Bradley W. Miller

The appellant, a transit enforcement officer, appealed his convictions for fabricating evidence and obstruction of justice, as well as his sentence.

He had issued fraudulent tickets to homeless individuals to cover up time theft.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in rejecting the appellant's alternative inference that the tickets were issued on information and belief.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the 14-day intermittent sentence was reduced to time served, in light of recent jurisprudence making conditional sentences available for fabricating evidence.

The Crown applied to quash the respondent's application to re-open his appeal against conviction for a home invasion.

The Crown argued the court was functus officio because reasons dismissing the appeal had already been released, and alternatively, that re-opening was not in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's application, holding that a court is not functus officio until the formal order is entered, which had not occurred here.

The court also found the application to re-open, based on proposed fresh evidence of innocence, had a reasonable prospect of success and should proceed to a hearing.

The appellant brought an adjournment application because a litigation guardian was recently appointed and the appellant had been hospitalized for mental health concerns.

The respondent opposed the adjournment.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment, setting timelines for responding to a Rule 2.1 application and scheduling the appeal hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his 20-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility, denying a change of venue, finding reasonable grounds for his arrest, and upholding the lawfulness of a strip search.

He also challenged the pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessment, no error in the venue decision, and that the arrest and subsequent searches were lawful and Charter-compliant.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's discretionary calculation of pre-sentence credit.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping for ransom and conspiracy to kidnap.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the 33-month delay between his arrest and the completion of his trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge made errors in calculating the delay, the recalculated delay still fell within the Morin guidelines and was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance set out in Jordan.

The appellant appealed an order awarding retroactive and prospective spousal support to the respondent.

The appellant argued the order was a nullity because it was made under the Divorce Act after being severed from a divorce order, and alternatively, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had attorned to divorce proceedings in Alabama.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the support order was properly made under the Family Law Act and that the application judge correctly determined he had jurisdiction.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for theft under $5,000.

He had entered a bank, passed a note demanding money, and left with $600.

After a directed verdict dismissed a robbery charge, he pled guilty to the included offence of theft.

On appeal, he argued there was an insufficient factual basis for the conviction and that his sentence should have been reduced to six months to avoid collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the elements of theft were met.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered the immigration consequences but concluded a 12-month sentence was fit and proportionate.

The appellants, John Disher and Reana Weaver, appealed their sentences for drug trafficking offences involving fentanyl and carfentanil.

Disher was originally sentenced to 12 years and Weaver to 7 years.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider Disher's rehabilitative prospects and by failing to properly apply the principles of restraint and rehabilitation for Weaver, a youthful, first-time Indigenous offender.

The appeals were allowed, and the sentences were reduced to 8 years for Disher and 4 years for Weaver.

Following a successful Crown application to review the accused's release on bail under s. 680 of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal posted its reasons online.

Both the Crown and the accused raised concerns that the reasons should be withheld or edited due to a publication ban under s. 517.

The Court held a hearing and determined that the reasons must be published in full.

The Court found no express statutory authority applying s. 517 to s. 680 reviews, noted that the original bail judge's reasons were already widely available online, and concluded that publishing edited reasons would be unintelligible and contrary to the open court principle.

The appellants, claimants who suffered abuse at St. Anne's Indian Residential School in Ontario, filed a Request for Directions (RFD) regarding the respondent's disclosure obligations under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement (IRSSA).

The Eastern Administrative Judge (the Ontario Supervising Judge) recused himself and directed that the RFD be heard by the British Columbia Supervising Judge, relying on the Court Administration Protocol (CAP).

The appellants appealed, arguing the RFD must be heard in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the CAP contains mandatory language requiring RFDs involving relief for a particular class to be directed to the supervising court with jurisdiction over that class.

As the appellants are members of the Ontario class, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction.

The matter was remitted to the Chief Justice of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to assign a different judge.

The appellant held an unsatisfied default judgment against a contractor for defective sewer installation and sought to recover the judgment from the contractor's insurer under s. 132 of the Insurance Act.

The insurer denied coverage because it did not receive notice of the action until nine years after it was commenced.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the insured breached the policy's timely notice condition and refusing relief from forfeiture due to prejudice to the insurer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that notice provided by the appellant under Statutory Condition 8 did not cure the lack of timeliness, and that the appellant stood in no better position than the insured.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and appealed his 60-month sentence for sexual offences involving three youths and one adult.

He argued the trial judge erred by double counting his abuse of authority as an aggravating factor, since it was an element of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the specific context of the abuse, where the appellant used his position as fire chief to groom and abuse young men seeking firefighting careers.

The sentence was found to be fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats to burn property and breaching court orders.

The Ontario Review Board ordered her detention at a forensic mental health centre.

She appealed, arguing the Board erred in finding she posed a significant threat to the public and in failing to consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the treating psychiatrist's evidence that the appellant lacked community supports, had a history of non-compliance, and would likely revert to substance abuse and decompensate if released.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several assaults, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued that a conditional discharge was appropriate and that his risk could be managed in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded a detention order was necessary due to the appellant's lack of insight into his mental illness, his substance use, and the need for proactive intervention to prevent decompensation.

The Crown applied for a review of a second bail judge's decision to release the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy.

The second bail judge had found a material change in circumstances based on new evidence regarding the identity of a purchaser of GPS trackers and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's application, finding that the second bail judge made a palpable and overriding error in assessing the strength of the Crown's case and erred in law by treating the pandemic as an automatic material change without considering it in the context of the first bail judge's findings.

The accused was ordered detained pending trial.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondents' motion to enforce a settlement agreement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants, initially self-represented in a medical malpractice action, had emailed the respondents offering to dismiss the action on a without costs basis, which the respondents accepted.

The appellants later retained counsel and refused to proceed with the settlement, arguing the email was sent without the authority of all appellants and was merely an exploratory step.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that an objective reading of the correspondence established a binding agreement on the essential terms.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's refusal to exercise his discretion to decline enforcement, as the settlement was not unconscionable.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment enforcing a loan agreement and personal guarantees, arguing they were entitled to a set-off due to the respondent's breach of related investment and commercial agreements.

The appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of the respondent's sales to prove a breach of the commercial agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court also dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the investment agreement had not been orally amended and that the commercial agreement was not a live issue at trial.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal from an order declaring him a vexatious litigant, citing a pending Superior Court application to appoint a guardian for his property and care.

Despite concerns about delay and a previous dismissal of a litigation guardian application, the Court of Appeal granted a brief 60-day adjournment due to newly authored psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's capacity.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for home invasion offences and attempting to obstruct justice.

The respondent had been sentenced to eight and one-half years for the home invasion and six months consecutive for attempting to obstruct justice by passing a note to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the home invasion sentence, finding it lenient but not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court found the six-month sentence for attempting to obstruct justice to be demonstrably unfit and increased it to two and one-half years consecutive, emphasizing that interfering with a witness normally warrants a penitentiary term.

The appellant appealed his sentence, specifically challenging a condition in a s. 161 prohibition order that prohibited contact with the adult complainant's parents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the parents did not fall within the definition of a victim under s. 161(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code.

The prohibition order was amended to remove the parents, while all other aspects of the sentence remained unchanged.