Eleanore A. Cronk

The respondent was injured when the top of a utility pole erected by the appellant municipality snapped during a windstorm and struck his vehicle on the highway.

The trial judge found the municipality liable in negligence and awarded damages.

On appeal, the municipality argued the action was barred by the limitation periods in sections 284(2) and 284(3) of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 284(3) only applies when a vehicle leaves the highway, and section 284(2) did not apply because the claim was properly framed in negligence rather than non-repair.

The trial judge's inference of negligence and assessment of evidence were also upheld.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon following an attack at a bus station.

The sole issue at trial was identification.

The appellant appealed the convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the pre-trial identification procedures were flawed and prejudicial, and the eyewitness descriptions of the assailant did not match the appellant's physical characteristics.

The Court concluded the identification evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The appellant husband appealed a motions judge's finding that the parties had reached a settlement agreement regarding the division of their property, including the matrimonial home and the husband's business.

The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge's conclusion was not supported by the evidence, noting that the wife's former solicitor's evidence contradicted the finding.

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment was set aside in its entirety.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court's order, and confirmed the certificates, deeming them to have been issued, filed, and continued as of September 28, 1997.

The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

The Crown brought ex parte applications under s. 487.055(1) of the Criminal Code for DNA databank orders against two repeat sexual offenders on parole.

The issuing judge granted the orders ex parte.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provision and the ex parte procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the provision but found that the issuing judge lost jurisdiction by proceeding ex parte without any evidence justifying the need to do so.

The appeals were allowed and the authorizations quashed.

The appellant appealed a judgment of Justice Rogin dated October 31, 2002.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appeal adjourned sine die pending a reference to be made in relation to the matter.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial.

Costs were fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order allowing the Crown to set-off damages payable to the appellant under a judgment against monies the appellant owed to the Crown under a restitution order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the combined effect of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act and the Financial Administration Act entitled the Crown to the set-off.

The court also rejected arguments based on bankruptcy principles and res judicata.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that because the appellant was not involved in the accident and did not have first party insurance, she was not entitled to statutory benefits and had no recourse against the Fund under s. 6 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act.

The appellants appealed a judgment that ordered judgment in accordance with an offer to settle, permitted equitable set-off, and extinguished the remainder of the debt owing to the bank.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment regarding the offer to settle and equitable set-off, but found no evidentiary foundation or reasons for extinguishing the remainder of the debt.

The appeal was allowed in part to vary the judgment, directing that all monies paid pursuant to the offer to settle be used to set-off the indebtedness, without extinguishing the remaining debt.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the appellant DeMarco failed to account for trust funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The appellant conceded he acted in a fiduciary capacity but argued his failure to account was due to incompetence and negligence, not wrongdoing under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to adequately discharge his onus as a trustee to account for the trust funds was sufficient to trigger s. 178(1)(d).

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to traffic and two counts of trafficking, as well as his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the conspiracy conviction should be quashed and an acquittal substituted.

The Court of Appeal agreed and allowed that portion of the appeal.

The appeal against the trafficking convictions was dismissed, as the identification evidence was overwhelming.

Given the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, the Crown conceded the sentence should be reduced.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and reduced the sentence to time served, equivalent to 14 months.

The appellants, the chief and band council of the Wasauksing First Nation, appealed a decision dismissing their application to rectify the corporate records of Wasausink Lands Inc. (WLI) to reflect that all band members were members of WLI and the band council were its directors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the factual basis for rectification was not established and that s. 309(1) of the Corporations Act is not intended for fundamental corporate restructuring.

The Court also declined to impose a constructive trust as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and rejected the claim for a constitutional exemption based on aboriginal rights.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of stolen property and possession of cocaine, as well as the associated sentences and a forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions on Counts 1 and 2 and the cocaine charge, finding ample evidence of wilful blindness and possession.

However, the court set aside the conviction on Count 3 (home theatre/DVD equipment) due to insufficient evidence.

The forfeiture order was upheld under s. 490.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a two-year sentence, conceding that the sentence was fit but arguing it was improperly imposed.

The Court of Appeal distinguished the case from R. v. Luther, noting the sentence was fit and exactly what the appellant had requested at trial.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, was wrongfully dismissed and subsequently defamed by his former employer on two separate occasions.

The trial judge awarded damages for defamation but failed to distinguish between the first slander, which was statute-barred, and the second actionable slander.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the global damages award and substituting an award of $10,000 for the actionable slander.

The Court upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs order, which denied costs to a successful co-defendant and required the unsuccessful defendant to pay the plaintiff's entire costs, due to the defendants' failure to make timely documentary disclosure.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding reimbursement of advertising fund contributions was dismissed.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a patient during a breast examination.

The appeal was based on two grounds: inadequate jury instructions regarding the appellant's defence, and improper instructions to the triers during the challenge for cause based on racial bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the triers on their task and procedure.

The Court also noted significant deficiencies in the trial judge's failure to review the evidence supporting the appellant's defence that the examination was conducted for a medical purpose.

The appellant company appealed an order declaring it in breach of a redemption obligation and entitling the respondent to immediate redemption of his preference shares for $1,600,000.

The appellant had refused to pay quarterly dividends to the respondent despite having the funds, suspecting the respondent of breaching non-compete obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that the failure to pay dividends constituted a default under the Shareholders' Agreement, triggering the respondent's unconditional right to redeem his shares.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the default provision only applied when the company lacked funds.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment granting sole custody of the parties' daughter to the respondent mother.

The father sought joint custody or a new trial, alleging he was denied a fair trial due to being unrepresented, an alleged conflict of interest involving a legal secretary, and procedural unfairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fair trial arguments and upheld the sole custody order, finding that the parents' high-conflict relationship made joint custody unworkable.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to grant the father increased access to the child.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from commercial negotiations.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the law of fiduciary obligations to parties negotiating towards an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that none of the indicia of a fiduciary duty were present, as the appellant did not repose trust of a confidential nature and was not vulnerable.