concerning repayment of other loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to consider the absence of contradicting evidence, accurately recalled the evidence of misrepresentation, and that any misapprehension regarding other loans would not have affected the verdict.

An application to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing the complainant in a shower.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defence and by not admitting preliminary inquiry evidence under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding no evidentiary basis for self-defence and noting the hearsay issue was not raised at trial.

However, the court found that convictions for both offences offended the rule against multiple convictions, staying the assault with a weapon conviction and affirming the aggravated assault conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious assault.

At trial, the Crown introduced telephone records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act to rebut the appellant's alibi that he was with his former wife at the time of the offence.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider whether the records were made in the usual and ordinary course of business and their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the records were properly admitted and reliable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 3-year sentence for the vicious attack was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in determining the location of the assault.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the trial judge to infer the assault occurred at the complainant's room based on the absence of a blood trail.

The Court also found that any misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's brother's cooperation with police was not material to the result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm and committed for trial.

His application for certiorari was dismissed by the Superior Court of Justice.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error, agreeing that there was evidence upon which the preliminary inquiry justice could form the opinion that the appellant should be committed for trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining the scope of a guarantee and resulting damages on an application under Rule 14.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a factual dispute regarding the guarantee's scope and an insufficient factual basis to determine damages.

The court set aside the judgment and directed the trial of an issue on the alleged breach of the guarantee and resulting damages.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, three years probation, and a lifetime driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death.

The respondent, while engaged in a 'show of speed', caused a collision resulting in the death of a 29-year-old mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence could have been more substantial, it was not demonstrably unfit given the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of alcohol or drug use, and prior good character.

Furthermore, the court noted that reincarcerating the respondent after he had already been released on parole would serve no genuine societal interest.

The respondent wife was substantially successful on appeal and sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal held that substantial success alone does not warrant substantial indemnity costs.

Taking into account the different degrees of success, the court awarded the respondent costs of $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in summarizing the defence theory, admitting propensity evidence regarding handguns, instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct, restricting cross-examination on polygraph tests, and charging the jury on first-degree murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and concluding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have rendered a verdict of first-degree murder based on the evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement fixing the costs of the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent trustee in bankruptcy on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $8,500 plus GST, payable by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding the costs of an appeal in the context of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings involving Air Canada.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, Air Canada, against the appellant, Global Payments Canada Inc., on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $46,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and sentence.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Johnson, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dangerous offender designation, and referred the matter back for a new sentencing hearing, finding this was not a rare case where the curative proviso could be applied.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents in relation to a complex tax loss scheme involving limited partnerships.

On appeal, they argued that evidence obtained during a joint investigation by Revenue Canada's Tax Avoidance and Special Investigations sections violated their Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that while the predominant purpose test from Jarvis might push back the date the Charter breach occurred, the evidence was inevitably discoverable and properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, finding the sentences fit for a massive $118 million tax fraud.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 months' imprisonment for assault causing bodily harm and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant and a co-accused assaulted the victim after suspecting him of stealing money, kicking and punching him while he was on the ground.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's failure to explicitly consider a conditional sentence, as it had not been requested by defence counsel and was inappropriate given the appellant's breaches of release conditions.

The court also held the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, wearing a disguise, attempted robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all relating to incidents involving fast food deliverymen in an apartment building.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to prove identity and intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding similar fact evidence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the reasoning process for similar fact evidence, provided a deficient explanation of reasonable doubt that failed to comply with Lifchus, and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that he did not understand the potential consequences of his guilty pleas until he reviewed the complainant's victim impact statement, and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant failed to appreciate the nature of the charges or the sentencing consequences.

The desire to dispute comments in a victim impact statement unrelated to the essential elements of the offence was not a valid ground to set aside the pleas.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in concluding that a boot print found at the scene matched his boot print.

The Crown had called two expert witnesses on footwear analysis who testified that the characteristics of the boot print were not manufacturing defects but natural wear and tear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the expert evidence.

The plaintiff, an experienced investor, invested in special warrants and special shares of two private companies on the advice of his broker.

The broker failed to warn him of the risks associated with these investments, including the risk that the planned initial public offerings might never take place.

The plaintiff lost his entire investment and sued the broker and her firm for negligence.

The trial judge found the defendants liable but reduced the damages by 50% due to the plaintiff's contributory negligence in signing subscription agreements without reading them.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the broker breached her duty to warn and that her misrepresentation precluded the defendants from relying on the subscription agreements to raise an estoppel.