Bradley W. Miller

The appellant, a judgment creditor, appealed the dismissal of an application seeking a declaration of entitlement to the balance of matrimonial home sale proceeds, which were held in trust as security for the ex-husband's future child and spousal support obligations.

A writ of execution had been registered against the ex-husband's interest prior to the divorce order.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in interpreting the relevant jurisprudence and in failing to address the court's fundamental duty regarding child support.

The discovery of the writ of execution constituted a material change in circumstances.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge to consider whether a variation of the Divorce Judgment was appropriate in light of the material change.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The appellant appealed a trial decision concerning spousal support, equalization payment, imputation of income, and the dismissal of a fresh evidence motion.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding an error in the equalization calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal on all five grounds, affirming the trial judge's decisions on interpreter competency, lump sum child support, income imputation, spousal support, and the refusal to admit fresh evidence.

The court allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not deducting the value of a date of marriage asset from the respondent's net family property in the equalization calculations, leading to an increased equalization payment owed by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning the interpretation of a commitment letter for real estate financing and the calculation of damages.

The lender (MarshallZehr Group Inc.) terminated the commitment letter before any funds were advanced to the borrower (Ideal (BC) Developments Inc. et al.), citing the borrower's failure to satisfy initial funding conditions.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to the lender, upholding the termination and awarding damages including a lender fee.

The appellate court affirmed the motion judge's interpretation that the cancellation provision in the commitment letter allowed for termination in the pre-closing period when no funds had been advanced.

However, the court found that the lender fee was not recoverable as the commitment letter stipulated it would be deducted from the initial advance, which never occurred.

The damages award was reduced accordingly.

The appellants sought a declaration that the respondents' foreclosure on pledged shares was void for non-compliance with the notice requirements of the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) and sought an order for the return of the shares.

The application judge dismissed their application, finding the respondents acted within a contractual right of foreclosure outside the PPSA and denied equitable relief.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while s. 17.1(2) of the PPSA, which allows secured parties with control over investment property to deal with collateral as per the security agreement, does not permit foreclosure without notice, the respondents had, in fact, provided adequate notice under Part V of the PPSA.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of an exculpatory clause (clause 28) in a preconstruction condominium purchase and sale agreement.

The appellants sought to recover more than their deposit plus interest upon termination of the agreement.

The court affirmed the motion judge's finding that clause 28, which limited the respondent's liability to the deposit plus interest, was clear and not altered by the incorporated Tarion provisions, as it represented an agreed allocation of risk consistent with the Tarion framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition requiring his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), seeking an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the ORB's decision as reasonable.

The court found that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to his mental health diagnoses, substance abuse, history of non-compliance with community privileges, and the violent nature of his index offences.

The court also rejected the argument that the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated a conditional discharge, emphasizing that public safety remains the paramount consideration and that a detention order provides essential early intervention capabilities beyond those available under the Mental Health Act.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court order staying charges against three respondents (two brothers and their mother) due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had calculated the delay at 32 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by including the period from the end of evidence and argument until the stay decision in the Jordan ceiling calculation, based on the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.G.K. Correcting this error reduced the net delay to 29.25 months, falling below the ceiling.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's characterization of other delay periods and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable, even if below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge to release the verdict.

Three family members appealed their convictions and sentences arising from a scheme to steal lottery tickets from customers at their family convenience store, one of which won a $12.5 million prize.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding all verdicts were reasonable.

On sentence, the court reduced one appellant's custodial sentence from four to three years and reduced her restitution obligation, but otherwise upheld the sentences.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum imprisonment provisions under s. 462.37(4) of the Criminal Code, distinguishing Boudreault on the basis that the fine in lieu of forfeiture regime targets offenders who possessed proceeds of crime, unlike the indiscriminate victim surcharge.

The s. 11(b) application was dismissed under the transitional exceptional circumstance provision from Jordan.

On the Crown's appeal, the court entered convictions against the acquitted co-accused on theft and possession counts and ordered a new trial on fraud and possession of proceeds counts.

The appellant, Terry LeBlanc, was the high bidder at a Sheriff's auction for a residential property.

His winning bid of $260,000 was less than 60% of the lowest appraised value ($320,000), leading to the sale's cancellation based on an internal Attorney General policy.

LeBlanc sued the Crown for breach of contract.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the contract permitted unilateral cancellation, section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act shielded the respondent, and equitable principles allowed declining enforcement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the auction terms, as announced and posted at the courthouse, allowed for unilateral cancellation up to the time of satisfaction of sale terms, making it unnecessary to address the other grounds.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application under the Condominium Act, alleging the respondent corporation failed to properly maintain common elements and acted oppressively regarding a noise complaint from fans above her unit.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the corporation acted reasonably and complied with its statutory obligations, thus not breaching the appellant's reasonable expectations or acting oppressively.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Freddy Mawick, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5000, arguing that evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The evidence included information from UPS and financial institutions, some obtained via production orders and some without judicial authorization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the UPS information, that the production orders were validly issued based on reasonable grounds, and that any alleged Charter breaches were minor and did not warrant exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court affirmed that the Crown does not need to show that records will afford evidence directly against the accused for a production order to be valid, only that they are relevant to the offence.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

Inzola Group Limited appealed a trial decision dismissing its claims for breach of contract and bias against the City of Brampton regarding a multi-million-dollar construction Request for Proposals (RFP).

Inzola was disqualified for breaching RFP terms, including failing to sign a confidentiality agreement, communicating outside the sole point of contact, and making public disclosures to the media.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that Inzola's breaches were fundamental and threatened the integrity of the RFP process.

The court also rejected Inzola's argument that the City breached a duty of fair and equal treatment by handling a different alleged breach by another bidder (Dominus) differently, finding Dominus's breach inconsequential compared to Inzola's.

The appeal on liability was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was denied.

The applicant, Carmela Maria Capone, moved to quash the appeal of the respondent, Zoran Fotak, from two interlocutory orders made in ongoing family law proceedings.

The motion judge had ordered the respondent to bring a stay motion as a condition for his jurisdictional challenge to be heard, clarifying that no decision on the merits of the jurisdictional challenge had been made.

The Court of Appeal found the orders to be interlocutory and not appealable, as they did not determine any substantive claim or defence.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal brought by the defendants (appellants) challenging a trial judge's decision to grant specific performance of a real estate agreement and award substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in refusing multiple adjournment requests, including those based on medical grounds, and in granting specific performance for a property they claimed was not unique.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding adjournments, citing the appellants' history of non-compliance with court orders and lack of diligence.

It also affirmed that specific performance is not an "extraordinary remedy" and that the trial judge correctly applied the factors for its award, including the property's unique qualities and the inadequacy of damages.

The substantial indemnity costs award was also upheld due to the appellants' litigation misconduct.

The appellant sought to overturn a motion judge's decision to amend prior court orders, arguing that an equalization payment of $280,000 was still owed despite a subsequent settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the final settlement agreement, which divided funds from the matrimonial home sale, was intended to settle "all outstanding issues" including the equalization payment.

The court applied the "officious bystander test" and common sense to conclude that the equalization payment was implicitly offset by other amounts owed, dismissing the appeal.

This appeal concerned the equalization of net family property under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that full equalization would be unconscionable and in awarding only 10% of the full equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the conclusion of unconscionability was reasonable given the short marriage, the extent to which the appellant's net family property derived from gifts from the respondent, and the disproportionate financial contributions.

The court also affirmed the trial judge's discretion in setting the unequal division at 10%, rejecting the appellant's argument for a pro-rated division based on the length of cohabitation.

This is an appeal from a trial decision in a high-conflict matrimonial litigation case where the respondent's pleadings were struck due to willful non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's approach to evidence, refusal to recognize a constructive trust, spousal support determination, denial of a vesting order, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, affirming the trial judge's discretion in probing evidence even in an uncontested trial, applying the net family property scheme, and exercising discretion regarding support, vesting orders, and costs.

The court also reaffirmed the principle that a party in willful default of court orders may be denied audience on appeal.

The appellant, Cary Beazley, appealed the dismissal of his 2018 action against Canada and Ontario.

This 2018 action raised substantially the same issues and pleadings as a previous 2017 action, which had been dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and whose dismissal was upheld on appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the 2018 action on the grounds of *res judicata* and abuse of process, finding the pleadings substantially identical and that the claim could not possibly succeed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, agreeing that the claim was abusive and that the motion judge properly exercised discretion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the claim without requesting submissions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.