Charles William Hourigan

The appellant leased commercial premises from the respondent with a right to renew for five years.

The appellant sublet the premises to a third party without reserving the last day of the head lease term.

When the appellant attempted to exercise its renewal option, the respondent claimed the appellant had forfeited its rights through an assignment.

The application judge failed to resolve this central issue and instead found a breach of contract with no damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 3 of the Commercial Tenancies Act permits a sublease even without reserving the last day of the head lease term, provided there is sufficient evidence that the parties did not intend an assignment.

The sublease language clearly demonstrated the parties' intent to preserve the appellant's renewal rights.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of assault, one count of sexual assault, and one count of unlawful confinement arising from a domestic relationship.

The appellant was acquitted of four other charges and one charge was withdrawn.

He was sentenced to 21 months in jail and three years probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of a Charter section 11(b) delay motion and raised three grounds of appeal relating to credibility evaluation and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a warrantless search of their apartment and a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant.

The trial judge found the warrantless search unconstitutional but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by failing to consider the searching officer's misleading testimony and by improperly emphasizing objective grounds while diminishing the lack of subjective grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed material errors in his Charter analysis, excluded the evidence, and substituted verdicts of acquittal on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in property obtained by crime and possession of property obtained by crime after police discovered $1,136,555 in cash in his vehicle.

The primary issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the funds were proceeds of crime.

The appellant testified he believed the money was "Shoah Gelt" (money belonging to Jewish people in Europe or Asia seeking to move funds to safety).

The trial judge rejected this testimony and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: improper application of the W.(D.) test, insufficient reasons for conviction, and a grossly disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

The primary issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.

Two Crown witnesses gave conflicting evidence: one victim initially denied recognizing the shooter but later identified the appellant at trial, while the appellant's former co-accused initially identified the appellant but later testified that he himself was the shooter.

The trial judge admitted the co-accused's preliminary inquiry testimony for its truth under the principled exception to hearsay.

The trial judge failed to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the exculpatory identification evidence of both witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury required proper instruction on how to use the conflicting exculpatory evidence in assessing whether a reasonable doubt existed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm obtained by crime, possession of property obtained by crime, break and enter to steal a firearm, and break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and incorrectly applied the rules of circumstantial evidence in finding that the appellant was the perpetrator of the break-in and that the rifle was a firearm within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-grounded in the evidence and that there was no reasonable alternative inference.

The appellant appealed his conviction on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of oxycodone.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 rights based on an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip and subsequent police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the Debot factors, concluding that the anonymous tip was neither credible nor compelling, and that the surveillance provided minimal corroboration.

The court determined that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant, thereby breaching his Charter rights.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court found that exclusion of the evidence was appropriate given the seriousness of the state conduct, the profound impact on the accused's Charter-protected rights, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed an order sealing court files relating to the estates of Bernard and Honey Sherman, who were murdered in December 2017.

The motion judge had granted sealing orders ex parte, citing the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims and their loved ones, as well as concerns about the personal safety of estate beneficiaries and administrators.

The Court of Appeal set aside the sealing orders, finding that the respondents failed to meet the necessity threshold required for sealing orders.

The court held that personal privacy concerns alone cannot justify sealing, and that the evidence of risk to beneficiaries and administrators was speculative rather than based on concrete facts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on incapacity and consent, and the trial judge's response to jury questions regarding bodily harm and consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding admissibility of prior sexual assault evidence and counselling records, the exclusion of a prior consistent statement, the instruction on incapacity as part of the Crown's case, and the response to jury questions regarding the relationship between bodily harm and consent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment in a family law matter following an uncontested trial that proceeded after the appellant's pleadings were struck due to non-compliance with court orders.

The appellant sought a declaration that the vesting order granting title of the matrimonial home was made in error and challenged the award of spousal support as a lump sum payment from the sale proceeds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the vesting order was appropriate given the appellant's repeated failures to comply with court orders, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained the decision.

The appellant suffered a bowel leak after surgery and developed septic shock.

He sued the hospital and a nurse for delayed diagnosis and treatment, alleging nursing negligence and medication errors.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and that the appellant failed to prove causation, as his injuries were inevitable due to the onset of the sepsis cascade before the alleged negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the 'but for' causation test.

The plaintiffs brought an action under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act to recover insurance monies to satisfy a judgment arising from a settlement in a personal injury action.

The issue was which insurer—Gore Mutual (insurer of the vehicle owner) or Allstate (insurer of the injured passenger)—should satisfy the judgment.

The motion judge found Gore liable, concluding that the vehicle owner had not breached the insurance policy's cooperation clause and, alternatively, that relief from forfeiture was available.

Gore appealed, arguing the vehicle owner breached the policy by failing to cooperate and failing to provide updated contact information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the vehicle owner's conduct did not constitute substantial non-cooperation as required to breach the cooperation condition.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for adverse possession of a strip of land between two residences in Toronto.

The application judge found that the appellants failed to meet their onus to establish adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the application judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence, particularly that the predecessor in title recognized the respondents' ownership and did not intend to exclude them from the disputed land.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the application judge dismissing her claim for orders to change the respondent condominium corporation's budget and repair schedule, remove the individual respondent from the board, and obtain ancillary relief.

The appellant sought to introduce new evidence post-hearing to demonstrate that the corporation's assets were in danger and that the board was mismanaging the corporation.

The Court of Appeal declined to retry the application on a new evidentiary record, finding it was not the function of the appellate court and would be fundamentally unfair to the respondents.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

On appeal from a trial judgment involving an oil tank leak at a residential property.

The trial judge found Thompson Fuels negligent for failing to conduct required comprehensive inspections and water testing of fuel oil tanks, but found the Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) not liable.

The plaintiff was found 60% contributorily negligent and Thompson Fuels 40% liable.

The appellate court upheld the trial judgment with one adjustment regarding betterment related to a line of credit.

The court addressed complex issues including the enforceability of exclusion clauses in consumer contracts, the application of regulatory obligations to civil liability, Pierringer agreements, and the calculation of damages in environmental contamination cases.

An employee of a daycare facility operated by the appellant municipality sustained a workplace injury from a slip and fall on a wet floor.

The municipality leased the daycare space from the respondent school board.

The school board was sued and brought a third party claim against the municipality, seeking a declaration that the municipality must defend and indemnify it under the terms of their commercial lease.

The motion judge ordered the municipality to defend and indemnify the school board.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the interpretation of the lease provisions governing insurance obligations and indemnification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the municipality's obligation to maintain comprehensive general liability insurance constituted an assumption of the relevant risk of loss, and that the lease provisions, read together, clearly allocated the risk to the municipality.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision enforcing a Separation Agreement dated October 30, 2012, between the parties.

The appellant sought to set aside the agreement, alleging non-disclosure of assets by the respondent and arguing he did not understand the nature or consequences of the agreement.

The motion judge found no basis to set aside the agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the legal test, made findings open to him, and that the parties were sophisticated individuals who had received independent legal advice.

The court noted that both parties had failed to fully disclose assets, making the appellant's claim disingenuous, and that the agreement itself contained acknowledgments of sufficient disclosure.

The respondents granted a second mortgage on their Richmond Hill home to secure a $120,000 loan from the appellant.

Upon maturity, the appellant issued a discharge statement and subsequently a Notice of Sale with significantly inflated charges.

The respondents challenged the amounts and the premature notice in a Superior Court application under section 12 of the Mortgages Act.

The application judge determined the proper discharge amount and disallowed certain charges, including an illegal interest penalty and unsupported professional fees.

The appellant appealed, arguing the application judge lacked jurisdiction and that the matter should have been assessed by an assessment officer under section 43 of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding he had jurisdiction to address all issues and that the respondents' application was a justifiable response to the appellant's unreasonable conduct.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision setting aside an arbitrator's award of $12.3 million in damages for lost profits.

The arbitrator had found that the respondent unlawfully terminated a purchase and management agreement by delivering a "Defunct Project Notice" in bad faith, thereby depriving the appellant of the value of awarded contracts.

The application judge had set aside the award, finding the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by awarding damages for lost profits, which were allegedly precluded by the contract's indemnity provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator acted within jurisdiction by interpreting and applying the substantive provisions of the contract, and that section 46(1)3 of the Arbitration Act permits only limited review for jurisdictional error, not review of the merits of the arbitrator's decision.