Nikita Rathwell

The plaintiffs, representing a class of donors to a failed charitable tax shelter program, brought an action for professional negligence against the law firms and valuation firm that provided services to the program's promoter.

The professional defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred and that they owed no duty of care to the non-client class members.

The court held the claims were not statute-barred, as the limitation period did not begin to run until the Tax Court declared the program a sham.

The court granted summary judgment to the law firms, finding they explicitly limited their undertakings to their client and owed no duty of care to the class members.

However, the court denied summary judgment to the valuation firm, finding a triable issue existed regarding whether it undertook a duty to the class members by authorizing its valuation report to be used in their tax appeals.

This appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to appoint two amici curiae in a highly contentious and complex family law trial involving interjurisdictional issues.

The applicant mother was self-represented and exhibited emotional instability, while the respondent father's counsel was removed due to lack of funds.

The Attorney General of Ontario, as intervenor, moved to set aside the amici orders, arguing they constituted a de facto appointment of state-funded counsel.

The trial judge dismissed that motion, and this court upheld that decision.

The court found the appointment of amici was essential for the judge to discharge judicial functions, stabilize proceedings, and ensure a fair trial, consistent with established legal principles.

The amici's roles were distinct from traditional counsel, as they could not be dismissed by the parties and were not obligated to follow their instructions, primarily serving the court's needs.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for damages, arguing it was limitation-barred.

The plaintiffs, owners of a vocational college, claimed losses due to an excessively protracted regulatory compliance process and a restraining order.

The court found that the limitation period began when the plaintiffs were declared compliant on January 12, 2012, and was tolled during Ombudsman-mediated compensation discussions from that date until June 24, 2013.

As the action was commenced on June 3, 2015, it was within the two-year limitation period.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking her claim and dismissing her action against healthcare defendants and government entities.

The appellant alleged psychological harassment and criminal negligence resulting in bodily harm arising from her admission and involuntary treatment at a hospital.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on multiple grounds: the appellant failed to comply with statutory notice requirements under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act; claims against the Local Health Integration Network were precluded by statutory immunity absent a finding of bad faith; and the Charter claim lacked material facts supporting any infringement.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded to the respondents.

The respondent amicus brought a motion for leave to include the trial judge's final decision as fresh evidence in the appeal record, and for leave to serve the respondent with appeal documents by email.

The Ministry of the Attorney General, appealing the trial judge's earlier refusal to set aside the amicus appointments, opposed the fresh evidence request.

The court granted the uncontested request for email service.

However, applying the Sengmueller test, the court dismissed the request to admit the trial decision as fresh evidence, finding it would not likely be conclusive of an issue in the appeal.

The applicant physician appealed OHIP's decision to deny payment for fee codes Z428 and E628 for pacemaker lead extraction performed during a cardiac transplant surgery.

OHIP argued the codes were not payable because extraction sheaths were not used and the extraction was an inherent component of the transplant procedure.

The Physician Payment Review Board, assisted by a peer physician advisor, found that pacemaker lead extraction is an ancillary procedure with independent risks and is separately billable.

The Board interpreted the fee code descriptor 'including' as non-restrictive, concluding that the use of extraction sheaths is not a mandatory condition for payment.

The Board ordered OHIP to pay the applicant for the claims.

The applicant physician appealed OHIP's denial of payment for fee codes Z428 and E628, which he billed for extracting pacemaker leads during a cardiac transplant surgery without using extraction sheaths.

OHIP argued the codes required the use of extraction sheaths and that the extraction was an inherent component of the transplant procedure.

The Physician Payment Review Board, assisted by a peer physician advisor, found that pacemaker lead extraction is an ancillary procedure with independent risks and that the fee code's use of the word 'including' does not make extraction sheaths a mandatory condition for payment.

The Board ordered OHIP to pay the applicant for the submitted fee codes.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings to amend his human rights application to include a request for monetary compensation of $135,500.

The respondent opposed the request, arguing the financial losses had no connection to the alleged discrimination.

The Tribunal granted the request to amend, noting that the application was at an early stage, there was no prejudice to the respondent, and granting the amendment did not determine the appropriateness of the remedy sought.

The moving party, previously declared a vexatious litigant, brought a motion before a panel of the Court of Appeal to set aside a single judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend the time to file notices of appeal.

The moving party had previously brought multiple unsuccessful motions for the same relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the matter was res judicata and the motion constituted an abuse of process.