Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed his three-year global sentence for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation.

The appellant had sent hundreds of threatening messages of a sexually violent nature to his former domestic partner over two years, despite police warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the range for like offences and reflected the serious and aggravating features of the crimes.

The self-represented appellant appeared before the Court of Appeal and sought an adjournment to retain counsel.

The court denied the request, noting previous endorsements and communications over the summer.

The appellant then declined to make submissions.

Consequently, the appeal and all related motions, including a section 684 motion, were dismissed.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, based largely on the testimony and eyewitness identification of a co-conspirator who had already been convicted.

On appeal, the appellants argued the verdicts were unreasonable and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but allowed the appeals and ordered new trials due to errors in the jury charge.

Specifically, the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec caution that distracted the jury from the witness's motive to cooperate with police, and gave boilerplate instructions on eyewitness identification that failed to highlight the specific frailties of the witness's evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, assault, and uttering threats, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on eyewitness recognition evidence and in denying enhanced credit for strict bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's identification conclusion was supported by the totality of the evidence, including threatening Facebook messages.

The sentence appeal was dismissed regarding bail credit, but allowed on consent to grant the appellant one year from release to pay an $810.93 restitution order.

The appellant pled guilty to attempted break and enter and was sentenced to a short custodial term, probation, and a lifetime weapons prohibition under s. 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the weapons prohibition, arguing it prevented him from hunting for food.

The Crown conceded the appeal, agreeing that the offence involved intoxicated confusion with no intent to commit theft and no weapons or violence, making the prohibition discretionary rather than mandatory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the weapons prohibition order on consent.

The appellant appealed her 8.5-year custodial sentence and a $185,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture following convictions for human trafficking and related sex trade offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious aggravating circumstances and the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the fine, concluding it was amply supported by evidence of the profits the appellant derived from her crimes.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and firearms offences arising from a shooting during a fictitious drug transaction.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the Crown's key witness, rejecting the victim's testimony, making findings about the shotgun without expert evidence, and that he was deprived of a remedy for late disclosure Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary inferences, or handling of the Charter remedies.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated by an unlawful arrest and an illegal strip search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant based on a confidential tip and observed behavior consistent with a drug transaction.

The Court also found that while the rearrangement of the appellant's clothing constituted a strip search, it was conducted reasonably and was necessary for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with an offensive weapon, arguing that the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no indication that the trial judge applied different standards in assessing the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment for the sexual assault of his estranged spouse and use of an imitation firearm.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by treating premeditation as an aggravating factor, by granting insufficient enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and by imposing an overly long probationary period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreed statement of facts supported the finding of premeditation, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and the enhanced credit and probation orders were reasonable exercises of discretion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, voyeurism, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding animus, failing to explicitly find the complainant was fearful, and convicting on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of animus, clear evidence of fear upon the discovery of a hidden camera, and overwhelming circumstantial evidence that left no reasonable doubt of guilt.

Following the quashing of the appellant's conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to address the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had improperly grounded the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence on convictions for failure to comply with an undertaking, which are not serious personal injury offences.

The Court set aside the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence, substituting concurrent 30-day sentences for the failure to comply convictions.

The appellant, a young Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The sentencing judge rejected her s. 15 Charter challenge to s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded a conditional sentence for her offence, and imposed a 17-month custodial sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the provisions violated s. 15 by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders and s. 7 by being overbroad.

The provisions were struck down, and a sentence of time served was substituted.

The applicants, who were respondents on a Crown appeal from a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay, brought a motion to dismiss the appeal for the Crown's failure to perfect it in time.

The Crown filed its factum over nine months late without explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the Crown's delay was excessive and negligent, the applicants had taken no steps to ensure timely perfection, were not prejudiced by the delay, and the charges of serious fraud warranted a hearing on the merits.

The court also dismissed the applicants' request for costs against the Crown, as the Crown's conduct did not amount to a marked and substantial departure from reasonable standards.

A separate motion by one applicant for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code was granted.

The appellant, a medical student, was convicted of internet child luring after initiating a sexually explicit conversation with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl in an adult chat room.

He appealed his conviction, arguing entrapment and a violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police did not provide an opportunity to commit the offence, as the appellant initiated the contact and escalated the sexual nature of the conversation despite being told the persona was underage.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's right to counsel was not infringed, as he understood his rights and consulted duty counsel.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years.

He appealed, arguing that the warrantless search of the vehicle he was a passenger in, the seizure of his jacket, and the search of the jacket violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the search and seizure were not lawfully incidental to his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

Because the record was insufficient to conduct a proper s. 24(2) analysis regarding the exclusion of evidence, the court allowed the appeal and directed a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered a large grow operation on his leased farmland.

The police had unintentionally trespassed on the leased land while investigating, which the trial judge found breached s. 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by not considering the impact of the subsequent searches of the outbuildings and residence.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded the evidence found in the residence due to the high expectation of privacy, but admitted the evidence from the fields and outbuildings.

As the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual and physical assaults against his former common-law spouse and her children.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the primary complainant, improperly used his criminal record, failed to resolve material inconsistencies, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from the Summary Conviction Appeal Court's refusal to extend time to appeal a 2014 sentence.

The applicant argued the original sentence was illegal, an issue not raised previously.

The Court of Appeal found a strong argument for illegality and granted leave to appeal, setting aside the SCAC's refusal and remitting the matter to the SCAC to determine if time should be extended for an appeal on the legality of the sentence and, if so, to determine the appropriate sentence.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.