Yehuda Levinson

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for damages, arguing it was limitation-barred.

The plaintiffs, owners of a vocational college, claimed losses due to an excessively protracted regulatory compliance process and a restraining order.

The court found that the limitation period began when the plaintiffs were declared compliant on January 12, 2012, and was tolled during Ombudsman-mediated compensation discussions from that date until June 24, 2013.

As the action was commenced on June 3, 2015, it was within the two-year limitation period.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

In a family law proceeding involving disputes over custody and property equalization, the respondent brought a motion seeking sole custody of the child, removal of restrictions on withdrawals from certain bank accounts imposed by an earlier order, and other procedural relief.

The applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking compliance with outstanding undertakings and disclosure obligations.

The court found the earlier financial restrictions had unfairly limited the respondent’s ability to support the children and fund legal representation, and ordered the removal of the withdrawal limits.

Relying on the views and preferences of the nearly 16‑year‑old child conveyed through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the court granted the respondent permanent custody subject to specified access.

The court also directed steps toward resolution of the central dispute concerning the parties’ separation date and potential equalization claim.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting the landlord's application to terminate the tenancy for personal use.

The tenant argued the Board erred in finding good faith and that the affidavit required by s. 72 of the Residential Tenancies Act should have been sworn by the landlord's son.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the good faith finding was a question of fact not subject to appeal, and that the landlord's affidavit was sufficient as he required the unit for his personal use along with his family.

The respondent Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review for delay.

The applicant sought to review a decision from December 2000, having applied for reconsideration six times until November 2007, and commenced the judicial review in January 2011.

The Divisional Court applied the three-part test for delay and granted the motion, finding extreme delay, a vague explanation, and real possibility of prejudice to the Tribunal's process.

The applicants sought an injunction to prevent the closure of the only public secondary school in Niagara-on-the-Lake, pending an application for judicial review of the school board's decision.

The court dismissed the motion primarily due to the applicants' two-year delay in bringing the proceeding.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found no strong prima facie case, as the board's administrative decision was procedurally fair and reasonable.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience heavily favoured the board, which had already completed complex logistical arrangements to relocate students and staff.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision terminating his loss of earnings benefits.

The Tribunal had concluded that the applicant's repetitive strain injury resolved on the date of a normal EMG study, despite ongoing symptoms documented by treating physicians.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision unreasonable, as it could not be reconciled with the undisputed medical evidence confirming ongoing impairment.

The application was allowed and the matter remitted to a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's failure to respond to the motion resulted from a mistake within the meaning of rule 37.14(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the appellant's background, interaction with respondent's counsel, intention to defend, and receipt of a notice that the action had been dismissed.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment below was set aside.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict granting judgment to the respondent for $35,126 for prepaid telephone cards and implicitly dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the main action but allowed the appeal in part regarding the counterclaim for slander.

The Court found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the concepts of general, special, and nominal damages for slander, and that proof of special damages is not essential when the slander concerns the appellant's business.

A new trial was ordered for the counterclaim for defamation.

The appellants, the chief and band council of the Wasauksing First Nation, appealed a decision dismissing their application to rectify the corporate records of Wasausink Lands Inc. (WLI) to reflect that all band members were members of WLI and the band council were its directors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the factual basis for rectification was not established and that s. 309(1) of the Corporations Act is not intended for fundamental corporate restructuring.

The Court also declined to impose a constructive trust as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and rejected the claim for a constitutional exemption based on aboriginal rights.