6 total
Costs awarded on a substantial indemnity basis following plaintiff's successful trial judgment and offer to settle.
Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages for negligent construction in a real estate transaction, the court determined the costs and prejudgment interest.
The plaintiff had made an offer to settle that was lower than the trial judgment.
Applying Rule 49.10, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, rejecting the self-represented defendants' argument that their impecuniosity should preclude a costs award.
Application for vacant possession converted to an action due to material factual and credibility disputes.
The applicant, 2248169 Ontario Inc., sought orders for vacant possession and related relief regarding two properties occupied by the respondents.
The respondents claimed rights of occupancy under long-standing leases or assignments.
The court found that there were material factual disputes, including the existence and enforceability of the leases and whether the applicant had notice or was willfully blind to their existence.
The court held that these issues required viva voce evidence and could not be determined on the application record, and therefore ordered that the application be converted to an action.
The appeal was dismissed as the trial judge made no palpable errors assessing credibility.
The appellant, Orville Kebokee, appealed his conviction for sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code.
He argued that the trial judge erred in credibility assessment by accepting the complainant's evidence and rejecting his, and by impermissibly discounting issues based on the complainant's age.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis and affirming the deference owed to such findings.
The court rejected the argument that the trial judge's consideration of the complainant's age diluted the standard of proof.
Customer service complaints on social media can constitute matters of public interest under anti-SLAPP legislation.
The appellant, a corporation operating a Canadian Tire store, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.
The motion judge found that a Facebook post and media article by the respondents describing poor customer service at the store related to a matter of public interest.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding factual error.
The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.
Plaintiff awarded $16,000 in damages for defamatory Facebook posts and statements made by ex-wife and others.
The plaintiff brought an action for defamation against his ex-wife and two others regarding Facebook posts and oral statements made following their marital separation.
The statements included false allegations of incest, theft, and breach of court orders.
The court found the statements were defamatory, referred to the plaintiff, and were published to third parties.
The plaintiff was awarded $15,000 in general damages against his ex-wife for libel, and $500 each against the other two defendants for slander.
Consent order requiring attorney to pass accounts cannot be varied without recognized Rule 59.06 grounds.
The moving party sought an order vacating or varying a prior consent order requiring her to pass her accounts as attorney under a continuing power of attorney for an incapable person.
She argued the order was unnecessary because expenses for the incapable person were paid from a joint bank account.
The court held that the circumstances did not fall within Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and that consent orders may only be varied under Rule 59.06 in limited situations such as fraud or where the order fails to reflect the parties’ intentions.
The evidence did not establish any such basis, and the existence of a joint account predated the consent order.
The court concluded that the moving party remained obligated to pass her accounts and dismissed the motion.