Bradley W. Miller

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for weapon and drug trafficking offences, arguing that the conditional sentence for possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking was illegal, the overall sentence was demonstrably unfit, and the sentencing judge overemphasized the respondent's rehabilitative prospects.

The Court of Appeal found that the conditional sentence for cocaine trafficking was an error of law but determined it did not impact the overall sentence.

The court upheld the original sentence length, deferring to the sentencing judge's discretion and her findings regarding the respondent's significant rehabilitative efforts.

The appeal was granted only to correct the illegality by reallocating presentence custody to specific counts, without altering the global sentence length.

The accused's convictions for attempted murder were quashed on appeal, leading to a reassessment of his sentence for aggravated sexual assault and administering a noxious substance.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reduced the total sentence from 111 months to 81 months.

The court affirmed that while the mens rea for attempted murder is higher, the accused's conduct, involving deliberate infection of young men with HIV, demonstrated a high level of moral blameworthiness, justifying a substantial sentence despite the quashed convictions.

The court also addressed the application of the Kienapple principle to enter convictions on previously stayed charges.

Sharon Atkinson, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for arson, appealed the Ontario Review Board's conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge or a new hearing.

The appellant, diagnosed with Prader-Willi syndrome, intellectual disability, and personality disorder, argued the Board erred in finding her a significant threat to public safety and in assessing the sufficiency of civil mechanisms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's finding that the appellant remained a significant threat due to her persistent behavioural issues, high risk of recidivism, and lack of a viable plan for an absolute discharge, concluding that civil mechanisms would be inadequate to manage the risk.

Benham Yaali sought leave to appeal a 13-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing the sentencing judge erred by considering handgun possession as an aggravating factor and by failing to properly account for provocation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, upholding the sentencing judge's discretion in weighing factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, except for setting aside the victim impact surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of possession of a restricted firearm, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence, inconsistencies, and hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge extensively considered the inconsistencies in the evidence and reasonably accepted the testimony of the witnesses who saw the appellant with the backpack containing the firearm.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address the jury's questions regarding the absence of forensic evidence linking him to the fire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's answer was complete, legally accurate, and properly reminded the jury that a reasonable doubt can arise from an absence of evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition to the United States on the offence of fraud.

He argued the hearing judge erred in finding evidence linking him to the alias 'Marc Richards' and linking that alias to the fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence in the record, including emails and a passport photo, linking the appellant to the alias and the fraudulent scheme.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing and challenged the admission of his police statement, the exclusion of images from the deceased’s phone, and the jury charge on bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act was not triggered because the appellant was neither detained nor subject to reasonable grounds for belief that he committed the offence when interviewed, and the statement was voluntary under the confessions rule.

The court also upheld the exclusion of phone images as minimally probative and unduly prejudicial, and found no error in the limiting instruction on bad character evidence.

On sentence, the court upheld the adult life sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s factual findings, YCJA analysis, or treatment of IRCS, and rejected the proposed fresh evidence as lacking cogency.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a former student.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and erred in assessing credibility.

He also appealed his one-year sentence as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the sentence was fit given the extent of the manipulation and grooming.

The appellant entered into a building contract for a new home and paid a 25% deposit.

She later repudiated the contract after failing to agree on modifications to reduce costs.

The trial judge dismissed her claim for the return of the deposit, finding it was a true deposit subject to forfeiture upon repudiation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the deposit provision and in denying relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the deposit retained its character and that forfeiture was not unconscionable or disproportionate to the damages suffered by the respondents.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms and narcotics offences, arguing that police surveillance violated his s. 8 Charter rights, the initial search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations, and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, or that the police conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police surveillance from a distance on neighbouring property did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

While acknowledging minor s. 8 breaches related to delayed reporting and a defective warrant, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found no abuse of process, noting the police trespass was not serious and based on erroneous legal advice.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving over 80mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter and in concluding that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge made no error in concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and reasonable grounds for the breath demand.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, despite a delay caused by the police facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a corporation operating a Canadian Tire store, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge found that a Facebook post and media article by the respondents describing poor customer service at the store related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding factual error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants, a geneticist and his corporation, appealed a trial judgment dismissing their defamation action against the respondents for publishing an article in New Scientist magazine criticizing their prenatal paternity test as unreliable.

The trial judge found the respondents established the defences of justification, fair comment, responsible communication, and qualified privilege.

On appeal, the appellants abandoned their substantive grounds and raised a new allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's conduct and reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bias allegation was raised tactically and lacked merit.

The appellant was convicted of child luring contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and communicating with a person believed to be under 18 for sexual services contrary to s. 212(4).

He was one of 104 people caught in a police sting operation on Backpage.com.

The appellant claimed he believed he was engaged in role-play with an adult, not a 16-year-old.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and found the appellant actually believed the person was 16.

The appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 12 months' imprisonment under s. 172.1(2)(a) and 6 months under s. 212(4), to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the mandatory minimum under s. 172.1(2)(a) was declared unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable circumstances, though the 12-month sentence imposed was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of threatening death, intimidation by threats of violence, obstruction of justice, and criminal harassment arising from two separate incidents: a 2013 Family Court proceeding and a 2015 incident involving the distribution of nude photographs.

The trial judge admitted evidence of prior discreditable conduct (a 2012 similar nude photo incident) and used cross-count evidence from the Family Court incident when convicting on the criminal harassment charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions; the Crown appealed the sentence as illegal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of evidence.

The Crown's sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was modified from a blended custodial and conditional sentence exceeding two years to a global custodial sentence of two years less a day.

A dual status offender appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board refusing to schedule a placement hearing to determine whether his current place of custody (a penitentiary) was inappropriate to meet his mental health needs.

The appellant argued that the Review Board was obligated to review placement as part of every disposition review, or alternatively, that the Review Board should have exercised its discretion to order a placement hearing on its own motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Review Board's interpretation that a significant change in circumstances is a prerequisite to scheduling a placement hearing on an offender's application, and found no error in the Review Board's refusal to schedule a hearing on its own motion.

The appellants, as estate trustees of the Estate of James Kay, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Hull Defendants (Hull & Hull LLP, Ian M. Hull, and Doreen Lok Yin So).

The appellants had previously agreed to a Minutes of Settlement whereby the Estate would pay the Hull Defendants a specific sum for legal fees, and had obtained court approval of this settlement.

The appellants did not seek to set aside the consent settlement approval order, acknowledging it was favorable to them with no apparent basis for setting aside on grounds of fraud or new evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's decision or reasoning.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed his conviction on the basis that his guilty pleas were uninformed.

He was unaware of the serious immigration consequences of his pleas, specifically that he would be deported without a right of appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearm-related offences and possession of cocaine.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that trial counsel did not adequately inform the appellant of the specific immigration consequences, and that the appellant would have proceeded to trial had he been aware of the deportation consequences.

The court found the appellant satisfied both prongs of the test for setting aside a guilty plea: lack of awareness of a legally relevant consequence and prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.