Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, gang sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding DNA evidence, in refusing to declare a mistrial after the Crown mentioned the complainant's virginity, and that the Crown's closing address was inflammatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting the relevance of the virginity evidence to the aggravated sexual assault charge, and concluding the Crown's closing address was not inflammatory.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the custody of children.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die to allow the Children's Lawyer to conduct further investigations into whether the best interests of the children would be served by granting custody to the appellant or the maternal grandmother.

The court also ordered a further assessment of one of the children by a doctor, with written submissions to follow the receipt of the new reports.

The appellant requested that the Court of Appeal substitute the terms of access previously ordered.

The court declined, finding that the ordered terms were not unworkable and that the appellant's request for a substantially extended timesharing arrangement amounted to a marked deviation from the original order.

The court held that the appellant must bring a motion in the trial court to vary access.

The request was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's apportionment of liability following an accidental shooting where a 13-year-old was severely injured by a 15-year-old friend playing with a firearm at his father's house.

The trial judge had apportioned 50% liability to the 15-year-old, 25% to his father, and 25% to the injured party (conceded), while finding the mother, aunt, and uncle not liable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of no liability for the mother, aunt, and uncle, as they had no knowledge of the firearms and exercised reasonable supervision.

However, the majority allowed the appeal regarding the father's liability, increasing it to 45% (and reducing the 15-year-old's to 30%) because the father failed to secure the firearms, failed to inform the caregivers about the weapons, and demonstrated a prolonged lack of supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an ample basis for the trial judge's conclusion that the explanation could not reasonably be true, and that the fresh evidence did not alter this view.

The young person appealed the sentence imposed by the youth court.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to remove the period of closed and supervised custody and the final term of the probation order.

The appellant appealed a conviction on the basis of the trial judge's response to a jury request for transcripts of three main witnesses.

The trial judge informed the jury that the request could not be met and they had to be specific, effectively foreclosing the option of refreshing their memory on all the evidence.

The Court of Appeal held this was a reversible error, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly credit pre-trial custody and consider his guilty plea and status as an Aboriginal offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the pre-trial custody did not relate to the charge and was aware of the mitigating factors.

Given the seriousness of the offence, the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to view the evidence as he did and that the conclusion was not unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence reflected no error in principle and was not outside the acceptable range.

The debtor company became insolvent and an interim receiver was appointed.

The receiver terminated all employees but continued operations to sell the business as a going concern.

The union sought to bring successor employer proceedings before the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB).

The bankruptcy judge denied leave under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while s. 47(2) of the BIA does not authorize a bankruptcy court to determine successor employer status, s. 215 gives the court jurisdiction to deny leave to proceed before the OLRB based on bankruptcy considerations.

However, the bankruptcy judge erred by effectively determining the successor employer issue himself.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the bankruptcy court.

In an addendum on costs following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed additional written submissions from the parties regarding the costs of the trial.

The Court was not persuaded to alter the trial judge's original disposition of costs.

The Crown appealed the 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for an offence involving drinking and driving and fleeing the scene.

The Crown argued the trial judge displayed bias during the sentencing hearing and that a conditional sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's comments inappropriate but not indicative of prejudgment.

Considering the fresh evidence that the respondent had complied with her sentence, abstained from alcohol, and completed rehabilitation, the Court held the conditional sentence was within the appropriate range and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect in accordance with R. v. Handy.

The trial judge's assessment was entitled to great deference and was not unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and assault arising from a real estate transaction where he allegedly misappropriated funds from the complainant.

The trial judge based her decision entirely on a credibility contest, finding the complainant credible and the appellant not credible.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding reasonable doubt and credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed their Dangerous Offender designations and indeterminate sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the designations and indeterminate sentences, and ordered a new hearing.

Additionally, because several convictions had been previously set aside by the court, the fixed sentence of twelve years and two months was quashed and a new hearing was ordered under section 686(8) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and sexual assault on several grounds, including inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, flawed pre-trial identification, an alibi that he was out of the country, discrepancies regarding his physical appearance, and the trial judge's reliance on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly addressed the evidentiary issues and that any minor errors did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed an eleven-month sentence for breaching a non-contact clause in a recognizance of bail on a pending sexual assault charge.

The breach involved an unintentional, two-minute meeting with the victim with no threats or violence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was outside the appropriate range, granted leave to appeal, and reduced the sentence to four months, with two months' credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his sentence, introducing fresh evidence of his concerted efforts at rehabilitation since his release on bail, including attending programs and relocating.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that while the appellant committed a minor theft while on bail, his severe addiction meant rehabilitation would not always be linear.

The sentence was reduced to the fourteen months already served.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal, finding the new theft conviction belied the rehabilitation claims.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that a doctor had doubts about his diagnosis of a major mental illness.

The Court of Appeal found that the doctor did not dispute the diagnosis and believed discharge was inappropriate due to the risk of harm presented by the appellant.

The Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable, supported by evidence, and represented the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order vacating certificates under the Mining Act.

The Court of Appeal found that whether the motions judge was acting as a commissioner or a court, he was obliged to decide the matter on the real merits and substance of the case under s. 121 or s. 136 of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, the order vacating the certificates was set aside, and the certificates were confirmed.